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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the determinants of labor market outcomes, with a focus on the
labor market return to post-secondary education. The first chapter analyzes the matching
of firms and recent college graduates through on-campus recruiting. Based on in-depth
interviews with employers and career services personnel, I develop a theoretical model de-
scribing how firms choose target campuses given relevant search frictions. The model’s
central insight is that the decision to recruit at a university and the wage offer are driven
not just by the university’s quality, but also by the quality of the surrounding universities.
There is strong empirical support for this prediction using the Baccalaureate and Beyond
survey and newly collected data from 39 finance and consulting firms. Holding university
quality constant, a university with a better regional rank is more likely to attract firms,
and its graduates have higher earnings (controlling for the individual’s test score). Struc-
tural estimation suggests that search frictions have important consequences for firm hiring
strategies, student outcomes, and profits in this market.
The second chapter analyzes whether there is a differential labor market return to cer-
tificates and Associate’s degrees from for-profit relative to not-for-profit universities. Using
the Beginning Postsecondary Student Survey and Transcript Data, we find no statistically
significant differential return. Point estimates suggest a slightly lower return to a for-profit
certificate and a slightly higher return to a for-profit Associate’s degree. There is consider-
v
able variation in the return to certification across majors, including many with negligible
or negative returns.
The third chapter analyzes the impact of teen motherhood on labor market investments
and outcomes, using five cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Teen mothers who
conceived pre-maritally obtained less education (especially socioeconomically advantaged
teens), married earlier and faced a higher risk of never marrying (especially after 1960).
Socioeconomically advantaged teens avoided this negative outcome. Women who had been
teen mothers in the 1940s and 1950s appear to have been at a disadvantage in the labor
market of the 1970s, and faced higher costs of divorce. Motherhood positively affected
labor force outcomes for teens married before conception, perhaps driven by earlier-timed
births.
vi
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Chapter 1
The Campus in the Frog Pond: The Effect of
Neighboring University Quality on Firm
Recruiting Decisions
1.1 Introduction
Firm hiring is critical for the functioning of the economy, affecting both employer pro-
ductivity and worker investments. The matching of workers to firms has been a central
topic in both labor and macroeconomics. It is well-acknowledged that there are frictions
in this matching process, and these frictions have, in general ways, been incorporated into
well-known theoretical models of the labor market (Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982a,b,
Pissarides 1984a,b). However, there has been little work describing actual firm hiring
practices, and the specific frictions associated with them. This paper provides microfoun-
dations for the matching process between firms and workers in a specific market. I analyze
the search frictions that are institutionally relevant for this particular market, and their
consequences for firm hiring strategies, worker outcomes, and firm profits. I focus on the
market for recent college graduates accessed through on-campus recruiting.
Firms have been recruiting on college campuses since the Westinghouse Electric Com-
pany in the late 1800’s.1 The size and formality of these programs have increased over
1Many of these historical on-campus recruiting programs were quite large and extensive. In 1955, of a
highly selected sample of 240 firms, approximately 60% visited more than 20 universities to recruit college
seniors. The companies sampled by the Conference Board were not highly representative of American
businesses. In 1944, there were 412,471 incorporated businesses, and it was estimated that 1000 of them
sent representatives to recruit on college campuses (Habbe 1948, 1956).
2the past century. Today virtually every industry fulfills a portion of its hiring needs by
recruiting on college campuses across a wide range of selectivity, for jobs ranging from
retail to finance.2 In 2011-2012, 19% of the Harvard senior class accepted a job through
the on-campus recruiting program (Harvard University Office of Career Services 2012). In
the 2010-2011 year, 20% of employed undergraduate business school graduates at Virginia
Tech found their jobs through the on-campus recruiting program, and 14% through the
Career Fair (Career Services at Virginia Tech 2012).
On-campus recruiting represents an interesting and important area of study because of
its prevalence and underlying frictions. Given that many firms hire in this way, student
job prospects are arguably linked to the firms recruiting on their campus. This sharply
contrasts with a perfect labor market in which two applicants of equal ability are equally
likely to be hired, regardless of the university they attended. Additionally, in-depth conver-
sations with employers and university career services personnel conveyed that identifying
qualified applicants is costly for firms, representing an important search friction. Ana-
lyzing the campus recruiting market is of further interest due to the availability of rich
data. Many firms publicize their target campuses, offering a unique opportunity to observe
recruiting strategies in an important segment of the labor market. This paper develops a
directed search model of the on-campus recruiting market, along with a new dataset, to
describe the market and explore the consequences of its underlying search frictions for firm
strategies and student outcomes.
Based on conversations with employers and university career services personnel, I de-
velop a directed search model of how firms choose target campuses. Given that review-
ing applicants is costly, and these costs are decreasing in the proportion of high-quality
students, the labor market’s most selective universities attract the most firms.3 Firms
recruiting at less selective universities are compensated by attracting more applicants and
2At the 2011 Brookyln College Career Fair, employers ranged from department store Century 21 hiring
cashiers to Prudential hiring financial services associates (Brooklyn College 2013).
3The terms college and university in this paper are used interchangeably; the term university includes
liberal arts colleges except where otherwise noted.
3offering lower wages. With regional labor markets, the central reduced-form prediction
is that firms are less likely to recruit at a university with a lower regional rank, holding
university quality constant.4 As a result of less competition among firms, wages are also
lower at these universities.
Undergraduate recruiting in the finance and consulting industries is an ideal setting for
testing this prediction. Labor markets in this setting are regional, and there is dramatic
variation in the distribution of university quality across region. The model predicts that
a Texas firm looking to hire high-quality recent college graduates from nearby universities
will have Texas A&M near the top of its list, since it is one of the most selective universities
in the region. However, a Philadelphia firm looking to hire high-quality recent graduates
from nearby universities will not have Pennsylvania State University near the top of its
list, even though its SAT scores and US News and World Report rank are similar to those
of Texas A&M. There are many universities more selective than Pennsylvania State in the
Philadelphia region.5 The model predicts that the university’s quality relative to others in
the region, not its absolute quality, drives firm recruiting decisions.
I test the model’s predictions using a rich dataset compiled from multiple sources.
Target campuses for undergraduate recruiting were identified from firm websites, for 17
finance firms and 22 consulting firms. Location of each of these firm’s offices was also
obtained from their website. Figure 1.1 shows the target campuses for the management
consulting firm Bain. By simple observation, these campuses are less selective outside of
the Northeast, as the model predicts.
Data on university selectivity were collected from the Integrated Post-Secondary Ed-
ucation Data System (IPEDS), from each individual university’s Common Data Set, and
from each university’s website. These data were collected for 342 universities.6 To account
for regional differences in labor demand, the analyses control for the number of finance and
4Throughout the paper a lower rank will refer to a worse rank.
5For the finance and consulting industries, the proportion of high-quality matches is described well by
the general selectivity of the university. However, in other industries another measure may better capture
the proportion of high-quality matches.
6The selection of the sample is discussed in detail later in the paper.
4consulting firm offices in each region.
There is strong support for the reduced form predictions in the data. Firms are nearly
three percentage points less likely to recruit at a university if its regional rank is lower by
50 positions (a relevant magnitude for universities of similar absolute quality), even after
controlling for numerous measures of absolute university quality. This effect is statistically
significant at the .01 level, and is economically important as there is an active recruiting
relationship for 7.4% of (university, firm) pairs. The effects are stronger for consulting firms
than for financial firms. Financial firms in the data recruit for a wide range of positions,
from finance to IT. Given that hiring for some of these positions is likely to be less sensitive
to the number of better-ranked universities, this result confirms intuition.
As predicted by the model, search frictions affect where firms recruit and also the
earnings of recent graduates. Using the Baccalaureate and Beyond 2009 survey, I find that
earnings of recent graduates are 4.25% lower if the regional rank of their alma mater was
worse by 50 places, conditional on the university’s absolute quality and the individual’s
SAT score. As predicted, this effect is much stronger for those with the highest SAT
scores, as these are the students targeted by prestigious firms. For these students, lowering
the regional rank by 50 places decreases earnings by 21%. These effects are statistically
significant at the .1 and .05 levels respectively.
One of the central motivations of the paper is to understand the importance of search
frictions for firm and student outcomes. The particular friction addressed in this paper is
the cost of reviewing each applicant to determine the applicant’s quality. While the reduced
form results present general evidence that this search friction exists and is important, they
do not present direct evidence on the size of the friction or how the size of the friction
affects wages at each university. In order to more directly quantify the impact of the
search friction, I structurally estimate the model including the screening cost parameter
(cost per applicant reviewed). I then counterfactually set the screening cost parameter to
zero, and evaluate the impact on firm allocation across universities, wages, and profits.
I find that the screening cost is large, costing firms up to $12,000 to review an applicant.
5The applicant review process, which includes very lengthy discussions weighting various
candidate attributes both before and after interviews, will be described in detail in the
next section. The screening costs per hire range from $6900 at a selective university where
over 85% of the students score above a 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT,
to nearly $29,000 at a much less selective university where the fraction of high-scoring
students is 14%. Conversations with people who have experience recruiting for consulting
firms suggested that the cost per MBA student hire is approximately $100,000, and for
undergraduates the number is only slightly lower.
Removing this friction has a positive effect on the number of firms recruiting, and the
wage offers, at less selective universities. In the absence of screening costs, firms are less
likely to recruit at highly selective universities and the wage offers at those universities fall.
This is driven by an expanded set of universities at which firms can profitably recruit. In
the East, a university with a proportion of high-type students at the cut-off below which
firms cannot profitably recruit, attracts a few firms who offer slightly above the reservation
wage. In the absence of screening costs, the number of firms at this university more than
doubles, and the wage offer is $37,000 above the reservation wage.
Despite the historical and current importance of on-campus recruiting for firm and
student outcomes, this is among the first papers to study this particular market. A related
paper by Oyer and Schaefer (2012) also studies firm employee matches and the relation
to university location, though with a different focus. Their paper analyzes the within-firm
concentration of lawyers graduating from the same law school.7
The paper has a number of important policy implications. Firstly, it contributes to the
large policy (and academic) debate about whether high tuition is justified by better labor
market outcomes. This debate has intensified due to the rising cost of college attendance,
and the significant variation of this cost across universities. In 2011-2012, the average
total price of attending a public, 4 year institution full-time for in-state residents living
7Previous studies have looked at determinants and outcomes of various other recruiting methods, in-
cluding newspaper ads, employment agencies, and referrals from employees (DeVaro 2003, DeVaro 2005,
Holzer 1987).
6on-campus was $20,355.8 The 2011-2012 average at the top 20 institutions as ranked by the
US News and World Report in 2013 is $56,810. Previous literature has analyzed the effect
of university characteristics on future outcomes. This paper suggests that the labor market
return to a BA is additionally affected by the quality of the surrounding universities. This
has obvious implications for students applying to college and for policymakers considering
student debt, financial aid, and education funding.
Secondly, this paper has important implications for the composition of society’s elite
leadership class. Finance and consulting firms have become pathways to prestigious posi-
tions across many sectors of society. Alumni of these firms have become CEOs of Fortune
100 companies, Secretaries of the Treasury, presidents of universities, and leaders of major
non-profit organizations. McKinsey states on their website that they have nearly 27,000
alumni in many industries, and more than 300 of them are CEOs of companies with more
than 1 billion dollars in annual revenue (McKinsey 2013). The prominent positions of fi-
nance and consulting alumni may certainly be the result of selection. However, it is at least
plausible that the powerful networks they develop at these firms play some role in shaping
their future career paths. Reduced access to these firms may represent not just difficulty in
entering these two fields, but more importantly diminished access to leadership positions in
many sectors of society. This paper finds that those graduating from the best universities
in each region have greatest access to these careers; in the East access is limited largely to
graduates of the most elite universities in the country.
Most generally, this paper suggests the importance of one’s pool for labor market out-
comes. One of the first papers on this topic, “The Campus as a Frog Pond” (Davis 1966),
argued that students sort themselves into careers based on the value of their GPA relative
to others in their university. Holding scholastic aptitude constant, it is better to be a big
fish in a small pond.9 I address the place of the university, rather than the student, in
8Total price includes tuition, fees, books, supplies, on-campus room and board, and other campus
expenses. This price is for first-time students. These data come from IPEDS.
9Previous literature has also analyzed discrimination in the labor market when workers are divided into
pools (Lang, Manove, and Dickens 2005).
7the pool, finding that there are benefits to attending the best university in a small pond.
If labor market outcomes are determined not solely by an individual’s characteristics, but
also by the individual’s relative rank in the pool, this has many important implications for
workers’ choices and for policy.
Section 1.2 describes the campus recruiting market. Section 1.3 presents a model an-
alyzing the firm decision regarding which universities to target for on-campus recruiting.
Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 presents the empirical strategy for testing the
model’s predictions. Section 1.6 discusses the results. Section 1.7 analyzes the relation
between earnings of recent graduates and regional rank of the alma mater. Section 1.8
provides robustness checks and discusses alternative explanations. Section 1.9 presents the
structural estimation and the counterfactual exercises, and Section 1.10 concludes.
1.2 The Campus Recruiting Labor Market
To understand the institutional details of the undergraduate campus recruiting market,
I conducted numerous interviews with career services personnel and consulting firm em-
ployees (both former and current). These conversations elucidated several important com-
ponents of firm hiring procedures, and of the labor market more generally: firms choose
target campuses, reviewing applicants is costly, and labor markets are regional. These
components are specific to undergraduate recruiting. Recruiting of MBA students is in
general a completely separate process, managed by different staff members.
Target Campuses Firms choose a core set of universities at which to target their re-
cruiting efforts. Each target campus has a team of employees responsible for managing
the recruiting process. The team consists of human resources personnel and consultants
who have recently graduated from that university. These employees work with the career
services office to develop a presence on campus and attract applicants. The team visits
the campus several times during the semester, for career fairs, information sessions, prac-
tice interviews, and ultimately for first-round interviews. For students at target campuses,
8their applications are submitted to the university-specific team. Students at non-target
campuses may still apply through a general online procedure. While some students obtain
entry-level jobs in this way, it is the exception and not the rule.
Costly Recruiting Firms invest heavily in identifying the best applicants, through a
lengthy and careful interview process. The details of this process are outlined below for
one firm at one university. The important components of this procedure are generalizable.
First, the firm decides how many team members will conduct interviews at the university.
This determines a fixed number of interview slots on that campus. To fill those slots, each
team member separately rates each application. Ratings are based on SAT scores, GPA,
courses, and extra-curricular involvement. Employees use university-specific knowledge
to better evaluate applicants, for example re-weighting GPA by course difficulty. Team
members then average their ratings for each applicant. After this process, there is a clear
consensus to interview certain applicants and to reject others.
Many of the applicants have ratings between these extremes. For these applicants, the
team members spend more time reviewing the application and discussing whether to offer
an interview. Once all of the slots are filled, the team members conduct the first round
interviews. After these interviews, the applicants are evaluated again, and some are asked
for second round interviews (not necessarily by the team members, as discussed below).
Finally, the firm decides which applicants to hire.
Firms invest significantly in the applicant review process, and thus search frictions (in
the form of screening costs) appear to be important in this market.
Separate Labor Markets Many of the firms I spoke with have offices located through-
out the United States. At the beginning of the application process, firms ask applicants to
rank the office locations at which they would like to work. Following the initial on campus
interview, the student’s application is sent to her first-ranked office. This office can call
the student for a second interview, or may pass the student to the second-ranked office.
9An important point for this paper is that firms rarely send a student’s application
to an unranked office. Those involved in on-campus recruiting explain that once firms
identify qualified candidates, they do not want offers rejected due to geographic location.
This implies that a firm looking to hire someone for a Texas office cannot simply hire a
student from any university. The firm needs to hire someone who is interested in working
in the Texas office. Each office location has a relevant labor market, from which it is able
to attract applicants. The absence of a national labor market suggests that firms must
choose target universities in the relevant labor market of each office. Construction of these
separate labor markets will be discussed in detail in the empirical analysis section.
1.3 A Theoretical Model of Firm Recruiting on College Campuses
Incorporating the search frictions and institutional details described above, I develop a
directed search model of the labor market for campus recruiting. The model, in which
firms post wages, closely follows Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005).
1.3.1 Set-up
I assume a finite mass of identical firms that hire new workers through recruiting on college
campuses and posting a wage. They each have one unfilled position, and choose one
university at which to recruit and fill the vacancy.10 Firms can only hire students from the
university at which they recruit. Firms must hire high ability students (H), as low ability
students (L) have negative productivity. There are many universities in the market, each
with an unobserved random number of students, e, who are interested in applying for jobs
with these firms. e is distributed Poisson with known mean  This is the distribution
that would arise if students at large universities made independent and equally probable
decisions to apply for jobs with these firms. Universities have different proportions of H-
10The model can trivially be extended to allow firms to hire for multiple positions, and to recruit for
each at different universities. However, this requires the assumption that a given firm recruits for different
positions within the firm independently.
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and L-type students. The proportion of H students at university  is denoted .11 All
H-type workers have the same productivity,  at each of the recruiting firms.
As will be discussed in detail below and in the Appendix, firms post a wage to attract
applicants. I assume that students do not know their type. Thus, both H-type and L-type
students apply even though the firm can only hire H-type students. While students do
not observe their own type, firms can observe student type after reviewing the applicant,
including reading the applicant’s resume and conducting an interview. Thus, firms must in-
cur reviewing costs to identify the H-type students within the applicant pool. The intuition
for assuming that students do not know their type is that recent college graduates arguably
have uncertainty about the match between their skills and the tasks in an unknown work
environment. On the contrary, firms have observed many college graduates transition to
their company, and have accumulated knowledge about predictors of success.12
Consider a two-stage game in which the first-stage consists of firms simultaneously
making wage offers, which they must pay to the worker they eventually hire. In the second
stage, students observe the wage offers and simultaneously apply to firms. Each student
may only apply to one firm. Once the students apply to firms, the firms begin to read
applications and conduct interviews. Firms proceed with this process until they identify
the first H-type student. At that point they will hire the H-type student and stop reviewing
other applicants. Intuitively, if the proportion of H-type students is lower, then firms will
have to review more applicants before reaching an H-type student. Thus, the costs of
recruiting will be decreasing in .13
11Firms decide how to allocate across universities once they observe the size and quality of the universities
in their market. In this sense, size and quality of the university are treated as exogenous and no general
equilibrium effects are considered.
12The assumption that students do not observe their type is important for the model only in that it ensures
that the expected cost of finding an H-type applicant is lower at universities with higher . Assuming that
students do not know their type is one simple way to achieve this result, since it ensures that L-type
applicants apply to firms. There are other assumptions that would yield the same result.
13The previous section suggested that the firm first reviews each applicant. As a result of this first review,
there may be certain applicants who they will definitely interview and others they will definitely reject. The
firm then engages in costlier review for the remaining applicants. If there are few individuals who the firm
definitely interviews after the first review process, then this set-up is nearly identical to the one described
in the model. In the model, firms review applicants until finding the first H-type student. In actuality,
firms review the applicants remaining after the first review until they fill all of the interview slots.
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The cost function is given by the expected number of applicants reviewed multiplied by
the cost per application reviewed,  The expected number of applicants reviewed is given
by the following expression:
∞X
=1
⎛
⎝−!
X
=1
(1− )−1
⎞
⎠ = (1− 
−)
 (1.1)
Given that the firm chooses a wage to target  applicants, the Poisson probability of every
possible number of applicants arriving is multiplied by the expected number of applicants
reviewed for that number of arrivals. With probability one the firm has to review the first
applicant, with probability 1−  it has to review two (because with probability p the first
applicant is an H-type), with probability (1− )2 he has to review three, and so on. Thus
the cost function is given by(1−−)(  ). These costs are increasing in  for the reasons
explained above, and they are also increasing in  because with more applicants, firms can
go through more applications. For example, if there is just one applicant, the maximum
cost is  but if there are 4 applicants it is possible that the firm could review 4 applicants,
and so pay 4.
1.3.2 Strategies
The strategy for firm  at university  consists of its choice of wage offer  The vector
Wt ≡ hi denotes the profile of wage offers at university . Students will generally
adopt a mixed strategy, the outcome of which will be application to just one firm. A
student’s mixed strategy is a vector-valued function of the form q(Wt)≡ hqi(Wt)i, where
each (Wt) is the probability that the student will choose to apply to firm i. Student
strategy choices are restricted to those consistent with the anonymity of firms: if  =
 then (Wt) = (Wt). I consider symmetric equilibria, in which all students at a
university adopt the same mixed strategy.14 The number of students at university  who
14As discussed in both Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009), this is a
reasonable assumption in large labor markets. Asymmetric mixed strategies in these settings require an
implausible amount of coordination, as each student would have to know her exact strategy and that of the
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apply to a firm will have a Poisson distribution with mean , where
 = (Wt) (1.2)
1.3.3 Payoffs
Given that the number of students applying to a given firm has a Poisson distribution,
the probability that the firm’s vacancy is filled is given by 1− − . While the expected
number of applicants is equal to  there is only a  probability that each applicant is an
H-type. A student’s payoff, if he is hired by firm , is given by the firm’s wage offer ; if
the worker is not hired his payoff is zero. Firm i’s payoff from recruiting at university  is
given by expected operating profits
 = (1− −)( −  −  ) (1.3)
1.3.4 Equilibrium
I search for an equilibrium {W∗t  q∗t(·)} for each  of the wage-posting game that is symmet-
ric among students. Following LMD, to solve for the equilibria of the entire wage-posting
game, subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium is used as the solution concept. This is the
same as subgame-perfection, the only difference being a competitive equilibrium is substi-
tuted for a Nash equilibrium in the first-stage of the game. That is, in equilibrium firms
are required to be price-takers in that the expected income they must offer applicants is
taken as given and dictated by the market. In Nash equilibrium agents must take into
account the effect their behavior may have on market prices, however small.15
The game is solved backwards. While the details of the solution are in the Appendix,
other students.
15Peters (2000) studies finite versions of matching models of this type (sellers announce prices and buyers
understand that a higher price will affect the queue and the probability of trade). He shows that as the
number of buyers and sellers becomes large, the payoff functions faced by the firms converge to payoffs
satisfying the market expected income property (a deviation by one firm does not affect the overall market
expected income). This result is conditional on the assumption that student application strategies are
symmetric, and an exponential matching process.
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the following paragraphs highlight important intuition. As described above, in the final
stage, given the wage that was posted and the applicants the firm received, each firm will
review applicants until identifying the first H-type student. The firm will then hire that
student.
In the penultimate stage, students observe the posted wages and decide where to apply.
Students pursue application strategies such that their expected income (the wage multiplied
by the probability of getting the job) is equalized across firms. If one firm were to offer a
higher wage, it would attract more applicants such that the expected income from applying
to that firm would be equivalent to the expected income from applying to a firm offering
a lower wage.
In the first stage, firms choose the expected number of applicants () to maximize
profits. The number of applications each firm receives is a random variable, and there is
a positive probability that a firm will receive no applications. If a firm does not receive
any applicants, it cannot hire or produce. The central trade-off for firms considering a
higher wage is the cost of the higher wage versus the benefit of attracting more applicants
and decreasing the probability that the vacancy goes unfilled. Assuming that the expected
income at a university (∗ ) is fixed,
 = 
∗
( ) (1.4)
The first-order condition of profit maximization yields a solution for  and  as a function
of the number of firms recruiting at a university.
Following LMD, I arrive at the following proposition (details are provided in the Ap-
pendix):
Let  ≡  denote the ratio of the expected number of applicants at university  to
the number of firms recruiting students at .  denotes the number of firms recruiting at
university , and  ≡P=1.
Proposition 1: The game between firms and workers at university t has a subgame-
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perfect competitive equilibrium {W∗t q∗t(·)} that is unique among those in which all students
at university t adopt the same mixed strategy. In this equilibrium, all students adopt the
strategy q∗t(·), as defined above, and all firms adopt the strategy ∗ as given by
∗ = ( − ) − 1 (1.5)
The expected income of each worker is
∗ (W∗ ) = ( − )− (1.6)
and the operating profit of each firm is
∗ = [1− (1 + )− ]( −  ) (1.7)
As  goes from 0 to ∞, ∗ goes from 0 to  −  , ∗ goes from  −  to 0 and ∗ (W∗t)
goes from  −  to 0.
The replacement of  by  implies that at a given university each firm is target-
ing the same number of applicants. This follows from the first-order condition for profit
maximization, which does not depend at all on the firm,  :
∗(Wt) = 1 
 − 
∗ (W∗t) (1.8)
The equilibrium in Proposition 1 is unique among those in which all students at university
 have the same expected income.
If there are  universities, and firms recruit at  ≤  of those universities, then
the equilibrium profit from recruiting at each of the  universities must be the same.
This implies that there are 3 conditions that govern the equilibrium: the first-order
conditions determining the number of applicants targeted by each firm, at each university
( ); the equality of profit equations for firms recruiting at the  universities
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(−1 ); the number of applicants to each firm multiplied by the number of firms
must equal the number of students at each university ( ); and the number of
firms recruiting at each university must equal the total number of firms (1 ).
I am able to reduce the 3 conditions governing the equilibrium to  − 1 equations
and − 1 endogenous variables (1 −1). The equation below shows the equality of
profit condition for firms at university 1 and university 2; there will be analogous equations
for firms at university 1 and all of the remaining universities at which firms recruit. Note
that the number of firms recruiting at university  is defined as the total number of firms,
assumed to be a known parameter, minus the total number of firms recruiting at universities
1 through − 1.
(1− −1( 11 ))( − (1(1 − )
1(1(
11 ) − 1)
− 1 )
− (1− −2( 22 ))( − (2(2 − )
(2)(2(
22 ) − 1)
− 2 ) = 0 (1.9)
For the  − universities that do not attract any recruiting firms, a profit inequality
condition must hold in equilibrium. This condition specifies that when an infinitesimally
small number of firms recruits at the university, the profit is less than the profit at all of
the universities attracting firms. When an infinitesimally small number of firms recruits
at the university, each is guaranteed to have an H-type in the applicant pool, and will
pay a wage of zero since there is no competition. The profit inequality condition between
university  + 1 which does not attract a recruiting firm, and university 1 which does
attract a recruiting firm is shown below:
 − +1  (1− 
−1( 11 ))( − (1(1 − )
1(1(
11 ) − 1)
− 1 ) (1.10)
In equilibrium, some firms recruit H-type applicants at universities with high , while
others recruit H-type applicants at universities with lower . However, by definition, firms
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must make the same profit, regardless of where they recruit. The university with the
highest value of  will be very attractive to firms since the expected reviewing cost will be
lowest. Many firms will recruit at this university. However, at some point it will no longer
be profitable to recruit there because as the number of recruiting firms increases, the size of
each firm’s applicant pool decreases. With a smaller applicant pool, the Poisson probability
that an H-type applicant arrives in the pool decreases. At this point, it will be profitable
for firms to recruit at the university with the second highest value of , where the expected
reviewing costs will be higher, but so will the probability that an H-type applicant arrives
in the pool. This illustrates the central tradeoff in the model: recruiting at a university
with higher  yields lower expected reviewing costs, but also a greater probability of an
unfilled vacancy because of greater competition from other firms.
By definition, applicants at the same university must receive the same expected income
(probability of getting a job multiplied by the wage) from applying to any recruiting firms.
In equilibrium, all firms at a university attract the same number of expected applicants,
the probability of getting a job is the same when applying to any firm, and so is the wage.
I now further characterize this equilibrium in terms of expected number of applicants
per firm and wages at each university, and derive six additional propositions. These propo-
sitions are all testable predictions:
• Proposition 2: The expected number of applicants per firm is decreasing in .
• Proposition 3: The expected number of high-type applicants per firm is decreasing
in .
• Proposition 4: The wage is increasing in .
• Proposition 5: The equilibrium implies a cut-off value of  such that for universities
with  below the cut-off, it is not profitable for any firm to recruit.
• Proposition 6: This cut-off value of  is increasing in the equilibrium level of profit,
∗(   )
17
• Proposition 7: The number of firms recruiting at a university, and the wage offer,
depends on the distribution of (p,S) at the other universities in the market.
While the formal proofs of the propositions are found in the Appendix, the intuition is
provided here. Holding wage and expected high-type applicants per firm constant, recruit-
ing at universities with higher  is more profitable because expected reviewing costs are
lower. Thus, firms must be compensated for recruiting at universities with lower values of
, either through offering a lower wage or receiving more applicants. In this model, and in
other models of this type, firms are compensated through both mechanisms. If each firm
is receiving fewer applicants, then there is more competition among firms, and the wage is
higher.
When the equilibrium level of profit is higher, the profit at the cut-off university must
clearly be higher as well. The number of firms recruiting at the cut-off university is assumed
to be infinitesimally small, and so profit at this university is driven only by , and not by
competition from other firms. Thus, a higher equilibrium profit must be associated with a
higher cut-off value of .
To illustrate the intuition behind prediction (7), consider the following example, in
which each cell represents the number of H and L type students at a given university:
Region 1 Region 2
100H,100L 80H, 0L
80H, 100L 100H,100L
0H, 100L
Each region has the same total number of H and L type students. Holding constant
the number of firms in each region (and assuming that firms must recruit within their
region), Proposition 7 suggests that the university with 100H, 100L in region 1 will attract
more firms than the university with 100H, 100L in region 2. Firms have a preference
for recruiting at universities with a large proportion of H-type students, as this reduces
expected reviewing costs. As such, the university with 100H, 100L in region 2 will be
18
a second-best recruiting choice and the university with 100H, 100L in region 1 will be
a top recruiting choice. Thus, despite being observationally identical, the university in
region 2 will receive fewer firms. As a result of less competition among firms, earnings of
recent graduates will be lower at this university as well. When firms make their recruiting
decisions they take into account all of the alternative universities in the market. This
prediction will be tested by exploiting variation in the distribution of university quality
across regions of the United States.
1.4 Data on Firm Recruiting Decisions and University Characteristics
Many firms publicize the university campuses at which they actively recruit. Recognizing
that this presents a unique opportunity to observe firm hiring practices, I construct a
dataset of recruiting strategies for finance and consulting firms. In addition to being
important destinations for recent graduates, the finance and consulting industries have
several characteristics making them ideal for this study. Firms in these industries often have
multiple offices across the country. This allows me to compare recruiting strategies across
region for the same firm. Firm fixed effects mitigate the concern that firm heterogeneity
across region is driving regional variation in recruiting strategies. Secondly, consulting firms
generally recruit college seniors for entry-level consulting positions, fairly homogeneous
across firms in the industry. This lessens the concern that elite firms are recruiting for
different positions at prestigious universities and non-prestigious universities. This is less
true for financial firms, which may be recruiting for investment banking positions at one
university and IT positions at another university. The empirical specifications separate the
effects by industry.
Constructing the dataset of firm recruiting strategies first involved identifying the set
of elite finance and consulting firms, using the Vault industry rankings. Vault, a career
resources company, publishes annual rankings of the top 50 firms by prestige for various in-
dustries. These rankings are calculated by surveying individuals who are currently working
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in the industry; individuals are not allowed to rank their own firm. For each of the firms in
the finance and consulting rankings, I attempted to collect data on firm recruiting strate-
gies from the firm websites. Target campuses for college recruiting were identified from firm
websites for 22 of the Vault Top 50 Consulting Firms ranked by Prestige (2011),16 for 13
of the Vault Top 50 Banking Firms ranked by Prestige (2012), and for 4 of the Vault Top
25 Investment Management Firms (2009). The firms in the dataset are listed in Appendix
Table 1.1.17
The firm/university dataset was constructed by denoting whether each of these firms
actively recruits undergraduates at each of the universities in Princeton Review’s Best 376
Schools: 2012 Edition. Firms publicize where they are recruiting in a variety of ways. Some
firms list the universities where they recruit, whereas others require that each university is
typed into a search field to determine whether the firm recruits at that particular university.
It is generally very clear whether the firm actively recruits at the university. Locations of
each of the firms’ offices were also collected from the firm websites.18
Figures 1.2a and 1.2b give an example of the data collection for Bain. The main page
of the Bain careers website has a search field for university. When typing in Texas A&M
it is very clear that the firm actively recruits at the university. However, when typing
in Pennsylvania State University it is clear that the firm does not actively recruit at the
university. Eight of the 22 consulting firms do not explicitly state that the target campuses
16Some consulting firms had recruiting data, but because the firm had divisions other than consulting,
these data were not used.
17The ranking of consulting firms comes from an earlier year than that for banking firms because of the
project timeline. Target campuses for consulting companies were collected in Spring, 2012, while target
campuses for finance firms were collected in Spring, 2013. Firm rankings in 2011 were collected for Spring
2012 recruiting data because the recruiting data in Spring 2012 arguably pertain to the senior class of 2012.
The recruiting for this class begins in the Fall of 2011, and so rankings were taken from 2011. There is no
Vault ranking of investment management firms after 2009.
18The Claremont Colleges (Claremont McKenna, Harvey Mudd, Pitzer, Pomona, and Scripps) have a
joint on-campus recruiting program in which nearly every recruiting firm participates. While a firm may
opt out of recruiting at all five colleges, and only recruit at one of the five, conversations with the career
services staff at the Claremont Colleges confirmed that this is very unusual. In the data, I treat the five
colleges as one, the Claremont Colleges. If a firm recruits at just one of the colleges, I treat it as recruiting
at the Claremont Colleges as a whole. The explanatory variables for the Claremont Colleges are constructed
by taking the average across all of the universities, weighted by the university populations. Since Pitzer
does not report SAT scores, it is assumed that the number of students with high test scores at Pitzer is
equal to the average at the four other colleges.
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are for undergraduate, and not MBA recruiting. However, based on the text of the website
many of these seem to be undergraduate target campuses. For example, many of these
firms distinguish between university and experienced hires. In the case of at least one firm,
experienced hires include MBA students. The results are robust to excluding these eight
firms.
The firm recruiting dataset is then merged with a rich dataset containing university
characteristics. This dataset was constructed from a variety of sources including the Inte-
grated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), the Common Data Set, US News
and World Report rankings, and each university’s website. IPEDS is a public-use dataset
made available by the US Department of Education, with extensive information on loca-
tion, admissions, enrollment, and finances at the university level. Variables obtained from
IPEDS include: 25th and 75th percentile SAT and ACT scores, percent reporting SAT
and ACT, percent of applicants admitted, enrollment, in- and out-of-state tuition, whether
located in a large or a medium-sized city, whether it is a public institution, and whether
the university offers more than a Bachelor’s degree.
While IPEDS contains many variables describing the academic ability of the students
at a university, it would be beneficial to have data describing the academic ability of
those in the top of the distribution at each university. Recruiting decisions of elite firms
likely depend in part on these students. Further information on higher quantiles of the
ability distribution is available from the Common Data Set. The Common Data Set is
a collaboration between universities and publishers (as represented by by The College
Board, Peterson’s, and US News and World Report), in which universities respond to a
standardized questionnaire each year regarding topics such as admissions, financial aid,
and academics, for a specific cohort.
While the responses of all of the institutions are not publicized in a centralized dataset,
many of the universities publicize their responses to the Common Data Set on their web-
sites. I collect these data from individual university websites. The variables obtained
include: the percentage of enrolled Freshman who scored in the 700 to 800 range on the
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SAT Math and Verbal, in the 30 to 36 range of the ACT Math and English, the percentage
in the top 10% of their High School class, the percentage reporting SAT scores and the
percentage reporting ACT scores.
The qualities desired in future employees of elite finance and consulting firms may
be captured in unobservables, such as leadership ability or work ethic, rather than in
standardized test scores. As long as universities value these same unobservables in their
admissions processes, some of this will be captured in the percent of students admitted,
which is included in the controls. An additional measure capturing general perceptions
about the ability of a university’s students, not captured by observable characteristics, is
the US News and World Report ranking. These rankings are based on a number of different
measures of academic quality and selectivity, including assessments by the university Pres-
ident, Provost, and Director of Admissions of their peer universities. The rankings also are
constructed using assessments of universities by high school guidance counselors (US News
and World Report 2011). Since these rankings are constructed in part using assessments
by others in the field, they help to capture the unobservable perception of student ability
at each university. The US News and World Report rankings does not include liberal arts
colleges in the same ranking as universities. The rankings for universities are included in
the dataset, in addition to an indicator for whether the ranking is non-missing. This allows
for the inclusion of both liberal arts colleges and universities in the sample.
Selectivity of the university is assumed to help employers evaluate the quality of poten-
tial applicants, and so the important measure of university selectivity is that from when
the job candidates applied to the university. Since the majority of the recruiting data
pertain to college seniors in Spring, 2012, the data from IPEDS and the Common Data
Set are obtained for the Freshman class in the Fall of 2008.1920 However, for the US News
19Some universities report SAT percentiles for the Fall, 2008 entering class in the year 2008, and others
report these data in 2009. IPEDS contains a variable clarifying which entering class the data pertain to.
For the universities that do not report this variable, it is assumed that the 2008 data are reported in 2008,
as this is true for the majority of universities.
20Recruiting data for finance firms pertain to seniors in Spring, 2013; however, I use university charac-
teristics from Fall 2008 not 2009. This should not be of great concern as these variables are not expected
to change dramatically over the course of a year, and employers may use multi-year averages to evaluate
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and World Report ranking it is less clear that the relevant ranking is that from the year
of entrance. These rankings not only contain selectivity information, but also educational
inputs such as information on faculty and resources available to students. These variables
can improve student quality during the time of the student’s enrollment. I thus use the
2012 US News and World Report rankings.
The distance between the firm and the university will arguably affect the recruiting
decision. Latitude and longitude of universities and firm offices are collected in order to
calculate distance. The zip code of each university was obtained from IPEDS, and this
was matched with the ZCTA from the Census Gazetteer. The Census Gazetteer contains
the latitude and longitude at the level of the ZCTA, the most common zip code in a
census block. Most of the university zip codes are able to be matched to the ZCTA. For
the universities with zip codes that did not match a ZCTA, the latitude and longitude of
the city in which the university is located was identified using the Census Gazeteer (The
Census Gazetteer contains latitude and longitude at the ZCTA level, and also at the city
level). Latitude and longitude were also obtained for each office location (city) of each
firm. Using the latitude and longitude for each university and each office location, I find
the closest office location of each firm to a given university.21 Since there are 39 firms, for
each university there will be 39 closest offices, one for each firm.
Of the universities in the Princeton Review’s Best 376 Schools, two were excluded
because they did not have IPEDS data, three universities were excluded as they are located
outside of the United States, and the five service academies were excluded. As mentioned in
footnote (18), the five individual Claremont Colleges were replaced by one joint observation.
Of the remaining 362 universities, 13 were excluded because they did not report any data
on SAT or ACT scores.
selectivity.
21 I compute the length of the great circle arcs connecting each university and each office location for a
given firm, located on the surface of a sphere. The arc length, measured in degrees, is then converted to
statute miles as measured along a great circle on a sphere with radius 6371 kilometers, the mean radius of
the earth. These calculations are performed using the  and 2 commands in MATLAB. I then
find the office location with the smallest distance to the university.
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1.5 Empirical Analysis of Firm Recruiting on College Campuses
1.5.1 Theory to Empirics
The first three predictions of the model focus on the relation between firm recruiting
outcomes and university selectivity within a region. These predictions easily translate into
empirical tests, which will be described later in this section. The central prediction of the
model (Proposition 7) is that the number of firms recruiting at any university depends on
the size and quality of each university in the region. This prediction is empirically tested
by exploiting dramatic regional variation in the distribution of university size and quality.
This implicitly assumes regional labor markets for recent college graduates entering the
finance and consulting industries. The next subsection argues that this assumption is
reasonable.
The relation described in the central prediction is complex, and not easily transformed
into a reduced form variable. The general intuition suggests that, holding constant uni-
versity quality, firms are more likely to recruit at a university when it is one of the most
elite in the region. Greater competition among firms also results in higher wages at these
universities. The reduced-form empirical analysis tests whether the university’s regional
rank affects firm recruiting decisions and earnings of recent graduates, separately from
the national rank and other variables measuring absolute university quality (and student
quality for the earnings prediction).22 This does not capture the prediction of the model
perfectly, as it does not account for the exact size or quality of the universities in the re-
gion. For example, it is more advantageous to be ranked number two in the region when the
first ranked university is small, and cannot support many recruiting firms. This additional
component is accounted for in a robustness reduced-form specification, and most directly
in the structural estimation of the model.
22The model suggests that the relevant variable is regional rank, and not the percentile of the rank in
the region. Firms prefer going to the best universities. Conditional on the total number of firms in the
region, a median-ranked university that is 50th in its region faces more competition than a median-ranked
university that is 5th in its region. While both are median-ranked universities, firms have 49 preferable
choices in one region and only 4 in the other.
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The model’s central prediction is an equilibrium relation between the distribution of
students across universities, firm recruiting decisions, and wages; this paper argues that the
relation is causal. The distribution of students across institutions is treated as exogenous
since many of the universities in the sample were founded hundreds of years ago, and
their prestige and selectivity developed for reasons independent of firm recruiting.23 This
paper argues that the distribution of students across institutions determines firm recruiting
strategies and wages.
1.5.1.1 Constructing Separate Labor Markets
As described in Section 1.2, the relevant labor markets for each office location are the
universities with students interested in working at that location. Conversations with con-
sulting firm employees confirmed that students generally want to work in an office close
to their university or their family (recent work has shown that most students attend uni-
versity close to home (Mattern and Wyatt 2009)).24 Thus, one possibility would be to
exogenously define labor markets as the universities in the region surrounding the firm.
However, the data show where each firm recruits, and this information can be used to infer
23Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, University of Pennsylvania, Brown, Dartmouth, Rutgers, and
William and Mary were all founded before 1770, with the general mission of educating “the men who
would spell the difference between civilization and barbarism.” These institutions trained political leaders
and clergy in subjects completely non-vocational, and thus educated mainly the aristocratic classes of the
time. In contrast, agricultural and mechanical colleges proliferated in the 1850’s and moreso after the
legislation establishing Land Grant colleges in 1862. These institutions had the mission of teaching farmers
and mechanics about their vocations, and not the classics. They were based on the democratic ideal that all
individuals, regardless of background, had the right to an education. Admissions standards were different
for these colleges as they were purposefully serving a different population and would provide them with an
education that required different abilities. Many of today’s state universities started as land grant colleges
devoted to agricultural and mechanical education. Over time these universities developed in ways consistent
with their missions: the older colleges were often the first to design selective admissions policies, and to
develop into leading scholarly research institutions through establishing PhD programs, attracting leading
research scholars, and providing fellowships for academic study. A historical study of American colleges
and universities makes clear that the mission of the university determined its prestige and its selectivity,
rather than selectivity being driven by the firms recruiting or hiring the university’s graduates (Rudolph
1990).
24Mattern and Wyatt (2009) use a sample of 916,466 students who graduated from high school in 1999
and took either the SAT, PSAT/NMSQT or AP exam, and enrolled at a 4-year institution in the United
States. The median distance traveled to college was 94 miles, the 25th percentile was 23 miles, and the
75th percentile was 230 miles. 84% of students attended a college in either their home state or a bordering
state.
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the labor markets as perceived by the firms. The data do not identify the particular firm
office that recruits at a university, and as mentioned, the recruiting procedure implies that
students can choose the location for which they want to interview. However, based on
the institutional background described above, I assume that each university was targeted
mainly to fulfill the hiring needs of the closest office to that university. This assumption
will be further explored in a later section.25
Using an algorithm from the network literature, I define four large regions (East, Mid-
west, South, and West) such that firms are very likely to recruit within these regions,
and unlikely to recruit outside of these regions.26 The East is comprised of Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Washington, DC, Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina; the Midwest is comprised of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska; the South is comprised of Tennessee, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama; and the West is comprised of Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona,
Colorado, Utah, California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho.
The remaining states were all in their own markets, either because the universities in
those states had no recruiting firms, or the only recruiting firms were from the same state
and those offices did not recruit in any other state.27 These regions are shown in Figure
1.1, where the white states are those that are in their own region. I evaluate the robustness
of the results to the regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (combining New
England and the Mideast).28
25While most firms do not explicitly state which office is recruiting at the university, the Bain Dallas and
Houston offices are an exception. The websites for Bain Dallas and Bain Houston each list the following
universities in the on-campus recruiting section: Brigham Young University, ITESM (Monterrey Tech),
Rice University, Southern Methodist University, Texas A&M, The University of Texas at Austin, Vanderbilt
University, Washington University. As these universities are all in relatively close proximity to the Dallas
and Houston offices, this suggests that firms hire regionally for these positions.
26This algorithm is described in detail in the Appendix.
27The states in the latter category were Kansas and New Mexico. Firms recruited at University of Kansas
and University of New Mexico, with their closest offices being Kansas City, Kansas and Albuquerque, New
Mexico respectively. These offices were not the closest firm offices to any other university, in a different
state, where the firm recruited.
28The eight OBE regions are defined as follows: New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut), Mideast (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
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As described earlier, the 376 universities in the Princeton Review decreased to 349 due
to excluding non-US universities, service academies, and universities with missing SAT or
ACT data. For an additional seven universities, the closest office of every firm was not in
their region.29 This leaves 342 universities in the final dataset.
1.5.1.2 Constructing Regional Rank
The rank of the university within its region is used as a reduced-form variable, capturing the
intuition of the model’s central prediction. This rank is calculated based on the proportion
of high-type students, , at the university. High-type students are defined as those scoring
at least a 700 on the SAT Math or at least a 30 on the ACT Math. These cut-offs were
chosen because universities were asked in the Common Data Set for the percent of enrolled
Freshman scoring between a 700 and 800 on the SAT Math, and between 30 and 36 on the
ACT Math. These are the highest scores on each exam. The definition of high-types uses
both SAT and ACT scores as there is considerable variation across universities in which
exam is more commonly submitted.
The proportion of high-type students, , at each university is calculated using various
datasets. For universities with data from the Common Data Set, the percent of students
scoring in the highest range of the test is weighted by the percent reporting that test.30 For
land, and Washington DC), Southeast (West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida), Great Lakes (Wis-
consin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio), Plains (North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri), Southwest (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas), Rocky Mountain
(Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado), and the Far West (Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Alaska, and Hawaii).
29For six of these seven, there were no firm offices in the region. However, for West Virginia University the
closest firm office of Piper Jaffray is the Pittsburgh office even though the firm has an office in Charleston,
West Virginia.
30These datasets do not provide the percent of students scoring both in the highest math and the highest
verbal ranges. Therefore, it is not possible to construct the proportion of high-type students at a university
where a high-type is defined as someone scoring in both the highest math and verbal range. High-type
students are defined in terms of math, rather than verbal scores, because of the quantitative skills required
in the finance and consulting industries. While verbal scores are not included in the calculation of regional
rank, they are included as control variables in the regressions. Using the data from the Common Data Set,
the correlation between the percentage of students scoring in the 700-800 range on the SAT math and the
percentage of students scoring in the 700-800 range on the SAT verbal is .88. This mitigates concerns that
the results would be strongly affected if regional rank were instead defined in terms of verbal scores.
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universities without the data from the Common Data Set,  is predicted using the test score
percentiles from IPEDS. The prediction specification is based on universities with both the
Common Data Set and IPEDS, and follows the strategy of Papke and Wooldridge (1996)
for fractional response data. A detailed description of the calculation of  is included
in the Appendix. Universities are ranked by their value of  both within their region
and nationally. Universities with the same value of  are given their average rank, which
preserves the sum of the ranks.
1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Firms, Universities, and Recruiting Decisions
Table 1.1 presents basic summary statistics by region, as defined above. Panel A shows
that the greatest number of firms and firm offices are in the East, followed by the West, the
Midwest, and lastly the South. The last row of the first panel shows that nearly half of the
universities in the sample are in the East, with about 20% in the West and Midwest and
8.5% in the South. The remaining universities in the sample are in states that comprise
their own regions.
Panel B of Table 1.1 shows dramatic variation in the national rank of the region’s best
universities. In the East, the top universities are also the top national universities. This is
not the case in the other regions, with the 5th ranked university in the Midwest and West
ranked around 30 nationally, and the 5th ranked university in the South ranked about 90
nationally. The model’s predictions are tested using this variation.
Table 1.2 provides descriptive evidence that recruiting strategies vary across region.
The table compares the characteristics of universities with at least one recruiting firm.
Only the universities in the East, Midwest, South, and West are included in the table,
excluding two universities in the main sample located in states that comprise their own
region. Each observation in this table is a university, and the observations are weighted
by the number of firms recruiting at the university.31 In measures of absolute quality,
31The weights are normalized so that the sum of the weights of the universities in the table (only those
in the East, Midwest, South, and West) equals the total number of universities in these four regions with
at least one recruiting firm.
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for example  national rank, US News ranking, and test score percentiles, firms recruit
at much higher quality universities in the East than in the other regions. However, the
regional rank is actually lower for universities in the East than in the other regions. This
may be because there are more universities in the East, or because there are more firms
in the East and so they go further down the regional rankings. The regression analysis
controls for the number of firm offices in the region.
Target universities in the East look different on other dimensions as well: they are
smaller, less likely to be public, and more likely to be in large cities than the target
universities in the Midwest and South though less likely than those in the West. Tuition
is dramatically higher in the East than in the other regions. The students at the target
universities in the East appear to be of higher socioeconomic background: despite higher
tuition, they are less likely to be receiving any financial aid (including grants, loans, and
scholarships), less likely to be receiving need-based Pell Grants (except compared to the
Midwest), and less likely to take out loans (except compared to the West). The proportion
of black students is higher at target universities in the East than in the Midwest and West,
though lower than in the South. The proportion Hispanic is lower at target universities
in the East than in the South and West, though higher than in the Midwest. For many
of these variables, including regional rank and percent admitted, the F-test rejects at the
.05 level that the averages in the Midwest, South, and West are the same as those in the
East.32 While it is impossible to know exactly who these firms hire in each region, this
table suggests that the pool of applicants looks quite different across regions for the same
set of firms.
Figure 1.3 visually shows the identifying variation utilized in the reduced form analysis.
 is plotted against , the percent of students scoring greater than or equal
to 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT, for each of the regions. For a given ,
32The F-test also rejects that the averages in the Midwest, South, and West are the same as those in the
East for the following variables: tuition (in-state for public universities), 75th percentile of ACT English,
number of students, whether it is a public institution, the percent hispanic and black, the percent receiving
pell grants, and the percent receiving any aid.
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 is worse in the East than in the other three regions. For example, consider
four universities in different regions, all with similar values of : Penn State (=.171),
Miami University in Ohio ( = 163), Texas A&M ( = 165), and University of Georgia
( = 161). While these universities all have similar values of  their regional ranks are
vastly different. Penn State is ranked 70, Miami University in Ohio is ranked 38, Texas
A&M is ranked 28, and University of Georgia is ranked 9.
Figure 1.4 shows the lowess regression line of the total number of recruiting firms on
, along with the plot of  against , for the East and West. This is purely
descriptive as it does not control for the size of the university, which clearly affects the
number of recruiting firms. However, it is evident that between  = 2 and  = 6,
 is worse in the East than in the West for a given , while the total number
of firms recruiting at a university is higher in the West than in the East. This is the main
prediction of the model, and will be tested more formally in a regression framework.
The fourth prediction of the model is that there is a cut-off value of  below which no
firm will recruit. Figure 1.5 plots the total number of firms recruiting at the university
by  for the East and West. As expected, it is difficult to identify one value of  below
which no firm recruits. However, an alternative way of framing the prediction is that there
is some value of  above which all universities should attract at least one firm. To allow
for some noise, this cut-off is identified as the second highest value of  which receives no
recruiting firms. In the East, this value is .463, in the West it is .263, in the Mid-West it
is .358, in the South it is .20. It is clear that the  required in order to be guaranteed of
attracting a recruiting firm is much higher in the East than in the other regions.
1.5.3 Reduced Form Empirical Strategy
1.5.3.1 Within Region Predictions
The first three predictions of the model relate recruiting outcomes to the proportion of
high-type students at the university (): expected number of applicants per firm decreases
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in , expected number of high-type applicants per firm decreases in , and wage increases
in While the number of applicants per firm at each university is not known, I am able to
calculate the number of students per firm at each university and the number of high-type
students per firm. The within-region prediction on wage offers is further described in the
next section when I introduce the earnings data. I estimate the following specification
separately in each region, where each observation is one university:
 = + 1 + 
The dependent variables  include students per firm and high-type students per firm.
1.5.3.2 Across Region Prediction
For the following empirical tests, each observation in the data is a (university, firm) pair,
for example (Boston University, Bain). The location of the firm is defined as the closest
firm office to the university. For firms  in region , the decision to recruit at university 
in  depends on:
 =  + 1 + 2 + 3 +
39X
=1
 +  (1.11)
The variable  is an indicator equal to one if firm  recruits at university , and
equal to zero otherwise.  is a vector of university characteristics including: national rank
(based on ); 25th and 75th percentiles of Math and Verbal SAT and Math and English
ACT; percentage reporting SAT scores and percentage reporting ACT scores; percentage
scoring in the 700 to 800 range on SAT Verbal; percentage scoring in the 30 to 36 range on
ACT English; percentage in top tenth of High School Class; national US News Ranking;
in-state and out-of-state tuition; senior class enrollment; percent of applicants admitted;
the number of students with SAT Math scores in the 700 to 800 range or ACT Math scores
in the 30 to 36 range; indicators for public institution, location in a large city, small or
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mid-sized city, and offering more than a BA.
As described above, the variable  denotes the rank of the university
within its region calculated based on , the proportion of high-type students at the univer-
sity. The variable  denotes the distance between university  and firm  . The
regression includes firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the university
level since  does not vary within university. Since the empirical prediction
of the model is related to firm recruiting within the firm’s region, the regression drops 10
(university, firm) pairs not in the same region.
1.6 Results of Reduced Form Estimation
1.6.1 Within Region Predictions
Table 1.3 presents the results of the within region predictions, showing the results for re-
gions one through four. The first column reports the results from testing the first prediction
of the model: the number of students per firm is decreasing in  (the percent of students
scoring at least a 700 on the SAT Math or 30 on the ACT Math). The coefficients on
 (in tenths) are presented by region, with the dependent variable being the number of
students per firm. In all but region 3, an increase in  is associated with a statistically
significant decrease in the number of students per firm. Increasing  by .1 is associated
with 250 to 400 fewer students per firm. These magnitudes are not small, as the average
of the dependent variable ranges from nearly 900 in region 1 to nearly 1500 in region 4.
These results are consistent with the model’s first prediction.
Column 2 reports the results from testing the second prediction of the model: the
number of high-type students per firm is decreasing in . While the sign of the coefficient
on  is negative in all but region 3, it is only statistically significant in regions 2 and 4.
In these regions increasing  by .1 is associated with 20 to 30 fewer high-type students
per firm. The average magnitude of the dependent variable in these regions ranges from
approximately 230 to 250. While the evidence that the number of high-type students per
32
firm is decreasing in  is less strong, this is mainly driven by the coefficient in the South
(region 3). The coefficients in the other three regions are jointly significant at the .01 level.
1.6.2 Across Region Predictions
Column 1 of Table 1.4 presents the results from estimating the central prediction of the
model, Proposition 7. The negative coefficient on regional rank suggests that for a given
university quality, firms are less likely to recruit at universities with lower regional rank.
The coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level. Figure 1.3 identifies relevant
differences in regional rank for a given absolute quality, which helps to evaluate the mag-
nitude of this coefficient. For  equal to approximately .2, the difference in the regional
rank between the East and the other regions ranges from about 40 to 60. The difference
between PSU and Texas A&M, which have approximately the same , is about 40 ranks.
The coefficient on regional rank suggests that, holding constant university quality, firms
are 2.85 percentage points less likely to recruit if the university’s regional rank is lower by
50 places. This is a large effect, as there is an active recruiting relationship in only 7.4%
of the (university, firm) pairs.
The coefficients on the other variables are all of the expected sign. A lower US News and
World Report ranking reduces the probability that a firm recruits at the university, and the
coefficient is statistically significant. Increasing the number of seniors scoring at least 700 on
the Math SAT, or 30 on the Math ACT, by 1000 (the standard deviation of this variable is
approximately 470 students) increases the probability that a firm recruits at the university
by a statistically significant 22 percentage points. Increasing the distance between the
firm and the university by one hundred miles (the standard deviation is approximately 175
miles) decreases the probability that a firm recruits at the university by 1.3 percentage
points.
Finally, most of the consulting firms in the sample recruit on college campuses only
for entry-level consulting positions. However, the financial firms recruit on campus for
a variety of positions, ranging from investment banking to technology. Since these firms
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recruit for positions that may place lesser value on Math test scores, the effect of regional
rank should be smaller for financial firms than for consulting firms. To allow for hetero-
geneity by industry, both  and all of the university-level characteristics are
interacted with indicators for the firm’s industry (banking is the omitted industry). Col-
umn 2 of Table 1.4 shows that consulting firms are approximately 3.5 percentage points
less likely to recruit at a university if the regional rank is lower by 50 places (statistically
significant). This effect is 1.35 percentage points stronger than that for banking firms (the
omitted group), and the difference in the effects is statistically significant. There is no sta-
tistically significant difference in the effect of  for banking firms compared
to investment management firms. There is also no evidence that higher ranked firms are
more sensitive to the regional rank of a university, conditional on allowing for all of the
absolute quality measures to also vary by firm rank (not shown).
Figure 1.3 shows that the difference in regional rank across region is decreasing in 
When  is close to 0, the difference in regional rank between the East and West is about
100, whereas this difference is close to 40 when  = 2. To allow for the effect of a lower
regional rank to vary non-linearly, I include the square, cubic, and quartic of regional rank
while also including these higher level terms for the absolute quality variables. This adds
60 variables to the estimation, resulting in loss of power. The coefficients on 
and its higher level terms are each small and very imprecisely estimated. However, jointly
they are statistically significant at the .05 level.33 Based on these coefficients, firms are 2.6
percentage points less likely to recruit at a university if the regional rank is lower by 50
places, though this effect is not statistically significant (not shown). Including higher-level
terms yields an effect very similar to the principal specification. The effect is more than
doubled when evaluated at a change of 100 places: firms are 6.2 percentage points less likely
to recruit at a university if the regional rank is lower by 100. This linear combination is
also not statistically significant (p=.13). A step-wise variable deletion procedure produces
results with a fairly similar interpretation.
33The joint test drops the constraint on the quartic term, perhaps due to high levels of collinearity.
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For robustness, the specification separating the effects by finance and consulting is
estimated using probit and logit. The results are present in Appendix Table 1.2. The
probit estimates suggest that there is no statistically significant effect of regional rank for
the banking firms, evaluated at regional rank of 10, 30 and 60. Recall that the regional
rank of Texas A & M is about 30, while Penn State is about 70. However, the effect of
regional rank is stronger for consulting firms than for banking firms. If the regional rank
is worse by 50 places, when evaluated at regional rank of 10 or 30, consulting firms are
over 2 percentage points less likely to recruit at the university relative to banking firms
(both statistically significant at the .1 level). Combining the coefficient on regional rank
and regional rank interacted with consulting, consulting firms are approximately 1.8 to
2 percentage points less likely to recruit at the university if the regional rank is worse
by 50 places (evaluated at regional rank of 10 and 30 respectively), though these are not
significant at the .1 level.
When evaluated at regional rank of 60, if the regional rank is worse by 50 places,
consulting firms are approximately 1.9 percentage points less likely than banking firms to
recruit at the university (statistically significant at the .05 level). Combining the coeffi-
cient on regional rank and regional rank interacted with consulting, consulting firms are
approximately 1.6 percentage points less likely to recruit at a university if the regional rank
is worse by 50 places, with p=.107. This effect is about 2 percentage points smaller than
the analogous OLS estimate from Column 2 of Table 1.4. However, the effect is still large
given that the mean of the dependent variable is .074. The magnitudes from the logit esti-
mation are similar. The differential effect of regional rank for consulting firms approaches
conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.094) when evaluated at a regional rank of
60. However, the total effect as well as the coefficients evaluated at regional ranks of 10
and 30 are not statistically significant at the .1 level.
The results of the principal specification are similar, though the coefficient on regional
rank is stronger, when using the OBE regions.
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1.7 Earnings of Recent Graduates and the Regional Rank of their Alma
Mater
This section tests the model’s predictions regarding wages, using the Baccalaureate and
Beyond Survey, 2009 (hereafter B&B: 09), published by the US Department of Education.
The B&B: 09 is a survey of approximately 15,050 college seniors in the 2007-2008 academic
year, who were surveyed again in 2009 after receiving their Bachelor’s degree. The dataset
has information on student demographics, college achievement, and post-college outcomes
such as earnings, further education, and geographic location. The individual-level data
also has the IPEDS unit ID of the university from which they received their Bachelor’s
degree. This is used to merge institution-level data, described earlier in the paper, with
the B&B: 09 dataset.
The estimation sample for the wage predictions is limited to respondents who graduated
from a university with national rank (described below) better than or equal to 400, and
were 25 or younger at the time they received their BA. The sample is further restricted to
include only those with one job, working at least 35 hours per week, and never enrolled full-
time in graduate school between the time that they received their BA and the interview.
The university characteristics in this section pertain to the characteristics of the Freshman
class in Fall, 2004, as the earnings data are for college graduates in the Spring of 2008.
I calculate university rank using the 25th and 75th percentiles of the Math SAT and
ACT score distribution for entering students. Assuming that test scores are distributed
normally, I use these percentiles to obtain the mean and standard deviation of each test
score distribution at each university. This allows me to calculate the percent of students
at each university scoring above 700 on the Math SAT and above 30 on the Math ACT.
Weighting these percentages by the percent of students reporting each exam, I calculate
the percent of students at each university scoring above 700 on the Math SAT or above
30 on the Math ACT (denoted by ). Universities are then ranked both nationally, and
within their region, by .
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Table 1.5 presents the means and standard deviations of selected variables, by region
of Bachelor’s degree institution.
Within Region Predictions The third column of Table 1.3 directly tests Proposition
4: within a region, the wage is increasing in . This prediction is relevant for high-type
students, as these are the students hired in the model. As such, only individuals scoring at
least 1400 on the SAT or ACT (converted to SAT score) are included in the estimation.34
Each cell presents the coefficient on  in the following regression, estimated separately in
each region:
 = + 1 + 2 + 
 is the natural log of the respondent’s earnings from the primary job
in 2009, calculated on an annual basis.35 The variable is indexed by individual , who
graduated from university , and is currently living in state . To adjust for differences in
earnings levels across states, respondent earnings are adjusted using state price parities for
2006, calculated by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (Aten and D’Souza,
2008).36 Because these regional price parity data are only available for US states, the
sample is restricted to individuals whose state of residence in 2009 was within the United
States. This drops very few observations.
To further account for possible differences in earnings levels across states, I control for
average earnings of college graduates aged 25-34 in the respondent’s state of residence in
2009. These data are obtained from the American Community Survey, and are adjusted
using state price parities as described above.
34This conversion was conducted by the Department of Education using the following concor-
dance table: Dorans, N.J. (1999). Correspondences Between ACT and SAT I Scores (College
Board Report No. 99-1). New York: College Entrance Examination Board. Retrieved from
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/rr9901_3913.pdf.
35All individuals in the sample have non-zero earnings, and so using the natural log does not discard any
observations.
36Price parities from 2006 were used as this was the closest year to 2009 for which the data are available.
Respondent earnings were adjusted using the price parity for their state of residence in 2009.
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I have experimented with clustering the standard errors at the university level. How-
ever, these within-region regressions have few observations and few clusters. Given the
problems clustering in these settings, it is unsurprising that clustering at the university
level resulted in smaller standard errors in some regressions. With few observations per
cluster, failing to account for the group error is not expected to significantly bias the stan-
dard errors. For these reasons, I have presented unclustered, robust standard errors in the
third column of Table 1.3.
While power is limited due to small sample size, the results provide suggestive evidence
that Proposition 4 is supported in the data. In each region (except the South) recent
graduate earnings are increasing in the proportion of high-type students at the university.
Increasing  by .1 is associated with an increase in earnings, of anywhere from 1% (West)
to 8% (Midwest). The coefficient in the Midwest is statistically significant at the .05
level. The results in the South should be treated with the most caution, as they are based
on approximately 10 observations. The Midwest and West both have approximately 50
observations, while the East has approximately 90.
Across Region Prediction I also use the B&B: 09 to test the second part of the model’s
central prediction: earnings of recent graduates are increasing in the regional rank of their
alma mater, holding constant individual ability and university quality.
The following specification is estimated:
 = ++1+2+3+
(1.12)
The variables in  include the university’s national rank (based on ), percent of
applicants admitted, the number of students in the Freshman class, and the number of
students in the Freshman class with SAT Math above 700 or ACT Math above 30 (number
of students * ). The individual characteristics in  include income in 2006 (parental
for dependent students and respondent for independent students), and indicator variables
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for whether the student is black, asian, other race, hispanic, male, a citizen during the
2007/2008 academic year, and a dependent during the 2007/2008 academic year. The
variable  is equal to the individual’s combined SAT Math and Verbal score
if the individual took the SAT. If the individual took the ACT, the variable is equal to
the ACT composite score converted to an SAT score. Approximately 30 individuals in the
data did not take either of these exams. Rather than discard them from the regression, a
separate variable is included in the regressions denoting whether the individual has SAT
score data.
The specification does not include region fixed effects as these would eliminate the
identifying across-region variation. As above, to adjust for differences in earnings levels
across regions, respondent earnings as well as income in 2006 are adjusted using state price
parities for 2006, calculated by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (Aten and
D’Souza, 2008).37 I drop approximately 30 individuals whose legal state of residence in
2007-2008, or state of residence in 2009, were not within the United States.
Estimation results are presented in Table 1.6, with standard errors clustered at the
university level. Column 1 shows that controlling for the individual’s SAT score, individual
level characteristics, university quality, and the average wage of a 25-34 year old college
graduate in the state, lowering the regional rank of the individual’s university by 50 places
results in earnings that are 4.25% lower (significant at the .1 level).
The model predicts that firms hiring elite students are most sensitive to regional rank.
This implies that the effect of regional rank on earnings should be strongest for the most
elite students. Column 2 presents the results when limiting the sample to individuals
with combined SAT score of at least 1400. The sample size in this regression is clearly
reduced, but the results remain informative. Lowering the regional rank of the individual’s
university by 50 places results in earnings that are 21% lower (significant at the .05 level).
These results suggest that the search frictions underlying campus recruiting have important
37As above, respondent earnings were adjusted using the price parity for their state of residence in 2009.
Income in 2006 (parental for dependent students and respondent for independent students) was adjusted
using the price parity for the legal state of residence in 2007-2008.
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consequences for student outcomes.38
1.8 Robustness Checks and Alternative Mechanisms
1.8.1 Separate Labor Markets
A critical assumption in this paper is that the United States can be divided into separate
labor markets. As described above, the labor markets were defined using the recruiting re-
lationships between universities and firms. These market definitions rely on the assumption
that the recruiting relationship is between the university and the firm’s closest office to the
university. The validity of this assumption is explored in this section. A particular concern
is that firms from other regions recruit their home-state students studying at universities
in the East.
To explore the extent to which students return to their home-state, I collect university-
level data on student mobility post-graduation. Many universities survey their graduating
seniors about future plans, including where they will be living or working. For a subsample
of universities, I assemble the survey results from university websites for the graduating
classes of 2011 or 2012. I combine these survey results with IPEDS data on the number of
students in the freshman class from each state, for each university. The freshman migration
numbers are taken from the Fall of 2007 (for the graduating class of 2011) or the Fall of
2008 (for the graduating class of 2012). For most universities the 2011 graduating student
survey was used. However, the 2012 survey was used when the 2011 survey was unavailable
or the IPEDS data was unavailable for the Fall of 2007.
The percentage of students moving to a given region after graduation is compared with
38For robustness, I estimate the wage regressions weighting each observation by the sampling weights of
the survey. The weights are normalized so that the sum of the weights is equal to the number of observations.
Without restricting the sample to those scoring at least 1400 on the SAT, weighting the observations results
in a coefficient on regional rank that is slightly larger in magnitude (-.1097 compared to -.0851 without the
sampling weights). The coefficient is statistically significant at the .1 level. When restricting the sample
to those scoring at least 1400 on the SAT, weighting the observations results in a coefficient on regional
rank that is smaller in magnitude and statistical significance (-.223 compared to -.426 without the sampling
weights). The coefficient is not statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the coefficient still
suggests a large effect.
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the percentage originally from that region. If a sizable number of a region’s students study
at a particular university in the Northeast, and they all return to their home region, this
suggests that firms from the home region may recruit at universities in the Northeast. This
behavior is not inconsistent with the theoretical model, but it suggests that the regions
defined in the empirical section are not entirely correct. For example, Bain Houston may
plan to recruit a number of Texan students from Harvard. This suggests that the relevant
labor market for Texas A&M also includes the Texan students at Harvard. As long as the
number of students from other regions interested in moving to the Texas region is small,
this will have only minimal effects on the regional prestige of Texas A&M.
Table 1.7 compares geographic flows to and from a subsample of universities. Each
university defines region somewhat differently in their graduating student survey, and some
not at all. The table lists the states included by the university in the region definition.
Since many students come from other regions to study at elite universities in the East, these
are the universities presented in the table. Among elite universities, those with the most
detailed and extensive data are shown. Panel A shows that students from the Midwest
are a small percentage of the class at elite universities in the East. Secondly, a smaller
proportion of students move to the Midwest post-college than came from the Midwest
pre-college. For example, while 9.4% of Princeton’s class comes from the Midwest, only
5.1% of Princeton students move to the Midwest following graduation. This suggests that
employers do not heavily recruit, or are not successful in recruiting, their home-region
students at universities in other regions. Panel B shows a similar pattern between the
Southwest and elite universities in the East and Midwest.
Panel C shows post-graduation mobility to the West from other regions. These per-
centages present a slightly different picture. A much higher proportion of the student body
at elite universities come from the West than from the Midwest or the Southwest. Further,
the percentage that move to the West from these other regions after graduation is also
much higher. In a few cases the percentage moving to the West post-graduation is actually
higher than the percentage from the West pre-college.
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Panel D shows post-graduation mobility to the Northeast from elite universities in other
regions. For Washington University and Vanderbilt, the percentage of students in the class
originally from the Northeast is quite high, and the percentage moving to the Northeast
post-graduation is also very high. While the percentage of students at UCLA and UC
Berkeley from the Northeast is quite small (less than 3%), the percentage of students
moving to the Northeast post-graduation is slightly higher.
This analysis suggests that firms in the Midwest and Southwest do not heavily recruit at
elite universities in the East. However, the possibility that California firms consider recruit-
ing at elite East Coast universities remains a concern. Importantly, the size of Dartmouth
in the California labor market is limited to only those Dartmouth students interested in
moving to California (Table 1.7 shows this is approximately 10% of Dartmouth’s class).
Introducing a university of that size into the West is unlikely to significantly affect the
results.
Finally, there is a concern that firms in the East consider recruiting at universities in
other regions. Many students move to the Northeast following graduation, but again these
numbers are small compared to the percent staying in the Northeast following graduation.
Travel costs may prevent firms in the East from recruiting outside the region, especially
given the number and quality of elite universities in the East. If firms in the East did
consider recruiting at elite universities in other regions, this would magnify the disadvantage
of graduating from a non-elite university in the East.
1.8.2 Accounting for Size of Neighboring Universities in Reduced Form Esti-
mation
While regional rank captures important intuition from the model, it does not account for
size and quality of the other universities in the region. For example, it is worse to be
ranked number two in the region when the number one university is very large. A further
specification tests whether firms are less likely to recruit at a university when there is a
larger pool of competition to that university’s graduates. The pool of competition to a
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given university’s graduates includes the students at equally, or more, elite universities in
the region. This too is an approximation because it is not just the aggregate number that
matters, but rather how many are at each university of a given quality.
For firms  in region , the decision to recruit at university  in  depends on
 ≡   (1.13)
 denotes the pool of competition to a university’s graduates, de-
fined as the total number of high-type students enrolled at universities at least as elite.
The eliteness of a university is defined in terms of .
Following the model, firms care how many other firms will be competing for the pool of
 , as this will affect the probability of filling the vacancy and the wage
that will be offered.  is normalized by , which is
equal to the number of firm offices in region . If a firm has multiple offices in region
, then each office counts separately. For robustness, the number of firms with offices in
region  is used as the denominator. In this case, if a firm has multiple offices in region ,
they do not count separately. For example, if Bain has an office in Boston and New York,
this would count as two firms using the main definition, and one firm using the robustness
definition.
 varies considerably across regions. For the universities falling in
the interquartile range of , the average number of students with high math test scores at
a university at least as elite is over 41,000 for universities in the East, while only 7,500
for universities in the South. The values of  also exhibit
similar regional variation.39 Plots of  by  look very similar
to the plots of  by  (not shown).
39 Interestingly, once the number of firm offices is controlled for, the value of
 is higher in the Midwest than in the East for universities in this
range. This is likely largely driven by the fact that the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC)
is a very large university, with a high percentage of students scoring greater than or equal to 700 on the
Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT (44%). Thus, each of the universities in the interquartile range for the
Midwest will have the students at UIUC counted in their  .
43
For a given university quality, I test whether firms are less likely to recruit at a university
if there is a larger pool of competition to the university’s graduates. The following linear
probability model is estimated:
 =  + 1 + 2 +
39X
=1
 + 
(1.14)
The university characteristics in  are the same as those described in the principal
specification, as is the variable  .
Appendix Table 1.3 shows that the results are similar in interpretation to those when
 is the main reduced form variable. The difference in ,
in hundreds, between the East and South/West is approximately .5 to .7 for  below .5. Re-
duced form estimates in Column 2 suggest that consulting firms are 2.2 percentage points
less likely to recruit if the pool of competition is larger by 50 students. This effect is 1.7
percentage points larger than for banking firms. The magnitude of the results is larger
when using OBE regions.
1.8.3 Alternative Mechanisms
The central theoretical prediction in this paper is that, holding university quality constant,
firms are more likely to recruit at universities that are more elite within their region. As
a result, wages are higher at these universities. There are two mechanisms yielding this
result, along with the assumption of regional labor markets. The best universities have
many desirable students, reducing the probability of a vacancy going unfilled. Secondly,
the proportion of desirable students is higher at the best universities, reducing the costs of
identifying them. The empirical results strongly support this theoretical prediction. This
section considers other mechanisms that could yield the same results.
The estimation includes a number of controls for university quality, such as the per-
cent scoring at least 700 on the Math and Verbal SAT, percent admitted, and US News
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ranking. However, given these observable characteristics, students at the most prestigious
universities in the region may indeed be more desirable. This could be for two reasons.
First, there may be some unobservable quality variables, unrelated to the regional prestige
of the university, that are positively correlated with regional rank. While the proportion
of students scoring at least a 700 on the Math SAT may be constant, universities with
higher regional ranks may have a greater proportion of students scoring at least a 780. The
number and variety of controls for absolute quality mitigates concerns of this first type.
Students may also be more desirable as a result of attending the most prestigious
universities in the region. This could arise if the firm or its clients care about regional
prestige separately from absolute quality. Alternatively, attending the most prestigious
university in the region may provide students with some unobservable benefit, such as
more confidence. This differs from the model with reviewing costs, in which firms can
hire students of equivalent productivity at any university if they review enough applicants.
However, a model in which firms care explicitly about regional prestige yields the same
prediction: firms are more likely to recruit at the best universities in the region. There
is no obvious way to test which mechanism is correct. However, the implications are the
same regardless of the precise mechanism.
Alternative explanations that are not related to the regional prestige of the univer-
sity would be more concerning. One possibility is that recruiting decisions are driven by
whether the university offers an undergraduate business major. Universities with higher
regional ranks may be more likely to offer undergraduate business majors, and thus be
more attractive to finance and consulting firms. Recruiting decisions may also be influ-
enced by whether the firm can recruit both MBA students and undergraduates at the same
university. Conversations with consulting firm employees suggested that the staff involved
in undergraduate recruiting are separate from those involved in MBA recruiting. Despite
this, the staff still have the ability to benefit from shared information about career services
offices, professors, and the campus.
In order to test these alternative mechanisms, data was collected on whether each uni-
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versity offered an undergraduate business major (distinct from an Economics major), and
whether they offered an MBA. The data was collected by visiting individual university
websites. Column 3 of Table 1.4 shows that the coefficient on  is not dra-
matically affected when including these variables in the regressions. All else equal, firms
are 2.5 percentage points more likely to recruit at a university that also offers an MBA, sta-
tistically significant at the .01 level. The coefficient on offering an undergraduate business
major is small and statistically insignificant (not shown).
Recruiting decisions may be driven by the alma mater of the employees. This strategy
may yield production complementarities between graduates of the same university, or it
may yield higher-quality hires as a result of insider knowledge. For example, graduates
know which majors at their university are more demanding and which extra-curriculars
require the most leadership ability. If employees working at firm offices outside of the East
attended less selective universities, then this mechanism could explain why the selectivity of
target campuses is lower in these regions. However, regional differences in the distribution
of university quality can explain regional differences in employee alma mater. Outside of the
East, students graduating from less selective universities may have greater access to elite
firms since there are fewer very selective universities. These employees may then be more
likely to hire from their alma mater. Because the model can explain regional differences in
employee alma mater, it is hard to argue that this is the dominating mechanism.
Firms may recruit at less selective universities outside of the East because high-type
students are scarce, forcing firms to hire less desirable students at less selective universities.
If regional rank is correlated with the scarcity of high-types, then the importance of regional
rank may mask this story of supply and demand. A basic story of supply and demand
suggests that recruiting decisions depend only on the number, not the proportion, of high-
type students at the university. This implies that the distribution of university quality in
a region should not matter for firm recruiting decisions. In contrast, this paper proposes
that a university’s relative eliteness within the region matters separately from the scarcity
of high-types. Relative eliteness could matter even if the supply and demand for high-types
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is the same in two regions. Consider again the following example:
Region 1 Region 2
100H,100L 80H, 0L
80H, 100L 100H,100L
0H, 100L
The total number of high-types and low-types is the same in regions 1 and 2. The
model in this paper predicts that the university with (100H, 100L) attracts more firms in
region 1, since it is the highest-ranked university in the region. In region 2, firms prefer
recruiting at the university with (80H, 0L) because expected reviewing costs are lower. In
contrast, a simple supply and demand story predicts that the university with (100H, 100L)
should attract the same number of firms in each region, as long as the number of firms is
constant in regions 1 and 2.
To provide evidence on whether the results are driven simply by supply and demand,
the total number of high-type students in the region is included as a control variable in
the main regressions. As seen in Column 4 of Table 1.4, including this variable has very
minimal effects on the results, though the magnitude of the coefficient on 
is slightly larger. Structural estimation of the model will present direct evidence against a
simple supply and demand story.
An alternative model of firm recruiting is that firms recruit at universities that lend
themselves well to planning recruiting trips. For example, if the firm is making a trip to a
particular university for recruiting, they may be likely to recruit at less selective universities
in the same city to save on travel costs. While the regional rank captures the number of
better-ranked universities within the region, this may be too large an area to provide
useful information about spillovers from saving on travel. For example, a university may
be located in a region with many more selective universities. However, those universities
may be 500 miles away, meaning that the university is not in a convenient location for
recruiting. If conditional on absolute quality, universities with worse regional rank happen
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to be located further from better-ranked universities within their region, then this could
lead to biased results.
This story seems unlikely as there are many universities that do not attract firms,
and yet are located in close proximity to the most selective universities in the region.
This paper argues that these universities do not attract firms precisely because of their
proximity to more selective universities. I do not control for the presence of a better-
ranked university within a small radius, which could possibly lead to spillovers from saving
on travel. However, the regressions do control for the distance to the closest firm office.
In the East, for example, firm offices are often located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
and Washington DC. The most selective universities in the East are also located in very
close proximity to these cities. Thus, by controlling for the distance to the firm office, I
also largely capture the distance to the most selective universities.
1.9 Structural Estimation and Counterfactual Exercises
The reduced form analysis suggests strong support for the model’s principal prediction.
However, to more directly address the size and impact of search frictions on labor market
outcomes, the model is structurally estimated. Structural estimation also enables coun-
terfactual exercises that test the model’s prediction more directly than the reduced form
variable.
The model suggests that firms have the opportunity of recruiting at T universities in
the market. However, it is not profitable to recruit at universities with <, where  is
the proportion of high-type students at university  and  is the per-applicant reviewing
cost. Further, even for universities with  ≥ , there is a cut-off level of  such that it is
not profitable for firms to recruit at universities below that cut-off.
If there are  universities with  greater than or equal to the cut-off level of , then
the equilibrium will be governed by  − 1 profit equality conditions in  − 1 unknowns,
where the unknowns are the number of firms recruiting at each university. Since the total
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number of firms is assumed to be known,  =  −P−1=1 . The profit equality
conditions for firms recruiting at universities 1 and 2 are shown in equation (1.9).
The variables that govern these equations are  (proportion of high-type students), 
(the total number of graduating students at the school),  (cost of reviewing each applicant),
 (productivity of the applicant once she is hired), and  (the total number of firms in
the market). The variable  is calculated as described above, and  is known directly from
the IPEDS data. Two minor adjustments are made to the model in order to make it more
realistic, and thus better able to explain the data. The first involves calculating the total
number of firms, while the second involves calculating the number of potential applicants.
1.9.1 Adjustments to the model
1.9.1.1 Calculating the Total Number of Firms in a Region
I assume that the total number of firms in each region is reflected by the total number of
finance and consulting firm offices in the region (for the 39 firms in my data). As discussed
in the data section, if one firm has an office both in New York City and Philadelphia this
counts as two firm offices in the East. The number of offices arguably captures regional
variation in labor demand better than the number of firms with at least one office in the
region. In the model, firms care about how many applicants they have for each job, which
is driven by the number of other jobs students can apply for. The number of jobs may differ
from the number of offices for at least two reasons. First, I do not count the number of
firm offices for firms not in my dataset. Second, each firm office may be hiring for multiple
jobs. To account for both of these factors, I assume that the total number of jobs for which
firms recruit is equal to  times the number of firm offices. I present results with  equal
to 10. However, for robustness I additionally consider  equal to 5 and 15.40
I observe in the data the number of recruiting firms at each university. I assume
that the factor necessary to adjust for multiple hires and missing firms is constant across
40Future work will use university-level data on the number of students entering finance and consulting
(from graduating student surveys) as an additional moment to identify the number of jobs in each region.
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campuses. The adjusted number of observed jobs at each university is given by b =
 ∗ ∗=1 , where  is the number of recruiting firms observed in
the data at university . Although b is the number of jobs, I will refer to these as
firms for ease of exposition. Calculated in the manner described, the total number of firms
in the East is 2800, 1490 in the Midwest, 840 in the South, and 2350 in the West.
1.9.1.2 Calculating the Total Number of Potential Applicants
If  is assumed to be the total number of graduating students at the university, this implies
that all graduating seniors are interested in working at a finance or consulting firm. This
clearly is not consistent with students’ preferences, as many students pursue careers in
other industries or graduate school. This suggests that the pool of applicants is only the
fraction, , of the senior class interested in working at these firms. This parameter is
unknown and for simplicity is assumed to be common to all schools. The profit function
is adjusted to include this extra parameter:
 = (1− −1( 11 ))( − (1(1 − )
1(1(
11 ) − 1)
− 1 ) (1.15)
The parameters  (applicant reviewing cost) and  (worker productivity) are also un-
known, although they are not separately identified.41 The productivity parameter, , is
normalized to 1, leaving two unknown parameters  and . Put differently, I estimate  .
1.9.2 Estimation
Among the universities with  above the cut-off , for any given values of  and  there
is a unique profit-equalizing allocation of firms across universities. I identify parameter
estimates for  and  by finding the values that minimize the difference between the model’s
predictions regarding the proportion of firms recruiting at a university and the data, using
41 If both  and  are doubled, then profits are doubled at each university in the profit equality conditions.
Since profits at both universities are doubled, the solution for each value of  will be the same for ( )
and (2 2).
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
The first step of the estimation involves identifying the cut-off level of , below which
firms do not recruit. For a given value of the parameter , it is clear that firms do not
recruit at universities with   . Once these universities are removed, it is possibe to find
the cut-off . The cut-off  is the university such that the profit from being the only firm
recruiting at the university is equal to the profit each firm receives from allocating across
all of the universities with a higher . If the firm is the only one recruiting at a university,
it is guaranteed to receive all of the H-type applicants, and so will fill the vacancy with
probability 1. The wage offer will be zero as the firm faces no competition. The expression
for profits at the cut-off university is simply −  . The theoretical appendix explains the
derivation of the cut-off  in more detail.
I identify this cut-off by starting with the lowest value of  such that  ≥ . I calcu-
late the profit from being the only firm recruiting at this university, using the expression
above. I also find the profit firms receive from allocating (in a profit-equalizing manner)
across all of the higher  universities, using the profit equality conditions in (1.9). As
the profit-equalizing allocation is governed by a system of many non-linear profit equality
equations, simply solving the system is not trivial. I find the allocation of firms across
universities that minimizes the squared norm of the profit equality conditions. I use an
interior point algorithm and MATLAB’s fmincon routine, and then check that the solution
indeed equalizes profits at all universities.42
If the profit firms receive from recruiting at the higher  universities is greater than the
profit at the lowest , then there would not be a profitable deviation to this lowest  and
it cannot be the cut-off. I then move to the next lowest value of , and employ the same
routine. The cut-off university is the university with the lowest , at which the profit from
being the lone recruiting firm is greater than or equal to the profit that firms receive from
allocating across all of the higher  universities.
Once the cut-off university has been identified for a given set of the parameters  and
42 I limit the number of function evaluations to 200,000 and the number of iterations to 50,000.
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, I find the profit-equalizing allocation of firms across universities with  greater than or
equal to the cut-off . I solve for this allocation using the routine described above.
As mentioned, I identify parameter estimates for  and  by finding the values that mini-
mize the difference between the model’s predictions and the data, using Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM). The moments are given by the difference between the predicted and
observed proportion of firms recruiting at each university (  −

 ),
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and this error multiplied by  and by (). This yields three moments for 2 unknown
parameters. The model is estimated separately in each region. To find the parameter val-
ues that minimize the GMM objective function, I search over  from .05 to .35 at intervals
of .05, and search over  from .01 to .2 at intervals of .01.
The parameter  is identified by explaining the extent to which firms prefer recruiting
at universities with a higher proportion of H-type students, holding constant the number
of H-type students. The parameter  is identified by explaining the extent to which firms
prefer recruiting at universities with a larger number of H-type students, holding constant
the proportion of H-type students. Consider two universities with the same proportion
of H-types; however, one has a much larger number of H-types than the other. If the
larger university does not attract more firms, this suggests that the proportion of students
interested in these firms () is so low that the larger university does not in fact appear
larger to the firms.
Recall that the parameter estimates for  and the expression for  are relative to  = 1.
One way of interpreting the model is that the employment relationship lasts for one year.
In this case,  should be understood as the productivity of the worker in that one year,
and  as the wage offered to the worker for one year. An alternative is to interpret  as
the present discounted value of the worker’s productivity over the course of the match, and
 as the present discounted value of the match to the worker. For ease of interpretation, I
will often interpret the results using the former explanation, and present values associated
with  = $100 000.
43 =  ∗   and  ==1
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Appendix Table 1.4 presents parameter estimates. The ( ) pair that minimizes the
objective function is (09 1) in the East, (03 3) in the Midwest, (1 25) in the South,
and (12 15) in the West. For  = 100 000 these values of  are all around $10,000 except
in the Midwest, where  = $3 000.44
The cut-off value of  in the Midwest is approximately .19, despite  = 03. The smaller
estimate of  in the Midwest suggests that in this region firms care more about the number
of high-type students at the university, separately from the proportion. There are a few
universities with high  in the Midwest that do not attract any firms. Universities with
similar , but much larger in size, attract many more firms. In order to minimize the error,
 is likely estimated to be larger in magnitude (making the larger university appear larger
to the firm) and  smaller. An example is the University of Michigan, which attracts 20
firms, and has  = 47 and  = 5 739. Case Western University attracts zero firms, and
has  = 46 and  = 1 026. While there are stark differences like this in the West as well,
for example between University of Texas-Austin and Trinity University, these universities
are much further down in the regional rankings. Thus the potential error given that Trinity
attracts zero firms in the data is lower, since the predicted number will be lower as well.
44The estimated values of  are relatively similar, though the estimated values of  are higher, when
assuming that  = 15, where recall that  is the factor by which I multiply the total number of offices in
the region to obtain the total number of firms in each region. For  = 15, the ( ) pair that minimizes
the objective function is (09 15) in the East, (07 3) in the Midwest, (11 35) in the South, and (11 3)
in the West. When there are many firms in the region, firms will be more likely to recruit at a larger
set of universities, even at those with relatively few students, because of increased competition from other
firms. In order to explain why we do not see firms in the data recruiting as heavily at small universities
even though the number of firms is assumed to be large,  is estimated to be higher. This makes large
universities appear larger to firms. The parameter estimates for  and  are in general lower when  = 5.
The ( ) pair that minimizes the objective function is (09 05) in the East, (01 2) in the Midwest,
(12 1) in the South, and (02 3) in the West. With fewer firms in the region, there will be less of an
incentive to recruit at lower  universities, since there is less competition at the most selective universities.
In order to explain why we see firms going to lower  universities in the data,  is estimated to be low
when we assume there are fewer total firms. The lower per-applicant reviewing cost incentivizes firms to
recruit at lower  universities. Furthermore, a lower  also explains why firms still recruit at some smaller
universities, holding  constant, even when the total number of firms is not large. While a lower  and 
may minimize the objective function with few total firms, a low  will not be able to explain preferences for
recruiting at higher  in the data and a low  will not be able to explain preferences for recruiting at larger
universities in the data, and so the minimum may still be associated with considerable error. Comparing
the objective function at the optimal parameters across different values of  suggests that the error is lowest
when assuming that  = 10 for regions 3 and 4. For region 2, the error is lowest when assuming that  = 5.
The error in region 1 is the same when assuming that  = 10 and  = 5, and this error is smaller than
when  = 15.
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As a result, the estimate for  does not have to be as high in the West as in the Midwest.
Further, since there are many more universities in the West of higher regional rank that
attract more firms,  is estimated to be larger there as well.
Non-zero estimates of  suggest that firms care about the proportion of high-types at
the university, in addition to the number. The way in which  enters the profit equality
conditions (1.9) confirms this intuition. This provides evidence against a simple story of
supply and demand driving the reduced form results.
An alternative story is that firms can costlessly identify H-type students, and so they
care only about the probability that an H-type student applies to the position. In this
story, high search costs do not dissuade firms from recruiting at less selective universities.
Rather, firms do not prefer recruiting at these universities because the small number of
H-types raises the probability that the vacancy goes unfilled. Without search costs, firms
care only about the number of H-types at the university and not the percentage of H-types.
The parameter  is identified by explaining the extent to which firms prefer recruiting at
a university with a higher percentage of H-types, holding constant the number of H-types.
Thus, if this alternative story were true,  would not be identified. Non-zero estimates of
 provide evidence against this story.
The estimated profit is .32 in the East, .84 in the Midwest, .38 in the South, and .22
in the West. For  = $100 000, these values of profit range from approximately $20,00 to
$40,000 except in the Midwest, where profit is nearly $85,000. The high value of profit in
the Midwest is due to the very low cost of reviewing applicants in that region. The higher
profit levels in the East than the West suggest that firms will visit universities with lower
values of  in the West than in the East. This is consistent with the evidence presented
in Figure 1.5: the  required in order to guarantee at least one recruiting firm is higher in
the East than in the West.
In order to measure the goodness-of-fit of the model, I compare the predicted and
observed distributions of the proportion of firms recruiting at the university. Figure 1.6
presents the results of this exercise for the East. As can be seen, the model fits the data
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reasonably well.
1.9.3 Impact of Search Frictions on Firm and Student Outcomes
The central question of this paper addresses the importance of search frictions for firm
hiring strategies and worker outcomes. Few papers have quantified the impact of search
frictions on wages. One exception is van den Berg and van Vuuren (2010), which finds that
search frictions have a small, negative effect on the mean wage in a given labor market.45
While that paper estimates an indicator of search frictions, I am able to estimate the search
friction itself (in the form of a screening cost) through structural estimation of the model.
In this section I quantify the importance of this search friction for firm strategies and
worker outcomes. I counterfactually set the cost per applicant reviewed to zero, so that it
is costless for firms to identify H-type students. I can then observe the effect of this change
on the number of firms recruiting at a university, wage offers, and firm profits.
Without screening costs, firms equalize profits by equalizing the expected number of
applicants at each university. Firms no longer face the additional cost of reviewing more
applicants at less selective universities. This provides a greater incentive to recruit at less
selective universities. Relative to an environment with screening costs, there should be
more firms at less selective universities. This creates upward pressure on wages at less
selective universities. Further, without screening costs, firms will be willing to recruit at
non-selective universities where they were not willing to recruit before. If enough firms leave
the more selective universities, then wages may fall at those universities in the absence of
screening costs.
With screening costs of .09 ($9,000) in the East, the cut-off level of  below which firms
are not willing to recruit is approximately .14. There are 85 universities in the East with
values of  below this cut-off, and 83 universities in the East with values of  above this
cut-off.
45 In their paper, frictions are defined as the mean number of job offers in employment before an invol-
untary job loss occurs.
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Table 1.8 shows the effect of removing screening costs for various universities in the
East. The table shows that, as expected, these screening costs have the greatest impact
on the least selective universities. With screening costs of $9,000 per applicant, firms are
not willing to recruit at the University of New Hampshire, where 5% of the students score
above a 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT. However, when it is costless to
identify high-type students, firms do recruit at this university. It does not attract many
firms since there are not many high-type students, but they offer a wage of $37,000 to
high-type students. With screening costs of .09, the high-type students were receiving the
reservation wage (a wage of zero here can be thought of as the students’ reservation wage).
With screening costs of $9,000 per applicant, the percentage of high-type students at
Fordham University (14%) is just above the cut-off required to attract a firm. Fordham
attracts only a few firms since it is one of the least selective universities above the cut-off.
Because there are so few firms, the wage offered is approximately $2,000 (as mentioned
above, a wage of 0 can be interpreted as the reservation wage). When it is costless to
identify high-type applicants, the number of firms increases from 6 to over 14. This creates
upward pressure on wages, which are now $37,000 for high-type students.
Finally, when screening costs are $9,000 per applicant, over 2.5% of the firms recruit at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which has the highest proportion of high-type
students in the East (86%). The large number of firms competing for MIT students creates
upward pressure on the wage, and yields a wage offer to high-type students of $45,000.
When screening costs go to zero, firms are willing to expand the set of universities at
which they recruit. In particular, they are willing to recruit at non-selective universities
where they did not recruit before, and they are willing to more heavily recruit at universities
that previously were above the cut-off but were not highly selective. The number of firms
recruiting at MIT drops from 72 to 51, and the wage offer drops to $37,000.
When the cost per applicant reviewed goes from .09 to 0, firm profits increase from .32
to .53, relative to worker productivity of 1.
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1.9.4 Cost per Hired Worker
After estimating the cost per applicant reviewed, it is then possible to calculate the screen-
ing cost per hired worker. The cost per hired worker is obtained by multiplying the expected
number of applicants reviewed, equation (1.1), by the cost per reviewing each applicant.
The cost per hired worker will clearly vary with the selectivity of the university. At less
selective universities, firms will have to on average review more applicants, and so the cost
per hired worker will be greater. The expected number of applicants reviewed at MIT
(=.86) is .77, and the screening cost per hired worker is about $6900. The expected num-
ber of applicants reviewed at Fordham University (=.14) is approximately 3.2, and the
screening cost per hired worker is $28,700. Recall that these differences in cost per hired
worker are equilibrated through the wage and the number of H-type applicants. Firms
that recruit at Fordham University pay more in screening costs, but have more H-type
applicants in their applicant pool and pay a lower wage.
1.10 Discussion and Conclusion
Using a newly collected dataset of target campuses for 39 finance and consulting firms,
along with the Baccalaureate and Beyond survey, this paper is uniquely able to study hiring
strategies and student outcomes in an important market. Incorporating the search frictions
associated with campus recruiting into a theoretical model yields the following prediction:
recruiting decisions are driven not just by university quality, but by the university’s quality
relative to others in the region. The paper presents reduced form and structural evidence
that search frictions exist in this market, and they have important consequences for firm
behavior and student outcomes. Holding quality constant, firms are less likely to recruit
at a university when the surrounding universities are more selective, resulting in lower
earnings for recent graduates (holding constant the individual’s SAT score). These results
underscore the importance of one’s pool for labor market outcomes, and suggest that there
are benefits to attending the best university in a small pond.
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The results raise larger questions about the equity and efficiency consequences of elite
universities. These consequences are worth evaluating through the framework of firm hir-
ing, recognizing this is just one of many relevant frameworks. In the presence of elite
universities, students at non-elite universities have reduced access to prestigious firms.
This assumes that firms would on occasion choose differently than the elite university ad-
missions committee. In this case, a system without elite universities is more equitable,
where equity is defined as equal access to firms for students equally likely to be hired by
those firms.
Elite universities also allow college admission decisions to have larger snowball effects.
Two very similar high school students may have vastly different career and income tra-
jectories because of elite college admissions. While equity may be greater without elite
universities, this system may not be more efficient. Elite universities incur substantial
screening costs, arguably reducing these costs for firms.46 The higher reviewing costs may
outweigh the benefit from choosing differently than the admissions committee.
The results also raise the question of why students choose to go to non-elite universities
in the East, when they could attend an equally ranked university in another region with
better labor market outcomes. In the model, firms decide how to allocate across universities
once they observe the size and quality of the universities in their market. In this sense, size
and quality of the university are treated as exogenous and no general equilibrium effects
are considered. Consider the possibility that students have applied to colleges accounting
for the benefits of attending the best university in the region. In this case, the quality of
Texas A & M should be greater than Penn State because it is higher ranked in its region,
even though observationally they are quite similar. This seems unlikely given the number
and diversity of controls for university quality.
There are a few possible explanations for why the quality of the university is not depen-
dent on the regional ranking. One likely possibility is that high school seniors applying to
college are not choosing their universities based on the employers recruiting there. Notably,
46This is just a transfer unless screening costs are lower for universities than for firms.
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labor market outcomes of recent graduates are not included in the US News and World
Report rankings. Another likely possibility is that college students derive significant value
from being close to their family and friends, which has implications for labor market mo-
bility in the United States. Specifically, this paper finds that high SAT score students earn
20% less at universities of equal absolute quality, but lower regional rank by 50 places.
This differential can be understood as the amenity value of living in the Northeast. This
explanation suggests that students care about living in the Northeast, and so are willing
to accept lower wages to do so.
Future work will investigate whether the regional rank of an individual’s alma mater
has persistent effects on labor market outcomes. There are important implications for
policymakers, along with students and their families, if these differences diminish over
time as workers gain experience and reveal their ability, or if an initial lack of access to
certain firms prohibits future access and affects earnings in the long-run.
Campus recruiting provides a unique opportunity to observe firm hiring strategies, in
an important market characterized by costly search frictions. As such, it represents an
exciting area for further research. Current, on-going research projects include a study of
firm hiring strategies and the business cycle, whether firm hiring is responsive to changes
in university size and quality, and determinants of the industries that recruit on campus.
1.11 Theoretical Appendix
This Appendix presents the derivations and proofs of the propositions stated in Section
1.3.
First, the details for deriving Proposition 1 are presented. These follow LMD very
closely, and so were not presented in the main text. As mentioned, the two-stage game is
solved backwards, starting with the second stage in which students apply to firms given
the firms’ wage offers, and then moving to the first stage in which firms offer wages.
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1.11.1 Students’ Equilibrium Strategy
Let  be the expected number of applicants from university  to firm . Since  is
the probability that any applicant is actually an H-type,  is the expected number of
applicants to firm  who are H-types. The probability that an additional applicant will be
hired is given by
( ) ≡ 
∞X
=0
1
+ 1
−()
! (1.16)
where 
−()! represents the Poisson probability that  other H-type applicants
would appear, and 1(+1) is the probability that the additional applicant would be hired.
The expression inside the sum represents the probability of being hired given that the
applicant is an H-type. However, not all applicants are H-types, and so the summation is
multiplied by the probability of being an H-type, . Manipulating the series yields
( ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
   = 0
(1−− )    0
(1.17)
Thus, if  denotes the expected income or payoff that the student from university 
can obtain by applying to firm , we have
 = ( ) (1.18)
Suppose that firms have set wage offers Wt≡ hwtii at university , and that the stu-
dent application subgame has an equilibrium in which all students adopt the same mixed
strategy. Then let  = {} denote the maximum expected income available to
students at university  in that equilibrium.
Students will choose to apply only to firms for which  = , so we can think of 
as the market expected income at university .
Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium of the student application subgame,
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 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
   ≥ 
    
(1.19)
 satisfies
  0    
 = 0   ≤ 
(1.20)
and
 = −1( ) |    ≥  (1.21)
The above line follows since  is exogenous, and it is thus possible to take the inverse
of  with  given. This implies that given Wt the total expected number of applicants
at all firms recruiting at university  is
X
=1
 ≡
X
{|≥}
(−1( ) | ) (1.22)
which depends only on the value of .
Therefore, in equilibrium  must take on a value that satisfies
X
{|≥}
(−1( ) | ) =  (1.23)
because  is the parametrically fixed expected number of applicants from university .
−1 is strictly decreasing in , and the summand can lose but not gain terms as K
increases, and so the left hand side of the equation is strictly decreasing in K. Thus, the
equation has a unique solution for  denoted by ∗ (Wt)
Equations (1.19) through (1.21) and  =  yield a vector of application probabilities
q∗t(Wt) that defines a unique symmetric equilibrium of the student application subgame
with offered wagesWt to applicants at university .
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1.11.2 Firms’ Equilibrium Strategy
As mentioned above, firms may only hire at one university. We begin by searching for
a subgame perfect competitive equilibrium of the two-stage game at all universities 
Subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium is a simplification of standard subgame-perfection
in which aggregate variables are assumed constant with respect to the changes in the
strategy of an individual agent. {W∗t q∗t(·)} is a subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium
for each , symmetric among the workers, if:
1. Each firm’s ∗ is a best response to the other components ofW∗t and to the students’
strategies q∗t(·) on the assumption that the market expected income ∗ (Wt) remains
fixed at ∗ (W∗t) and is not sensitive to the firm’s own wage; and
2. q∗t(W) is a best response of each worker to any vector of offered wages,Wt, and to
the choice of q∗(Wt) by all other workers.
Let  ≡  denote the ratio of the expected number of applicants at university  to
the number of firms recruiting students at .  denotes the number of firms recruiting at
university , and  ≡P=1.
Proposition 1: The game between firms and workers at university t has a subgame-
perfect competitive equilibrium {W∗t q∗t(·)} that is unique among those in which all students
at university t adopt the same mixed strategy. In this equilibrium, all students adopt the
strategy q∗t(·), as defined above, and all firms adopt the strategy ∗ as given by
∗ = ( − ) − 1 (1.24)
The expected income of each worker is
∗ (W∗t) = (ptv− c)e−rtpt (1.25)
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and the operating profit of each firm is
∗ = [1− (1 + )− ]( −  ) (1.26)
As  goes from 0 to ∞, ∗ goes from 0 to  −  , ∗ goes from  −  to 0 and ∗ (W∗t)
goes from  −  to 0.
The basic steps of the derivation are straightforward. Substitution of equation (1.21)
into (1.3) yields
 = (1− −)( −  )− (W
∗
t) (1.27)
With ∗ (W∗t) held constant, the first-order condition for profit maximization implies
∗(Wt) = 1 
 − 
∗ (W∗t) (1.28)
and it follows that ∗(Wt) is the same for all firms  recruiting at university . Since each
worker applies to just one firm, we have that ∗ =  = , so then (1.25) follows from
(1.28). Equations (1.21) and (1.27) and the definition of  then yield equations (1.24) and
(1.26).
1.11.3 Proposition 2: The expected number of applicants per firm, , is de-
creasing in p.
Proof:
Since profits have to be equal for all firms, regardless of whether they recruit at a
university with a high  or a lower , we can use the expression for profits to see what must
happen to  when we change  Using the implicit function theorem:


µ
(1− −)( − (  − 
( − 1))−


¶
=
− ¡32 + (−1 +  − (1 + ))¢
2 (1.29)
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

µ
(1− −)( − (  − 
( − 1))−


¶
= − (( − )) (1.30)

 =
22(− + )
( − ) +
(1−  + )
3( − ) (1.31)
Note that the first term in equation (1.31) is less than zero, since if firms recruit at a
university,  ≥ . When  = 0, the numerator of the second term in equation (1.31) is
zero. The numerator is decreasing in , and so for   0, the numerator will be negative.
Thus,   0.¥
1.11.4 Proposition 3: The expected number of high-type applicants per firm,
, is decreasing in .
Proof: When  = 0, the profit from recruiting at each university, seen in equation (1.9) is
(1− −)(− ()(−1)). This implies that when  = 0  is the same at all universities
 in the market. We want to show that with positive application costs,  is decreasing in
. We know that profits will continue to be equalized at all universities after the increase
in  This implies that for all  we must have

 =  (1.32)
We write

 =

 +



 (1.33)
Using the expression for profit in equation (1.27), we find that

 =
−(1− − + )
 (1.34)
When  = 0,  is the same for all universities , so the numerator of equation (1.34)
is the same at all universities. Thus, for universities with higher , the magnitude of 
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will be lower. Since  is negative, this means that it will be less negative for universities
with higher .
Similarly, we see that

 = 
−( − ) (1.35)
Since  is the same at all universities, we see that   0. Equation (1.33) then implies
that since  is the same regardless of , because  is more negative for lower  and  is
smaller for lower , then  must be larger for lower , 2  0 Thus, when  = 0  is
the same for all universities , and when  is increased    for   . Intuitively,
we can understand that when  is increased, profits immediately fall more at universities
with lower  because firms at these universities have to read through more applications and
so are more affected by the applicant reviewing cost. When increasing  profits increase
more at universities with higher  because there is a higher probability that each added
applicant will be an H-type, and so the marginal benefit of adding an applicant is higher.
After  is increased, since profits fall more at universities with lower , firms will move
from these universities to universities with higher . This will result in a greater number
of high-types per firm at universities with lower  than before  was raised. However, in
this case, the number of high-types per firm at universities with higher  will actually fall
because of the in-flow of firms from universities with lower .
This is equivalent to showing that when we increase the application costs from zero,
2
  0. ¥
1.11.5 Proposition 4: The wage offered at university t, ( −(−1)), is increas-
ing in .
Proof: We find the total derivative of the equilibrium expression for , with respect to .
Taking the total derivative allows for  to be affected by changes in  as well.

 =

 +




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The partial derivatives are obtained from  = ( −(−1)), while  is obtained using
the implicit function theorem as in Proposition 2.

 =
− + ( − ( − ))
( − 1)2

 =
−( − )(1 + ( − 1))
(−1 + )2

 =
−32 + (1−  + (1 + ))
3( − )

 =
µ(−1 + 2 + 2(−1 + )− (1 + ))
(−1 + )2
¶µ
1
2
¶
The denominator of  is greater than zero. To check that

  0, we need that
(−1 + 2 + 2(−1 + ) − (1 + ))  0. This expression is zero when  = 0, and
positive for positive values of . Thus, the wage offer will be higher at universities with
higher , and the difference in the wages will be even greater as application costs increase.¥
1.11.6 Propositions 5, 6: The equilibrium implies a cut-off value of ,  such
that for universities with  below the cut-off, it is not profitable for any
firm to recruit.
Proof: We want to find the value of  such that the profit from being the only firm to
recruit at a university with this value of of , is equal to the profit from recruiting at one of
the universities with   , when all firms are recruiting at these universities. Note that
the profit is equal at all universities with higher  since they each have recruiting firms.
Since we have a mass of firms, we consider the case when the number of firms recruiting
at the university with  =  is infinitesimally small, which implies that the number of
expected applicants per firm is infinite. This implies that firms find an H-type applicant
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with probability 1, but they will have to go through many applicants to do so because  is
low. The wage that will be offered at this university will be the outside offer, since there is
no competition among firms at this university. Thus, the equation determining the cut-off
value of , where 1   is
 −  = (1− 
−1( 11 ))( −1 − 1 ) = 
∗ (1.36)
This implies that
 =  − ∗ (1.37)
It is clear that a higher equilibrium level of profit decreases the denominator, and so
implies a higher value for  ¥
This implies that the cut-off depends on the level of profit in the market, which is
determined by the parameters ( ) and the ( ) combination at each university in the
market.
1.12 Empirical Appendix
1.12.1 Calculating 
The proportion of high-type students is assumed to be the percentage of students in the
incoming class who scored in the 700 to 800 range on the SAT math or the 30 to 36 range
on the ACT math. These represent the highest ranges of each exam. If each student
only reported the SAT or the ACT then the proportion of high-type students, , would be
obtained by averaging the percent of students in the highest SAT range and the percent of
students in the highest ACT range. This average would be weighted by the percentage of
students reporting each exam. However, some students report both the SAT and ACT, and
so the percent reporting SAT and percent reporting ACT does not sum to one. Assuming
that those who submit both exams have randomly distributed scores, the denominator in
the proportion reporting each exam is instead the sum of the percent reporting SAT and
percent reporting ACT. Specifically,
 =  ∗ (%[700 800] ) + ∗ (%[30 36] ) (1.38)
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 = %
% +% (1.39)
 = %
% +% (1.40)
For universities that have these data from the Common Data Set,  is calculated in this
way. However, not all universities had their 2008-2009 Common Data Set publicly available,
and even for those which did, some did not report these variables. Many of these universities
do report the 25th and 75th percentiles of the test scores in IPEDS. For these universities, it
is possible to predict the percent of students falling in the test score range, using their data
on test score percentiles. The prediction is calculated using the sample of individuals with
both the Common Data Set, and the 25th and 75th percentiles of test score, separately for
the SAT and ACT. While a number of specifications including higher level terms of the test
score percentiles were examined, the only specification yielding monotonic results was the
linear specification. In other specifications, higher score percentiles sometimes predicted
lower values of . The predicted percentage falling in the highest range of each exam is
then averaged, weighted by the proportion reporting each exam (which here is taken from
the IPEDS data since these universities only had IPEDS score data). If the university only
reported SAT percentiles and not ACT percentiles, just the SAT data was used to calculate
 rather than discarding the observation, similarly for those with only ACT scores.
1.12.2 Community Detection Algorithm
Community detection, which has its roots in physics, has been used to study various kinds
of networks, from the internet to social networks. These networks are understood to consist
of individual nodes, and possible links between the nodes. One area of interest in the study
of these networks is identifying communities, groups of nodes that have many links between
them and few links outside of them. This is often referred to as the “community structure”
of the network. Applying this to firm recruiting, there are certain underlying communities
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of firms and universities. These communities are characterized by firms that are very likely
to recruit at universities in the community, and not outside the community (Newman 2004).
The objective is to find those communities and treat them as separate labor markets in
the empirical section of the paper.
The algorithm used in this paper is one developed by Newman (Newman, 2004) to
detect communities in large networks in reasonable time. The Newman algorithm gives
similar results to previous algorithms that are intractable for networks with more than 20
or 30 nodes. The network in this paper has 51 nodes, one for each state and Washington,
DC. The algorithm develops a metric for testing whether a particular community division is
meaningful, and optimizes that metric over all possible divisions. Specifically, the algorithm
starts with each node as the sole member of a community, and then joins communities in
pairs always choosing the join that results in the greatest increase (or smallest decrease)
in the metric.
In this paper the nodes are each state and Washington, DC. The links between state
A and state B are defined as the number of firms in state A that recruit at a university in
state B, or vice versa. The algorithm defines the communities such that there are many
recruiting relationships within communities and few across communities. The division
that yields the highest value of the metric results in four communities. The metric value
of .8951 represents significant community structure, as values above .3 appear to indicate
significant community structure in practice (Newman 2004). The divisions are the East,
Midwest, South, and West. The states comprising these regions are listed in the paper. A
number of states are only in regions by themselves, as discussed in the paper.
Other divisions also yielded metrics with large values. The second highest metric value
was .8946, and was the same as the optimal division, but combined the South and the West
above. The third highest had a value of .8941 and was the same as the optimal metric but
separated the West into two different communities: South-Central West (Louisiana, Texas,
Oklahoma, Colorado); and Far West (Arizona, Utah, California, Oregon, Washington,
Idaho).
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Figure 1.2a:  Bain Recruiting Page for Texas A&M 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2b: Bain Recruiting Page for Penn State 
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Figure 1.3:  Differences in Regional Rank for a Given University Quality 
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Figure 1.4:  Differences in Regional Rank and the Number of Recruiting Firms 
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Note:  See text for calculation of regional rank and percent scoring at least 700 on Math SAT or 30 
on Math ACT.  Figure 1.4 plots the lowess regression line of the number of recruiting firms on p 
(the percent of students scoring at least 700 on Math SAT or 30 on Math ACT), excluding p > .72 
in the West.  
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Figure 1.5:  Number of Firms Recruiting at Universities by University Quality 
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Figure 1.6:  Percent of Firms Recruiting at the University: Observed vs. Predicted in the 
East  
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Note:  This figure graphically displays the goodness‐of‐fit of the structural model.  The last bin 
includes all universities with greater than .0455 of the recruiting firms.  
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Panel A: Number of Firms
East Midwest South West
# Consulting Firms 21 19 13 20
# Banking Firms 17 13 10 16
Total Firms 38 32 23 36
# Consulting Firm Offices 152 94 40 141
# Banking Firm Offices 128 55 44 94
Total Firm Offices 280 149 84 235
Number of Universities 168 67 29 71
Panel B: National Rank of Top 5 Regionally Ranked Universities
Regional Rank East Midwest South West
1 2 6 13 1
2 3 12 24 9
3 4 20 37 14
4 5 22 72 27
5 7 35 92 28
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Region
National Rank
Note:  Regions and university ranks are as defined in the paper. Number of firms 
denotes the number of firms with at least one office in the region.  Number of firm 
offices denotes the total number of offices, across all firms, in the region. Number 
of universities denotes the number of universities in the sample.  Sample 
construction is described in the paper.
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East Midwest South West
p (Proportion of High‐Types) 0.49 0.45 0.4 0.41
[.24] [.21] [.26] [.23]
Regional Rank 34.07 15.32 7.47 13.52
[35.21] [18.07] [8.79] [13.28]
National Rank 64.44 66.72 102.2 76.1
[76.58] [66.18] [112.89] [67.61]
Percent Admitted 28.71 47.25 41.87 37.58
[17.5] [20.33] [15.03] [23.08]
US News Ranking 30.59 40.81 46 40.85
[36.] [35.26] [39.81] [33.04]
SAT Verbal, 75th Percentile 718.03 694.62 682.33 688.93
[59.58] [55.08] [63.11] [50.64]
ACT English, 75th Percentile 33.08 31.67 30.89 31.89
[2.13] [2.51] [3.48] [2.34]
% in [700,800] SAT Verbal 0.41 0.27 0.27 0.27
[.24] [.21] [.17] [.21]
% in [30,36] ACT English 0.6 0.44 0.47 0.47
[.22] [.21] [.27] [.26]
% in Top 10 Percent of HS Class 0.75 0.64 0.66 0.74
[.25] [.26] [.21] [.24]
# Students 2090.85 3977.84 2790.97 3790.94
[1434.24] [2415.08] [1769.29] [2247.61]
Public 0.19 0.55 0.5 0.52
[.39] [.51] [.53] [.51]
Large City 0.31 0.24 0.5 0.42
[.47] [.43] [.53] [.5]
% Receiving Any Aid 67.28 73.42 78.8 71.85
[13.04] [10.6] [15.75] [8.2]
% Receiving Pell Grants 13.46 11.97 16.77 17.88
[5.93] [4.22] [12.88] [6.52]
% Receiving Loans 34.33 41.89 34.4 32.09
[18.7] [10.53] [13.28] [14.1]
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Universities with at Least One Recruiting Firm, by Region
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East Midwest South West
% Black 6.93 4.92 16.37 4.04
[7.04] [1.62] [25.5] [1.78]
% Hispanic 5.31 4.22 5.5 10.09
[2.06] [1.86] [4.86] [3.86]
Tuition (in‐state for public universities) 29772.61 20888.49 17793.9 16696.95
[11440.72] [13956.22] [16014.63] [15797.48]
N 90 27 10 32
Note:  Standard deviations are in brackets.  Sample only contains universities with at least one 
recruiting firm.  Each university is weighted by the number of firms recruiting there, and the 
weights are normalized so that the sum of the weights equals the total number of universities in 
the sample (in the East, Midwest, South, and West; not including the universities in the regions 
comprised of just one state).  p denotes the proportion of students scoring between a 700 and 
800 on the Math SAT or 30 and 36 on the Math ACT.  Regional and national ranks are calculated 
based on p.  Detailed description of the calculation of p is included in the paper and the 
Appendix.  A number of universities are missing values for SAT and ACT percentiles, US News 
ranking, % in top 10 percent of HS class, and tuition.  The means of 
these variables are calculated only over the non‐missing values. 
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Universities with at Least One Recruiting Firm, by Region 
(continued)
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Students 
Per Firm
High Type 
Students Per Firm  Ln(Earnings)
East ‐267.4*** ‐6.158 0.0192
[37.31] [4.035] [0.0199]
Midwest ‐422.1*** ‐30.87** 0.0769**
[80.88] [12.94] [0.0341]
South ‐224.9 16.63 ‐0.0556
[154.2] [23.81] [0.0339]
West ‐364.8*** ‐20.31** 0.0115
[79.00] [8.495] [0.0225]
Note:  *** p‐value ≤ .01, ** p‐value ≤ .05, * p‐value ≤ .1.  Robust standard errors in brackets. Each 
cell represents a separate regression, and contains the coefficient on the proportion of high‐
types at the university (in tenths). The dependent variable is denoted at the top of the column, 
and the region is denoted at the beginning of the row.  Separate regressions are estimated for 
each region.  In columns 1 and 2, each observation is a university with at least one recruiting 
firm.  In column 3, each observation is an individual who graduated in the previous year from a 
university in the specified region, and scored at least a 1400 on the SAT or ACT (converted to 
SAT score). See text for detailed explanation of the regression sample. The dependent variable 
in the third column is adjusted for state price parity as described in the paper. The average wage 
of college graduates age 25‐34 in the individualʹs state of residence is included as an additional 
control variable in the third column, also adjusted for state price parity. The earnings data is 
from the Baccalaureate and Beyond 2009 survey, described in the text.  In columns 1 and 2, there 
are 90 observations  in the East, 27 in the Midwest, 10 in the South, and 32 in the West. In 
column 3 there are 90 observations in the East; 50 in the Midwest; 10 in the South; and 50 in the 
West. Sample sizes in the third column are rounded to the nearest ten to preserve 
confidentiality.
Table 1.3: Relationship between University Selectivity, Students per Firm, 
and Earnings
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Dependent Variable: Recruit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regional Rank (in hundreds) ‐0.0567*** ‐0.0431** ‐0.0416** ‐0.0450**
[0.0178] [0.0194] [0.0195] [0.0214]
Regional Rank (in hundreds) *Consulting ‐0.0268** ‐0.0267** ‐0.0267**
[0.0118] [0.0117] [0.0118]
Regional Rank (in hundreds) *Investment 
Management 0.00903 0.0114 0.00901
[0.0329] [0.0328] [0.0329]
# Finance and Consulting Offices in Region 
(in hundreds) 0.0254** 0.0258** 0.0246** 0.0248**
[0.0107] [0.0107] [0.0108] [0.0111]
US News Ranking (in tens) ‐0.00608** ‐0.00563** ‐0.00536* ‐0.00563**
[0.00238] [0.00280] [0.00276] [0.00280]
# Seniors with ≥ 700 on Math SAT or ≥ 30 on 
Math ACT (in thousands) 0.223*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.202***
[0.0391] [0.0491] [0.0489] [0.0491]
Institution in Large City ‐0.00951 ‐0.00641 ‐0.00823 ‐0.00626
[0.0112] [0.0138] [0.0138] [0.0139]
Distance between School and Firm (in 
hundreds of miles) ‐0.0131*** ‐0.0127*** ‐0.0125*** ‐0.0126***
[0.00215] [0.00215] [0.00215] [0.00216]
Offer MBA 0.0246***
[0.00861]
Students in Region Scoring ≥ 700 on Math 
SAT or ≥ 30 on Math ACT  2.32e‐09
[9.84e‐09]
N 11,192 11,192 11,192 11,192
Mean(Recruit) 0.074
Table 1.4: Effect of Regional Rank on Firm Recruiting Decisions
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Table 1.4 (continued)
Note:  *** p‐value ≤ .01, ** p‐value ≤ .05, * p‐value ≤ .1.  Regional Rank refers to the 
rank of the university within its region.  See text and Appendix for details on 
variable and sample construction, as well as a full list of variables in the 
regressions.  Regressions include firm fixed effects, and standard errors are 
clustered at the university level. For variables with missing data, indicators denote 
whether the variable is non‐missing for a particular university. Regions are defined 
using a community detection algorithm, and include the East, South, Midwest, and 
West.  States comprising these regions are listed in the paper. Columns 2 through 4 
contain interactions between every university‐level characteristic and indicators for 
Consulting and Investment Management.  Column 3 additionally includes an 
indicator for whether the university offers a Bachelorʹs of Business Administration.
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East Midwest South West
Characteristics of Respondentʹs University
National Rank 128 194 234 189
[107] [102] [122] [99]
Regional Rank 49 62 19 40
[30] [38] [11] [23]
Percent Admitted 0.48 0.74 0.65 0.68
[.2] [.12] [.15] [.2]
Number of Students 2197.44 2605.25 3211.42 3140.36
[1446.79] [2229.21] [2192.36] [1977.81]
Number of Students with SAT Math 
> 700 or ACT Math > 30 524.73 407.15 381.47 406.88
[453.87] [565.78] [383.16] [323.35]
Characteristics of Respondent
Black 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01
[.24] [.15] [.24] [.12]
Hispanic 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.1
[.23] [.16] [.28] [.3]
Male 0.5 0.5 0.43 0.54
[.5] [.5] [.5] [.5]
Combined SAT/ACT Score 1227 1130 1120 1151
[169] [164] [180] [175]
Income in 2006 82,526 83,225 81,124 71,003
[69115] [65904] [81041] [80975]
Income in 2009 39,918 42,936 42,957 40,630
[16837] [24492] [16299] [20327]
Dependent in 2007‐2008 0.92 0.85 0.77 0.75
[.28] [.36] [.42] [.43]
Table 1.5:  Summary Statistics of Individual Level Data, by Region of Bachelorʹs 
Degree Institution
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East Midwest South West
Characteristics of Respondentʹs State of Residence, 2009
Average Earnings of College 
Graduate 51,521 54,071 54,738 51,716
[4014] [2863] [4758] [6263]
Regional Price Parity 111.04 92.56 92.24 104.28
[17.26] [10.72] [10.64] [17.2]
N 520 810 220 580
Note:  Means with standard deviations in brackets, by region of the individualʹs 
Bachelorʹs degree institution.  See text for construction of sample and region 
definitions. Regional and National rank are based on the proportion of students 
scoring above 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT. See text for detailed 
description of variable construction.  Mean SAT/ACT score calculated only over those 
individuals with data.  The sample size for the Combined SAT/ACT score is 510 in the 
East, 800 in the Midwest, 220 in the South, 570 in the West. Sample sizes are rounded 
to the nearest ten to preserve confidentiality.  Income in 2006 is adjusted for regional 
price parity based on the respondentʹs legal state of residence in 2007‐2008. Income in 
2009 is adjusted for regional price parity based on the respondentʹs state of residence 
in 2009.  Average Earnings of College Graduate is the average earnings of college 
graduates aged 25‐34 in the respondentʹs state of residence in 2009. This variable is 
from the American Community Survey, and is adjusted for regional price parity 
based on the respondentʹs state of residence in 2009. 
Table 1.5:  Summary Statistics of Individual Level Data, by Region of Bachelorʹs 
Degree Institution (continued)
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Table 1.6: Effect of the Alma Materʹs Regional Rank on Recent Graduate Earnings 
(1) (2)
All Students SAT≥1400
SAT/ACT Score 0.0324*** ‐0.0218
[0.00651] [0.0556]
Universityʹs Regional Rank ‐0.0851* ‐0.426**
[0.0488] [0.179]
Average Earnings of College Graduate in 
State of Residence (in thousands) 0.0222*** 0.0136***
[0.00239] [0.00490]
Observations 2230 200
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
university level. The dependent variable is the natural log of the 
respondentʹs earnings in 2009, adjusted for state price parity based on the 
state of residence in 2009. Average Earnings of College Graduate is the 
average earnings of college graduates aged 25‐34 in the respondentʹs state of 
residence in 2009.  See text for details on variable construction and the 
regression sample. Additional explanatory variables include: income in 2006 
(parental for dependent and respondent for independent), national rank of 
the studentʹs university (based on p), number of students in the entering 
class scoring above 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math ACT (number of 
students * p), number of entering students at the university in 2004, percent 
of applicants admitted by the university, and indicators for whether the 
student is black, asian, other race, hispanic, male, US Citizen, dependent in 
2007‐2008, and whether the student reported her test score.  Sample sizes 
are rounded to the nearest ten to preserve confidentiality.
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School Home Region
% of Universityʹs 
Students from Home 
Region
% of Universityʹs 
Students Moving to 
Home Region 
Dartmouth East North Central1  6.5% 3.0%
Princeton Midwest2  9.4% 5.1%
Georgetown Illinois 4.5% 1.5%
Dartmouth West South Central3  4.8% 1.5%
Georgetown Texas 3.6% 1.6%
Washington 
University
Southwest4 8.6% 5.0%
Dartmouth Pacific5  12.9% 10.4%
Princeton Southwest/West6  15.9% 13.0%
Georgetown California 10.0% 4.2%
Washington 
University
West7  8.3% 10.0%
Duke California 8.6% 10.1%
Washington 
University
Northeast8  23.3% 20.0%
Vanderbilt Northeast9  16.8% 17.8%
UCLA Eastern US10  2.2% 5.0%
UC Berkeley Eastern US10  2.5% 2.9%
Panel D: Flows to the Northeast Post‐Graduation
Notes: This table compares the percentage of a universityʹs student population originally 
from the specified region to the percentage moving to that region following graduation. Data 
sources are described in paper.  Superscripts denote the following regions:  1 
(WI,IL,IN,MI,OH), 2 (ND,SD,NE,KS,MO,IA,MN,IL,WI,IN,OH,MI), 3 (TX,OK,AR,LA), 4 
(TX,OK,CO,NM,AZ), 5 (CA,OR,WA), 6 (TX,OK,NM,AZ,CA,NV), 7 
(CA,OR,WA,UT,ID,WY,MT), 8 (NJ,NY,CT,RI,MA,VT,NH,ME), 9 
(CT,MA,ME,NH,NJ,NY,RI,VT), 10 (Exact states not provided, census regions inferred: New 
England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East South Central).  
Table 1.7: Pre‐ and Post‐College Student Geographic Mobility
Panel A: Flows to the Midwest Post‐Graduation
Panel B: Flows to the Southwest Post‐Graduation
Panel C: Flows to the West Post‐Graduation
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Table 1.8: Counterfactual Exercise‐Zero Screening Costs
University p
c 
(Reviewing 
cost)
% of  
Firms # Firms Wage
H‐type 
Applicants 
per Firm
Expected 
Income
0.09 0.00% 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00
0 0.12% 3.22 0.37 1.76 0.01
0.09 0.22% 6.08 0.02 4.20 0.0007
0 0.52% 14.48 0.37 1.76 0.02
0.09 2.58% 72.27 0.45 1.25 0.22
0 1.84% 51.38 0.37 1.76 0.15
Note: This table presents the results from counterfactually setting the cost of reviewing an 
applicant to zero, from .09 (the estimated value in the East). See text for details. The variable p 
denotes the proportion of students scoring at least a 700 on the Math SAT or 30 on the Math 
ACT. The variable c  denotes the cost of reviewing an applicant, and this is relative to worker 
productivity of 1. Wage and expected income are also relative to worker productivity of 1. A 
wage of zero can be understood as the reservation wage. 
University of 
New Hampshire
0.05
Fordham 
University
0.14
0.86MIT
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Banking Firms Consulting Firms
4 JP Morgan Investment Bank McKinsey 1
6 Credit Suisse Boston Consulting Group 2
8 Barclays Investment Banking Bain 3
11 Evercore Booz and Company 4
13 Perella Weinberg Mercer 6
14 Jefferies Monitor 7
20 Deloitte Corporate Finance Oliver Wyman 10
22 Royal Bank of Scotland AT Kearney 11
31 Piper Jaffray Parthenon 16
32 BNY Mellon Towers Watson 17
41 Miller Buckfire Navigant 19
46 Gleacher ZS Associates 21
48 Susquehanna NERA 24
Huron 27
Investment Management Firms Aon Hewitt 32
8 The D. E. Shaw Group Cornerstone 34
9 Wellington Management Cambridge Group 35
13 Fidelity Charles River Associates 36
19 Vanguard Corporate Executive Board 38
Advisory Board 39
Analysis Group 40
First Manhattan Group 43
Appendix Table 1.1: Firms in Dataset, Listed in Order of Firm Rank Within Industry
85
Marginal Effect Evaluated at 
Regional Rank of:  10 30 60 10 30 60
(1) Regional Rank (in hundreds) 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.008
[0.025] [0.023] [0.021] [0.030] [0.028] [0.025]
(2)
Regional Rank (in hundreds) *
Consulting ‐0.047* ‐0.043* ‐0.038** ‐0.046 ‐0.043 ‐0.038*
[0.027] [0.023] [0.019] [0.032] [0.028] [0.023]
Combination (1) + (2) ‐0.039 ‐0.036 ‐0.032 ‐0.036 ‐0.033 ‐0.030
[0.030] [0.026] [0.020] [0.034] [0.030] [0.023]
Observations 11,192 11,192 11,192 11,192 11,192 11,192
Probit Logit
Appendix Table 1.2: Effect of Regional Rank on Firm Recruiting Decisions‐Marginal 
Effects from Probit and Logit Estimation
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table presents the results from probit and logit 
estimation of specification (1.11). The coefficients presented are the marginal effects at 
varying levels of regional rank.  See text for details.
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Dependent Variable: Recruit (1) (2) (3)
Competing Students Per Firm Office (in hundreds) ‐0.0220** ‐0.00941 ‐0.00872
[0.0108] [0.0126] [0.0128]
Competing Students Per Firm Office (in hundreds) 
*Consulting ‐0.0339*** ‐0.0333***
[0.0122] [0.0122]
Competing Students Per Firm Office (in hundreds) 
*Investment Management ‐0.0189 ‐0.0168
[0.0354] [0.0354]
US News Ranking (in tens) ‐0.00693*** ‐0.00606** ‐0.00570**
[0.00224] [0.00266] [0.00262]
# Seniors with ≥ 700 on Math SAT or ≥ 30 on Math 
ACT (in thousands) 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.194***
[0.0358] [0.0470] [0.0467]
Institution in Large City ‐0.0110 ‐0.00791 ‐0.00954
[0.0115] [0.0139] [0.0139]
Distance between School and Firm (in hundreds of 
miles) ‐0.0124*** ‐0.0125*** ‐0.0123***
[0.00214] [0.00213] [0.00210]
Offer MBA 0.0248***
[0.00849]
N 11,192 11,192 11,192
Mean(Recruit) 0.074
Appendix Table 1.3: Effect of Competing Students on Firm Recruiting Decisions
Note:  *** p‐value ≤ .01, ** p‐value ≤ .05, * p‐value ≤ .1.  Competing Students Per Firm Office 
varies at the university level, and captures the competition for that schoolʹs students, coming 
from students at other universities at least as elite in the same region.  See text for details and 
for all explanatory variables included in the regression.  Regressions include firm fixed 
effects, and standard errors are clustered at the university level. The regression is restricted to 
observations for which the school and firm are located in the same region. For variables for 
which some universities are missing data, an indicator is included for whether the variable is 
non‐missing so that no universities are discarded from the sample.  Regions are defined using 
a community detection algorithm, and include (but are not limited to) the East, South, 
Midwest, and West.  States comprising these regions are listed in the paper. Columns 2 and 3 
contain interactions between every university‐level characteristic and indicators for 
Consulting and Investment Management.  Column 3 additionally includes an indicator for 
whether the university offers a Bachelorʹs of Business Administration.
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Appendix Table 1.4: Parameter Estimates based on Structural Estimation
East Midwest South West
c 0.09 0.03 0.1 0.12
λ 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.15
Profit 0.32 0.84 0.38 0.22
Number of Firms 2800 1490 840 2350
Note: Applicant reviewing costs are denoted by c, the 
proportion of students interested in working at these firms is 
denoted by λ, and profit denotes the equilibrium profit every 
firm receives from recruiting at a university in the region. Profit 
and parameter estimates for c are relative to student 
productivity of 1. See text for detailed explanation of the 
estimation. 
Chapter 2
The Wage Effects of Not-for-Profit and For-Profit
Certifications: Better Data, Somewhat Different
Results (with Kevin Lang)
2.1 Introduction
Critics of for-profit universities charge that these institutions recruit unqualified students
in order to obtain their federal student aid and provide these students with little benefit.
Indeed, in 2009, students at for-profit institutions accounted for nearly half of student
loan defaults (Federal Student Aid Data Center, 2012a), but only about 11 percent of
post-secondary students (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011a). Total funding
received by for-profit post-secondary institutions under Title IV in 2010-2011 was more than
32 billion dollars, about 20% of total Title IV funds (Federal Student Aid Data Center,
2012b; US Department of Education, 2011). Proponents, in contrast, argue that for-profit
institutions educate non-traditional students who would not otherwise attend college and
who therefore benefit from their existence. They maintain that the large quantity of loans
and defaults reflects the efforts of for-profit institutions to serve this under-served group.
Using a rich data set, we examine the labor market return to certificates and/or As-
sociate’s degrees, which we refer to collectively as certifications, and ask whether these
returns differ between for-profit and not-for-profit institutions.1 Estimating differential
returns is challenging. Since students who enter for-profit institutions tend to be disadvan-
1 In this paper, not-for-profit institutions include both public institutions and private, not-for-profit
institutions.
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taged, their poorer labor market performance after completing their education may reflect
our inability to control adequately for pre-entry differences. Therefore we compare the dif-
ference in earnings between certification completers and non-completers across institution
types. If the difference in earnings between certification completers and non-completers is
similar across institution type, lower earnings of for-profit certification completers are more
likely to be explained by pre-entry differences than by institution type. If the earnings of
certification completers relative to non-completers are lower at for-profit institutions, this
suggests lower returns to for-profit certifications. This conclusion requires that any ability
(or other) bias affecting the measured return to certification be similar across institution
type. To further account for pre-entry differences in background, we present propensity-
score-weighted regressions.
We find no statistically significant differential return to certification from for-profit
institutions. However, the point estimate of the differential return is non-trivially negative
for a for-profit certificate and non-trivially positive for a for-profit Associate’s degree. Much
of the latter difference reflects the greater tendency of strong students at not-for-profits to
continue to a BA, leading to differential selection into the Associate’s-degree-only group.
Controlling for major does not eliminate these differences. Nonetheless, the variation
across major in the return to certifications is large relative to the for-profit/not-for-profit
differential. The return to certificates in business, health fields (except Licensed Practical
Nursing), and human services is small or negative, while the return to a certificate in
vocational fields is positive. In contrast, the return to an Associate’s degree in business
and health fields is very large, while small or negative in vocational fields, liberal arts and
sciences, and human services.
The for-profit differential is identified mainly through majors with many students at
both institution types. The possibly higher return to an Associate’s degree from a for-profit
than from a not-for-profit, therefore applies only to majors served by both sectors. Many
not-for-profit majors are concentrated in Registered Nursing, a very high pay-off major
that is nearly absent from for-profit colleges in our data.
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Further, students starting Associate’s degrees at not-for-profits are more likely to pursue
a Bachelor’s degree. If the best students go on to Bachelor’s programs, the top of the skill
distribution will be missing from the not-for-profit Associate’s degree estimates. These
students will either be classified as having a BA or missing from the data if they are still
enrolled.
There is a small literature analyzing the for-profit post-secondary education sector.
This paper is an updated version of Lang and Weinstein (2012), which utilized the survey
but not the transcript data from the Beginning Post-Secondary Student Survey. The tran-
script data differ considerably from the survey responses and provide more detail about
majors. Of the individuals with both survey and transcript data, approximately 4% have
survey responses conflicting with transcript data on whether they started in a certificate
program. Similarly, approximately 15% have survey responses conflicting with transcript
data on whether they started in an Associate’s degree program. A more detailed com-
parison between the survey and transcript data is included in appendix tables 2.1 and
2.2. While the results in this paper do not differ dramatically from those in our earlier
paper, they are considerably more nuanced. Since the earlier paper received considerable
press coverage for its generally negative conclusions about for-profits, we believe that it is
important to signal that these results are somewhat different and have titled the paper to
reflect this.
Using the NLSY97, Cellini and Chaudhary (2012) find some evidence that the returns
to an Associate’s degree from a for-profit are higher than those from a public institution.
They do not consider certificates, an important educational offering at for-profit post-
secondary institutions. In our sample, more than 60% of students enrolled at for-profit
institutions are in certificate programs. Chung (2008) uses NELS88 which has a sample
of only 157 respondents enrolled in either certificate or Associate’s degree programs at
for-profit colleges. She finds that, after controlling for selection, obtaining a for-profit
certificate results in 141 to 158% higher earnings compared to those who have selected
into the for-profit sector but do not complete any certification. Using administrative data,
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Turner (2011) finds a larger earnings increase after enrollment in two or four year not-for-
profit institutions compared to for-profit institutions. However, the data are limited to
enrollment and do not contain information on certification.
Deming, Goldin and Katz (2012) find that comparable students who enroll at for-profits
are more indebted but more likely to obtain some qualification, most notably certificates
and, more modestly, Associate’s degrees, although less likely to obtain a Bachelor’s degree.
They have lower average earnings in part due to lower employment rates. Their paper
is deliberately exploratory and considers returns to enrollment, and not to certification.
Thus it asks whether, controlling for differences in observables, individuals who enroll in
for-profits have better or worse outcomes than those who enroll in not-for-profits but does
not ask whether there are differential benefits to completing the programs, the focus of this
paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: We begin with a brief introduction to the relevant
institutions. Those readers who are familiar with post-secondary education in the United
States can skip this section. Section 2.3 discusses the methods. Section 2.4 describes the
data. Section 2.5 contains the results. Section 2.6 presents robustness checks, and Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
We limit our discussion to post-secondary institutions accredited by an agency recognized
by the U.S. Department of Education. Post-secondary institutions in the United States
may be public, private but not-for-profit, or private and for-profit. Public institutions
typically receive direct funding from the state in which they are located but generally
also raise significant funds through tuition and other sources. In the period we study, on
average 30% of their funding came from government appropriations and grants for nonop-
erating activities (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011b).2 Public universities
are usually governed by a board of trustees, some of whom are appointed by the state
2Non-operating activites of a university are those which do not provide goods and services.
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government, for example by the governor or the legislature. Not-for-profit institutions are
also generally governed by a board of trustees; however, this board is not appointed by
government officials, or subject to their approval. They do not receive appropriations from
government sources although they may occasionally receive funding for certain operating
or nonoperating activities. In general, public institutions charge lower tuition and fees than
their not-for-profit analogs.
The principal difference between for-profit and not-for-profit private institutions is that
not-for-profit institutions cannot distribute profits to those who control them (Hansmann,
1996) but must distribute them in other ways, such as improving buildings and classrooms
or by avoiding profits through lower prices. In the United States, not-for-profit educational
institutions are generally exempt from corporate and property taxation, donations are tax
deductible for the donor, and they have access to tax-exempt bond financing.
In contrast, for-profit institutions can generate and distribute profits and can therefore
use equity financing. Economists generally model private firms as maximizing profit, and
thus expect that for-profit institutions should choose admissions, education quality and
other practices to do so. In principle, public and not-for-profit institutions maximize some
other objective, perhaps one that depends on the number of students served and the net
benefit they receive.
This could lead to very different behavior between for-profit private institutions, on
the one hand, and public and not-for-profit institions, on the other. However, competition
with the non-profit sector might constrain for-profits to behave similarly to non-profits.
Alternatively, the objectives of the non-profits might lead them to act very much as if
they were maximizing profit. Other combinations are also possible. Pressure from equity
holders might lead for-profits to operate more efficiently and thus avoid expenditures on
famous professors who do not teach, but there also may be pressure to devote less of their
revenues to education.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) develop a model in which firms choose non-profit status to
constrain their ability to maximize profits. This improves their competitive standing in
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markets where firms are able to take advantage of their customers. A related literature
on for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals finds no clear difference in quality (McClellan and
Staiger, 2000). In theory, for-profit institutions have greater incentives to provide lower
quality care in the absence of perfect information which could lead consumers to pay a
premium to stay in a not-for-profit hospital, but this prediction is not confirmed in the
data (Philipson, 2000).
Financial aid from the U.S. government is available for students pursuing career or
college (university) education at qualified public, private for-profit, and private not-for-
profit institutions. All of the students in our sample are at such institutions. First-time
students such as those we study may enter a certificate, Associate’s degree or Bachelor’s
degree program.
The relation among certificates, Associate’s degrees and Bachelor’s degrees can be seen
from the following example, gleaned from the Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU)
website. SNHU is a not—for-profit university. It offers, among others, a certificate in Baking.
The Baking certificate requires the student to successfully complete five courses consisting
of Food Purchasing, Culinary Skills and Procedures, Fundamentals of Baking, Intermediate
Baking, and Safety and Sanitation. It is described as being “for those interested in devel-
oping their baking and/or cooking skills part-time without formally enrolling in a degree
program.” A student wanting more extensive training can enter the Associate in Science in
Baking and Pastry Arts. This degree requires 22 courses: the five courses above plus five
specific additional courses in culinary arts, five specialized courses in baking and pastry
arts, two English courses, one course each in mathematics, fine arts and humanities, and
social and behavioral sciences, a course on the transition to college and one free elective.
The website further informs potential students that graduates can transfer their credits to
the Bachelor’s programs in culinary and hospitality management. The Bachelor of Science
in Culinary Management requires more general education courses, more cooking specific
courses and courses in marketing, management, consumer behavior, accounting and busi-
ness law. Roughly speaking, the Associate’s degree should take two years full-time and
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the Bachelor of Science should take four years. In contrast, the certificate program can be
completed in the full-time equivalent of one half year.
In 2006-07, 78% of Associate’s degree were awarded by public institutions, 6% by not-
for-profits and 16% by for-profits, The corresponding figures for certificates were 53%, 5%
and 42% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008). Of those starting in Associate’s
degree programs in our sample, approximately 75% were in public, 7% in not-for-profit
institutions and 17% in for-profit institutions. The corresponding figures for certificate
programs are 45%, 5% and 50%. It should be evident that the non-profit sector at these
levels is dominated by public institutions rather than not-for-profit privates.
2.3 Methods
Our data, discussed in detail below, consist of students who first enter post-secondary
education in 2003-04. We generate separate estimates for those starting in certificate and
Associate’s degree programs since these groups are likely to be very different. We do not
distinguish among individuals based on the types of programs the institution offers. Thus
we pool individuals enrolled in, for example, certificate programs at two-year and four-year
institutions. We do not examine students starting in non-certification or BA programs. For
ease of presentation, in this section we drop notation distinguishing whether the sample is
those entering certificate or Associate’s degree programs. We use the term certification to
refer to certificates, Associate’s degrees, or Bachelor’s degrees.
2.3.1 Basic Regression Analysis
2.3.1.1 Regressions without Controls for Major
Our starting point is a fairly standard log-earnings equation, in which we do not control
for the individual’s major:
 = + 1 + 2 + 3+ 4+ 5 + 6+ (2.1)
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+ 7 +18 + 
where  denotes log annual earnings in 2009 based on the current job in June of that
year. We have dropped the i subscript for simplicity. The variable C is an indicator for
whether the highest certification obtained was a certificate, and similarly for A(ssociate’s)
and BA(chelor’s). The variable  is an indicator for whether the student started at a
for-profit, and the subscript FP denotes that the certificate or degree was obtained from
a for-profit. Note that an individual who enters, for example, a certificate program in fall
2003 may have no certification, a certificate (but no higher certification such as a degree),
an Associate’s degree or, very rarely, a BA in 2009.
2 through 4 capture the “return” to earning a certification at a not-for-profit while
5 through 7 capture the difference between this return and the return at a for-profit
institution. We use the term “return” loosely to refer to the percentage difference in
earnings between an individual who obtains a certification and one who started but did
not obtain a certification. Thus, this use of return does not account for direct costs.
Because we are focused on the return to certifications, we do not additionally control
for the highest certification program in which the respondent is ever enrolled. Individuals
who enroll in a certification program sometimes enroll in a higher certification program
after completing or, more rarely, without completing their original certification. To avoid
cutting the data too finely, we control only for higher certifications that are completed and
not those merely attempted.
Ability bias is a concern when estimating returns to education. Usually ability bias re-
flects the difference between those who do and do not obtain a certification or an extra year
of education. In our case, ability bias reflects the unobserved difference in ability between
those finishing and those starting but not finishing at a particular type of institution. If
those who attempt post-secondary education but do not complete it are more favorably
selected than those who never attempt it, ability bias is less problematic for our analysis.
Moreover, 5 through 7 can be interpreted as differences-in-differences estimates.
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Therefore, we require only that any ability bias be similar across institution types. More
formally, write
 = Γ+ 2 + 5 + +  (2.2)
where we have combined the remaining variables into  and  and  represent the
unobserved factors that are correlated and uncorrelated with the included explanatory
variables. Our key parameter, 5 will be unbiased if
 ¡ 0 | = 1¢ =  ¡ 0 | = 0¢  (2.3)
If ability bias is the same at for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, it will be removed
when we compare the return at for-profit institutions to not-for-profit institutions. We
discuss the plausibility of this assumption when we describe the data and also in the
robustness section.
1 represents the return to starting a certificate or degree at a for-profit relative to
a not-for-profit, for those who do not receive any certification. This coefficient can differ
from zero either because human capital acquisition differs across institution types even
among those who do not complete a certification, or because the types of students who
do not complete any certification differ across institution types. To address the former
explanation, in some specifications we control for time spent in post-secondary education
and its interaction with  .
1 denotes the explanatory variables that are determined before or just after enroll-
ment, and therefore unlikely to be caused by the starting-institution type. These include
age, household size (parental household size for dependent students, and respondent house-
hold size for independent students), income in 2002 (parental income for dependent students
and respondent income for independent students), number of dependent children in 2003,
and indicators for black, Hispanic, male, English is the primary language, married in 2003,
and born in the United States. The explanatory variables also include family background
characteristics: expected family contribution to college finances in 2003, and indicators
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for parents having at most 12 years of education, respondent claimed as a dependent in
2003, and both parents born in the United States. We also include academic variables:
number of years the individual delayed enrollment in college after high school, whether
attained a high school diploma, and whether obtained a GED. For those who began their
post-secondary schooling before age 24, we also have indicators for high school GPA above
3.0, took the SAT or ACT, and SAT/ACT score. We refer to this last set as the under-24
variables.
There are a number of potentially endogenous variables. These include the total amount
of grants and veterans benefits for college the individual received in 2003, whether the
individual was always a full-time student during his/her postsecondary schooling, GPA in
2003/2004, number of dependent children in 2006 and 2009, married in 2009, the number of
times the student transferred, the number of months since the individual was last enrolled
in college, and total months enrolled. The last two variables are measures of education
quantity and post-education experience but may also be influenced by institution choice.
Our preliminary investigations showed only minor differences from our main results when
we included the post-2003 characteristics. We therefore present results only with the clearly
exogenous explanatory variables except for some robustness checks.
As noted above, some potentially important variables are available only for those start-
ing post-secondary education before age 24. We therefore choose four different combina-
tions of sample and explanatory variables: a “young” sample with all variables, a young
sample with only variables available for the entire sample, an “old” sample, and the full
sample. For the young sample, a specification test never rejects that our baseline estimates
of the effects of certification are unaffected by including the under-24 variables. Moreover,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for the young and old
samples for those starting in Associate’s degree programs. While we do reject this null
for those starting in certificate programs, the coefficients of interest do not differ between
the two samples. We thus estimate a regression interacting every variable with an indica-
tor for being in the older sample, except for these coefficients of interest. Including these
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interactions does not noticeably change the interpretation of the results.
For ease of presentation, we focus on the results from the regressions without these
interactions. We present the main specification estimates for the young sample with the
under-24 variables, the old sample, and for the full sample. For all remaining specifications,
we present only the results for the full sample, which are also generally the most precise.
However, in the text we point out any notable differences among samples and specifications.
2.3.1.2 Regressions Controlling for Major
Returns may differ among institutions because the fields they cover have different returns.
Therefore, we augment equation (2.1) with indicators for major of highest certification or
highest certification program for non-completers. These are business, manual and tech-
nological vocational training, liberal arts and sciences, human services, registered nursing,
licensed practical/vocational nursing, health administration, allied health-assisting, allied
health-treatment, somatic bodywork and related therapeutic services, health preparatory
programs, other health majors, health (survey),3 and undeclared. These comprise the full
set of majors in the data.
To allow major to affect labor market returns, we then further augment this equation
by interacting major with highest certification. However, due to limited data we combine
some of the majors:4
 = + 1+
3As will be explained in the data section, this refers to the broad field of health, and is used only for
those without transcript data on major.
4Some individuals have more than one highest degree. If the majors for these highest degrees differ,
there will be more than one major. To not impose the restriction that having two highest degrees is twice
as valuable as one, we control for (TotalNumberHighestCertificate-1), where this variable is equal to the
total number of certificates received minus 1, for those individuals whose highest degree is a certificate. For
all other individuals the variable is equal to zero. This variable is also interacted with the degrees being
from a for-profit. We create analagous variables for Associate’s degrees and Bachelor’s degrees. However,
these variables are not jointly significant and have little effect on the variables of interest (except in the
OLS specification for those starting in Associate’s degree programs, in which they are jointly significant,
but have little effect on the coefficients of interest), and so we do not include them in the specifications
shown here.
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X
∈
[ +  + ] + 2 + 3 + 4
+15 + 6+ 7+ 8 + 9
+ 10 + 11 + 12 +  (2.4)
The variable  is an indicator for majoring in one of the eight health fields
defined from the transcript data (registered nursing; licensed practical/vocational nursing;
health administration; allied health-assisting; allied health-treatment; somatic bodywork
and related therapeutic services; health preparatory programs; other health majors). The
variable  is an indicator for the highest certification being a certificate, and the major
associated with that certificate being ; similarly for  and 
We interpret the coefficients on  as the return to a not-for-profit certificate in major
 relative to starting, but not completing a certificate with this major at a not-for-profit.5
However, if  is one of the eight health majors from the transcript,  is the return to
certification with major  relative to someone who started, but did not complete certifi-
cation and majored in any of the health fields. This can be seen in specification (2.4) in
that we control only for  as described above and do not include eight separate
health field intercepts because the number of individuals who start, but do not complete a
program in each individual health field is too small. The coefficients on  have the same
interpretation mutatis mutandis.
The coefficient on  denotes the differential return to a certificate from a for-profit,
relative to a certificate from a not-for-profit, holding major constant.  and  have
similar interpretations.
2.3.2 Propensity Score Weighting
Since we will see that students beginning at different institution types have quite different
background characteristics, and since the linearity assumptions underlying the regression
5 If the major is missing in the transcript data, we instead use the most recent major as given in the
survey response.
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model may be problematic, as a robustness check we use propensity-score weighting. We
use standard logit to calculate the propensity to start at a for-profit institution separately
for the under-24 sample with the under-24 only variables; the under-24 sample without
the under-24 only variables, and the 24 and above sample. In the regressions using the
full sample, the propensity score weights for individuals less than 24 years old are those
that were calculated for the under-24 sample with the under-24 only variables, and the
weights for individuals 24 and older are those that were calculated for that sample. Once
we have calculated the probability that an individual started in a certificate (Associate’s
degree) program at a for-profit institution, these probabilities are used to generate weights
as described in the appendix. In the following sections, we present results obtained from
estimating regressions with the observations weighted by the sample weights multiplied by
these propensity score weights. The details of the propensity score methods are included
in the appendix.
2.4 Data
We use the Beginning Post-Secondary Student Survey and Transcript Data, 2004 (hereafter
BPS) sponsored by the US Department of Education. The BPS is a sample of approx-
imately 16,6806 students who began post-secondary education for the first time in the
2003-2004 academic year. Students were surveyed in their 1st, 3rd, and 6th year after en-
tering college. Since the BPS sample is composed of first-time college students, it contains
individuals who are enrolled both continuously and non-continuously. This is beneficial
for our study since students in certificate and Associate’s degree programs are often non-
traditional college students, and may have non-continuous enrollment patterns. However,
the BPS will be unrepresentative if many certifications are awarded to students who take
more than six years to complete the program.7
6For confidentiality reasons, the Department of Education requires that reports of observations be
rounded to the nearest ten.
7Approximately 40 individuals started in a certificate program, and were still enrolled in some program
in June, 2009 without having received any certifications. This represents 1.7% of those who started in
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For each individual in the BPS, transcripts were collected from each institution at-
tended from July 2003 to June 2009. The transcript data contain detailed information on
degree program, major, degrees obtained, and grades. Because many students who enter
four-year programs do not complete within six years, we focus on a sample of close to 1400
students who entered certificate programs and 2200 who entered Associate’s degree pro-
grams. All institutions in the data have signed Title IV agreements with the Department
of Education. This implies they are accredited by at least one Department of Education
approved accrediting agency, and thus are eligible for Title IV aid.
Many of the variables of interest are available through both the survey and transcript
data. For example, respondents are asked in the survey about the degree program in which
they start, their highest degree, and the sector of the institutions they attended. However,
this information is also on the transcripts provided directly by the educational institutions.
There are significant differences between the survey responses and the transcript data. We
treat the transcripts as more accurate, and so define the variables using the transcript data
when both are available. Only for the individuals without transcripts or with missing or
inconclusive data on the transcripts, do we use survey responses for variables also covered
in the transcript data.8
As described in the methods section, we control for major of highest certification earned,
or highest program for non-completers. If an individual has two certifications at the same
level and none higher, she will have two majors if they are from the same type of institution.
For this reason there is no omitted major category. We drop the few individuals with one
certification from a for-profit and one from a not-for-profit because it is impossible to
certificate programs. However, some of these individuals may be in new programs and not their original
certificate program.
Approximately 70 individuals who started an Associate’s degree were still enrolled in some program in
June, 2009 without having received any certifications. This represents 1.8% of those starting in Associate’s
degree programs. Again, some of these individuals may be in new programs and not their original Associate’s
degree program.
8Transcript data may be inconclusive when the individual has been enrolled in multiple certification
programs at the starting institution. The sector from which the highest certification is obtained is also not
able to be discerned from the survey data for a few individuals. This is because of coenrollment, multiple
transfers, or multiple highest certifications.
102
discern which certification is more responsible for labor market outcomes.
The survey response does not distinguish among health fields. The variable “health-
survey” equals one if the individual does not have transcript data on major and reports
his major as health.
Unfortunately, labor market data for 2009 were collected only for those whose last date
of enrollment was before February 2009. Our baseline results thus drop students who were
still enrolled five and a half years after entering a certificate or Associate’s degree program.
However, we perform a number of robustness checks to address these missing data.
Table 2.1 summarizes the data. The first two columns are the certificate program
sample, separated by those starting at a for-profit (700 observations) and not-for-profit
(710 observations). The last two columns describe the Associate’s degree sample which
is dominated by those starting at not-for-profit programs (1820 observations) relative to
those starting at for-profit programs (380 observations). The means are calculated using
the sampling weights. We remind the reader that the vast majority of students in not-for-
profit institutions are at public rather than private not-for-profit institutions.
2.4.1 Certificate programs
Table 2.1 shows that annual earnings in 2009 are approximately $6000 lower for students
starting certificate programs at for-profit institutions than for those starting certificate
programs at not-for-profit institutions, statistically significant at the .01 level. It is by no
means evident, however, that this difference is causal. Compared to those who start at not-
for-profit institutions, students starting in certificate programs at for-profit institutions are
much more likely to be black, Hispanic, female, younger, single, and listed as a dependent at
the time they enter college. Furthermore, income in 2002 (parental for dependent students
and respondent for independent students) and expected family contribution to college are
much lower.9 They are also less likely to have had a high school GPA above a 3.0, and
9In our analysis we treat these income measures as proxies for pre-enrollment skills and thus include
them as controls. It is possible that they reflect differences in the Ashenfelter dip prior to enrollment.
Differences across sector in the Ashenfelter dip would affect the coefficient on starting at a for-profit, but
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less likely to have taken the SAT, and those who did have lower scores. Somewhat more
of those entering not-for-profits (46%) than of those entering for-profits (37%) have not
gained any certification. This difference is statistically significant at the .05 level.
2.4.2 Associate’s degree programs
Table 2.1 shows that earnings in 2009 for students starting Associate’s degree programs
at for-profit institutions are approximately $3000 less than for those starting at not-for-
profit programs, statistically significant at the .05 level. Again, it is not clear that this
difference is causal. Compared to those who start at not-for-profit institutions, students
starting in Associate’s degree programs at for-profit institutions are much more likely to
be Hispanic, less likely to be listed as a dependent at the time they enter college, and have
more dependent children in 2003. Furthermore, income in 2002 (parental for dependent
students and respondent for independent students) is much lower among for-profit students,
their parents are less likely to have more than 12 years of schooling and are less likely to be
born in the US, and their expected family contribution to college is much lower. Students
starting at for-profits are less likely to have obtained their high school diploma, and more
likely to have obtained their GED. They are also less likely to have taken the SAT.
Unfortunately, the pattern of certification differs between those entering Associate’s
degree programs in for-profits and not-for-profits. In both cases there are small, not signif-
icantly different, numbers of students reporting leaving with a certificate as their highest
degree (about 3% at both institution types) and also who have acquired no certification
(52% at for-profits, and 55% at not-for-profits). However, those starting in Associate’s
degree programs at not-for-profit institutions are much more likely to have obtained a
Bachelor’s degree (and less likely to have obtained only an Associate’s degree) than are
not the interaction term between completion and certification from a for-profit. The results will also not
be biased if certification completers rebound from the dip differently than non-completers, since this will
affect the coefficient on completion but not the interaction term. The only situation in which the results
would be biased due to the Ashenfelter dip is if completers rebound from the dip differently than non-
completers and either the initial dips differed by sector or the difference in the rebound between completers
and non-completers differs by sector.
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those who started at a for-profit institution. Therefore, those with only an Associate’s
degree are likely to be more favorably selected if they began at a for-profit. This differen-
tial ability bias could bias the differences-in-differences estimates of the differential return
to certification. We present some evidence on the extent of differential ability bias across
institution type in the robustness section.
2.4.3 Differences in major across institution type
Table 2.2 shows the weighted percentage of students pursuing selected majors, for those ob-
taining and those starting but not completing certifications. Panel A shows striking differ-
ences between the two types of institutions. Those obtaining not-for-profit certificates are
much more likely to major in business, vocational fields, and licensed practical/vocational
nursing than are those obtaining for-profit certificates. They are less likely to major in
human services, allied health-assisting, and health administration.
Panel B shows this information for those starting Associate’s degree programs. We
see similar differences between institution types. Compared with individuals obtaining
for-profit Associate’s degrees, those obtaining not-for-profit Associate’s degrees are much
more likely to major in business, liberal arts and sciences and registered nursing and much
less likely to major in vocational fields and allied health-assisting. Similar proportions of
students major in human services, and allied health-treatment at the two types of institu-
tion.
Requirements for employment vary considerably across health fields. Medical assisting
and health administration, representing 26 and 12 percent of certificates and Associate’s
degrees from for-profits but only 7 and 4 percent from not-for-profits, do not require licens-
ing or degree completion (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Licensed practical/vocational
nursing (9 percent of not-for-profit and almost no for-profit certificates) and registered
nursing (11 percent of not-for-profit and almost no for-profit associate’s degrees), do re-
quire licensing and degree completion. Although simple theory suggests returns should be
equalized, we would not be surprised if required certifications yield higher returns
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2.5 Results
We wish to be clear that we do not view one set of estimates as superior to the others.
Propensity score weighting is more robust but less efficient than OLS. If the results differ
markedly, this raises concerns about the OLS estimates. When they are similar, we feel
more comfortable relying on the OLS estimates. Similarly, combining the younger and
older samples is more efficient but less robust and adding additional under-24 only variables
reduces the risk of bias but at the cost of losing much of the sample. We focus therefore on
whether the point estimates are similar in magnitude as well as the statistical significance
of individual estimates.
2.5.1 Return to Certificates for those Starting in Certificate Programs
Panel A of table 2.3 shows the return to certificates, not controlling for major, for stu-
dents who begin in a certificate program. Columns (1) and (4) show the results for the
full sample using OLS and propensity score matching. The coefficient on  is
small, positive, and statistically insignificant in both specifications, suggesting no return
to a certificate from a not-for-profit although the confidence interval includes non-trivial
effects. The coefficient on  in row (3) is non-trivial and negative in both
specifications, suggesting a smaller return to a certificate from a for-profit than a not-for-
profit, but the coefficient again falls short of statistical significance. Row (4) gives the sum
of the coefficients on  and  , which is about -5 log points in both
specifications.
The coefficient on the indicator for starting at a for-profit is negative and non-trivial in
both specifications and thus suggests that non-completers have lower earnings at for-profits
than at not-for-profits. Unless dropouts differ in time spent enrolled or post-enrollment
experience (both explored briefly below), we would expect dropouts from different insti-
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tution types to have similar earnings if we control adequately for other differences. While
the differences here are not statistically significant, they may suggest failure to control for
some unobservables.
Thus, these estimates suggest a small return to a not-for-profit certificate, a negative
differential to a for-profit certificate, and perhaps some evidence that even with our controls,
those starting at for-profits are negatively selected. The results for the young and old
samples are not dramatically different, although the coefficient on starting at a for-profit
is more negative and the return to a certificate is larger for the younger sample.
Table 2.4 gives the results for the specifications controlling for major, using the sample
of all ages. We focus on the full sample because the sample sizes by major get small when
restricted to the young or old sample. Columns (1) and (4) are the same as Columns
(1) and (4) in panel A of table 2.3, repeated to facilitate comparing results controlling
and not controlling for major. Columns (2) and (5) control for major. The coefficient on
 falls in both specifications when majors are included. Further, the coefficient
on  falls slightly in magnitude in both specifications. The total return to a
certificate at a for-profit is more negative. Finally, the coefficient on starting at a for-profit
decreases in magnitude when we control for major.
In columns (3) and (6) we show the results with interactions between major and certi-
fication. The coefficient on  falls even more in magnitude in both the OLS
and propensity score specifications.
Rows (5) through (11) of the third and sixth columns reveal that there is considerable
variation across majors in the return to certificates. While the interaction between each
major and certification is included in the regression, we only present the returns to cer-
tificates for majors where at least 30 students obtained a certificate in the OLS sample.
None of the returns is statistically significant, with the exception of a large, positive return
to a certificate in vocational fields (in the OLS specification). However, the return to cer-
tificates in Licensed Practical Nursing is large and positive, and the return to certificates
in Business is large and negative. From table 2.2 we see both of these majors are much
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more common at not-for-profit institutions and that non-completion is particularly high for
business certificates. The F-statistic testing the joint significance of the major*certification
interaction terms implies these terms are significant at the .01 level in both specifications,
and similarly when we test the joint significance of these terms and the major intercepts.
Finally, the F-test in both specifications rejects that the major*certification interaction
terms are jointly equal, significant at the .01 level.
2.5.2 Return to Degrees for those Starting in Associate’s Degree Programs
Panel B of table 2.3 shows the effect, not controlling for major, of certificates/degrees
on students who begin in an Associate’s degree program. Columns (1) and (4) show the
results for the full sample using OLS and propensity score matching. The coefficient on
0 in row 3, which denotes the return to an Associate’s degree from a not-for-
profit, is large, positive, and statistically significant and about 10 log points using both
methods. The differential return to a for-profit Associate’s degree, among those starting
such degrees, is approximately 8 log points using the OLS estimates while 3 log points
using the propensity score estimates, though statistically significant in neither. The total
return to an Associate’s degree from a for-profit (the sum of the coefficients on 0
and 0 ) is large, positive, and statistically significant, with magnitude approx-
imately 18 log points in the OLS specification and 15 log points in the propensity score
specification. Finally, the coefficient on the indicator for starting at a for-profit is negative
and non-trivial, and statistically significant in both specifications. As suggested in the
previous section, this may suggest failure to control for some unobservables.
We see large differences between the young and old samples among those starting in
Associate’s degree programs. The coefficient on 0 is anywhere from 18 to
24 log points larger for the old than the young sample, depending on the specification,
although not statistically significant. The coefficient on starting at a for-profit is also much
more negative for the older sample, and statistically significant. This may suggest that the
older sample is more negatively selected than the younger sample at for-profits.
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Table 2.5 presents the results for the specifications including controls for major. Columns
(1) and (4) are the same as columns (1) and (4) in panel B of table 2.3 for reference. The
return to a not-for-profit Associate’s degree decreases in magnitude and statistical signif-
icance with the inclusion of controls for major in both columns (2) and (5). Further, the
differential return to a for-profit Associate’s degree increases slightly and the return to an
Associate’s degree at a for-profit falls modestly.
Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we show the results from specification (2.4) which
includes interactions between major and certification. The coefficient on 0
increases slightly in the OLS specification, implying that those obtaining Associate’s de-
grees from for-profits are in majors with slightly lower returns. However, the differential
remains largely unchanged using the propensity score specification. After controlling for
major, and major interacted with certification, we continue to see a non-trivial, although
not statistically significant, positive differential effect of obtaining an Associate’s degree
from a for-profit relative to a not-for-profit.
Rows (9) through (15) in these columns give the returns to Associate’s degrees in
various fields. While the interaction between each major and certification is included
in the regression, we only present the returns to Associate’s degrees for majors where
at least 30 students obtained an Associate’s degree in the OLS sample. It is clear that
there is a lot of variation in the return to Associate’s degrees across majors. We see
large, positive returns, often statistically significant, to Associate’s degrees in business,
registered nursing, allied health-assisting, and allied health-treatment. The returns to an
Associate’s degree in liberal arts and sciences, vocational fields, and human services are
very small in the OLS specification and imprecise. We note that liberal arts and sciences is
much more prevalent at not-for-profit institutions, while vocational majors are much more
prevalent at for-profit institutions, as shown in table 2.2. The F-statistic testing the joint
significance of the major*certification interaction terms implies these terms are significant
at the .01 level in both specifications, and similarly when we test the joint significance of
these terms and the major intercepts. Finally, the F-test in both specifications rejects that
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the major*certification interaction terms are jointly equal, significant at the .01 level.
Since students starting Associate’s degrees at not-for-profits are more likely to advance
to a Bachelor’s degree, we now allow the “treatment” of starting at a not-for-profit to
be holding at least an Associate’s degree. This treats obtaining a Bachelor’s degree as a
causal effect of entering an Associate’s degree program rather than as a nuisance variable
for which we must control. We estimate specification (2.4) using this combined variable.
The coefficient on  is less than half the size of 0 in column (3)
of table 2.5, with point estimate .049 and standard error .094 (not shown). This suggests
that the “premium” for an Associate’s degree from a for-profit is in part due to excluding
the role of an Associate’s degree at a not-for-profit as a pathway to a four-year degree.
In assessing the smaller coefficient when we combine two-year and four-year degrees, we
should recognize that the latter take longer, but we should also recognize that students
at not-for-profits are more likely to still be enrolled in a Bachelor’s degree program and
such students tend to be positively selected as measured by their GPA while in college (not
shown). Our inability to include these students biases the coefficient on 0
upward.10
2.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we report the results of a series of robustness checks on the full sample.
10Careful readers may note differences between the results in this paper and Lang and Weinstein (2012)
attributable only to the use of the transcript data. They may wonder how using these data would affect the
results in Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012), hereafter DGK, who also use the Beginning Post-Secondary
Student Survey. We have not explored this question in detail. Using the transcript data, we have reestimated
the DGK specification, which gives the difference in earnings for those enrolling in a for-profit relative to
a not-for-profit, controlling for observable background factors. For certificate programs, the coefficient on
enrolling at a for-profit is -3936, significant at the .01 level which contrasts with a statistically insignificant
coefficient of -1576 in DGK. For those starting in Associate’s degree programs, the coefficient on enrolling
at a for-profit is -2051 and is not statistically significant, in contrast with a marginally significant coefficient
of -2794 in DGK. Given the nature of that paper, these differences appear modest to us.
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2.6.1 Differential Ability Bias
Unbiased estimates of the differences-in-differences coefficients require that ability bias be
similar across institution types. We addressed this in the Data section by comparing the
distributions of certifications across institution types. In this section, we test for differential
ability bias in two ways. First, we test for differences-in-differences in observables. If the
observable differences between completers and non-completers are similar across institution
type, this makes it more plausible that they are also similar in unobservables. Second,
we estimate our main specifications without controls to see if the differences-in-differences
coefficient changes, which is a way of summarizing the importance of observable differences-
in-differences.
We regress
 = + 1 + 2 + 3+ 4+ 5 + 6 + 7 +  (2.5)
The dependent variables are the variables in 1. Since we have multiple tests, we use
the Bonferroni correction adjusted for correlation. None of the differences-in-differences
is statistically significant at the .05 level for those starting in certificate programs. This
implies that the comparison of completers to non-completers, in terms of observables, is
similar across institution type. For those starting in Associate’s degree programs the differ-
ence between completers and non-completers in terms of the number of children is smaller
at for-profits, while the difference in terms of income in 2002 (for dependents) is larger
at for-profits. This provides some evidence that completers are more favorably selected
relative to non-completers at for-profits, and may partly explain the positive coefficient on
0 in table 2.5.
When we estimate the principal specification without the explanatory variables, the
differential return to a for-profit certificate, among those starting in certificate programs,
is -.13 (standard error .1) without controls, relative to -.07 with controls (table 2.4, column
(3)). Controlling for observable characteristics implies a somewhat smaller difference be-
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tween for-profit and not-for-profit certificates, suggesting that the difference might be even
smaller after accounting for differences in unobservables across institution types.11 The
differential return to a for-profit Associate’s degree, among those starting in Associate’s
degree programs, is .07 (standard error .09) without controls relative to .07 with controls
(table 2.5, column (3)), suggesting small differences-in-differences in observables.
Taken together, among those starting certificate programs these tests do not suggest
large violations of the requirement that ability bias be similar for not-for-profit and for-
profit institutions. As mentioned above, the evidence that completers are more favorably
selected at for-profits may help explain the positive coefficient on 0 .
Earnings are not observed for those who are either not employed or still enrolled in
school. Differences across institutions in who is employed represent another possible source
of bias. We showed earlier that those starting Associate’s degree programs at for-profits are
less likely to still be studying for a Bachelor’s degree, and this may yield differences across
institutions in who is employed. To evaluate the degree of the bias from excluding the
unemployed, we check whether there is a differential effect of certification from a for-profit,
relative to a not-for-profit, on employment (conditional on no longer being enrolled). While
the effects are statistically insignificant for both those starting certificates and Associate’s
degree programs (not shown), the magnitudes are non-trivial, suggesting that our estimates
should be treated with caution.
2.6.1.1 Time in program and time in labor market
Certificate and Associate’s degree programs may differ in length, and students might perse-
vere longer in one type of institution than another. Because length of program, or length of
time in program, may be correlated with human capital acquisition and thus earnings, we
control for months enrolled (results not shown). For those starting in certificate programs,
11We are invoking the common albeit unprovable assumption that the part of the unobservables that
is uncorrelated with observables is correlated with the key variable in a manner similar to the correlation
between the observables and the key variable. See Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) for an explicit analysis
of this form.
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the coefficient on months enrolled is small and insignificant, and the remaining coefficients
are unaffected. However, for those starting in Associate’s degree programs, the coefficient
on months enrolled is non-trivially negative, and statistically significant at the .1 level in
both the OLS and propensity score specifications. The coefficient on  falls
slightly in both specifications, and remains statistically insignificant.
Recall that the coefficient on Start at For-Profit is large and negative in table 2.5. To
address further this somewhat troubling result, we include not only total months enrolled,
but also its interaction with starting at a for-profit in specification (2.4). The coefficient
on starting at a for-profit is therefore the effect of starting at a for-profit and not spending
any time enrolled. Since we would not expect any differential for people spending no time
enrolled, a negative coefficient would suggest failure to control for pre-entry differences.
The coefficient on starting at a for-profit falls from -.113 in column (3) of table 2.5 to
-.046 (not shown). The coefficient using propensity score weighting increases slightly in
magnitude. The OLS results suggest that the large, negative coefficient on starting at a
for-profit can be attributed to differences in time enrolled before dropping out and the
differential benefit of incomplete programs across institution type, and not our failure to
control for differences in entrants’ characteristics. However, the propensity score results
continue to suggest that those starting Associate’s degree programs at for-profits may be
negatively selected, even with our controls. This may help explain the positive coefficient
on 0 .
Finally, we control for potential experience since leaving the program (measured by
months since last enrolled). To allow for the possibility that earnings growth after leaving
school is higher or lower for those starting at for-profits, we include both a linear term for
months since last enrolled and its interaction with starting at a for-profit. The interpre-
tation of the results is very similar to the interpretation of the original specification (not
shown).
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2.6.1.2 Labor Market Conditions
The estimated returns might reflect differences in labor market strength in areas where
for-profit and not-for-profit institutions are located. The median distance between the
respondent’s permanent home and starting-institution is 20 miles for individuals starting
in for-profit and 12 miles for those starting in not-for-profit Associate’s degree programs.
The corresponding numbers are 15 and 10 miles for those starting in certificate programs.
These distances suggest that for most students, the labor market where the post-secondary
institution is located is a good proxy for the local labor market.
To investigate whether labor market strength is correlated with institution type, we
include the unemployment rate for the county in which the institution is located. In order
to allow majors to differ in their responsiveness to the unemployment rate, we further
interact the county unemployment rate with all of the certification*major interactions in
specification (2.4). We also include the double interactions between county unemployment
rate and major; we do not include the double interactions between county unemployment
rate and certification since we already interact unemployment rate*certification with every
possible major.12
The regressions including unemployment rate, unemployment rate interacted with cer-
tification*major, and the unemployment rate interacted with major, yield nearly identical
results to those obtained with the same sample but without unemployment controls. While
12We use the IPEDS data from 2003 to identify institutions’ zipcodes because we are interested in the
institutions at which the students started college, which is the 2003-2004 academic year. Some colleges that
exist in 2003 do not exist in 2011. Since the IPEDS data from 2003 include the zip code of the institution
but not the county code, we use the HUD crosswalk between zip code and county. We merge this with
average county unemployment data for 2009 and assigned each institution its county unemployment rate.
When one zip code maps to two or more counties, we calculate a weighted unemployment rate for the zip
code. We use the institution where the individual was first surveyed, as defined in the transcript data. If
this is unavailable, we use the institution where the individual obtained the highest degree, or the highest
program for non-completers, as defined by the transcript data. If the transcript data are not available, we
use the first institution at which the individual was surveyed in 2004, provided in the 2006 survey data.
Finally, if the individual was not surveyed in 2006, or the institution ID was unavailable in that year, we
use the first institution at which the individual was surveyed in 2004, as provided in the 2009 survey data.
Students are missing the unemployment rate either because the IPEDS identifier for their institution was
missing, the zip code of the IPEDS identifier was not in the HUD crosswalk, or the IPEDS identifier was
not found in the IPEDS data system (very few).
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the coefficients on  in table 2.4 and on 0 in table 2.5 are larger
in magnitude than those we obtain when we control for unemployment, this is largely due
to the change in sample caused by some observations missing the county unemployment
rate. Thus, our estimated returns do not appear to be biased by institutions of one type
being located in particularly weak labor markets.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The growth of the for-profit education sector in recent years has been dramatic, and its
value has been widely debated. Much of this debate has involved claims that for-profit col-
leges leave students with very high debt levels and poor employment outcomes. Summary
statistics presented in this paper indeed show that post-college earnings are significantly
lower for students starting at for-profit institutions. However, it is also very clear that
those who start at for-profit institutions are less well prepared for college, had lower levels
of pre-college academic performance, and face other significant obstacles to college and
post-college success. This paper controls for these characteristics using both traditional
OLS and propensity score weighting.
We find large returns to Associate’s degrees from both for-profit and not-for-profit
institutions and some evidence of larger returns at for-profit institutions. However, we
argue that much of the estimated difference across institution type in the return to an
Associate’s degree reflects the greater role of the Associate’s degree as a pathway to a four-
year degree at not-for-profit institutions. This leads individuals with only an Associate’s
degree and not enrolled in a Bachelor’s degree program to be more adversely selected at
not-for-profits.
In addition, we find only weak evidence overall that acquiring certificates raises earn-
ings. The evidence for certificates earned at for-profits is even weaker and the point esti-
mate of this return is non-trivially negative. However, the return to for-profit certificates
is not statistically significantly different than the return to not-for-profit certificates. Nei-
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ther the for-profit Associate’s degree premium nor the certificate discount disappears after
controlling for field of study.
This conclusion comes with a number of caveats. First, some of the highest-return
majors such as registered and licensed practical nursing are unrepresented at for-profits
and therefore do not affect the comparison when we control for field of study. However,
since the for-profit education industry has grown significantly, even since 2003 when our
sample started post-secondary education, it is possible that for-profit institutions have
begun to offer these higher-return majors.
Second, our earnings data are from 2009, during an economic recession. It is possible
that the recession affected the return to certificates and Associate’s degrees differently in
different sectors. Furthermore, since for-profits and not-for-profits specialize in different
majors, if the recession affected certain fields more than others, we would expect that to
affect the differential return.
Finally, our data only allow us to observe earnings at most a few years after completing
a certification; we can only estimate short-run labor market effects. The earnings of indi-
viduals getting certifications from for-profits may subsequently grow faster or more slowly
than those with certifications from not-for-profits.
In general, our results suggest that the percentage increase in earnings from for-profit
and not-for-profit certifications are similar. However, students who enroll at for-profits
start with a lower earnings base, and the cost of tuition at for-profit universities is much
higher than at not-for-profit institutions. Using data from the BPS, in 2003, tuition and
fees for those starting in for-profit certificate programs were about $6400 more than for
those starting in not-for-profit certificate programs (statistically significant at the .01 level).
Similarly, the total was approximately $7000 more for students starting for-profit relative to
not-for-profit Associate’s degree programs (statistically significant at the .01 level). Given
these large differences, the return on investment is undoubtedly lower at for-profits.
Perhaps most significantly, this paper underscores the large differences across field in
the labor market benefits of certificates and Associate’s degrees, and the minimal benefits
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of certificates in many fields. As policy-makers consider their response to the explosion of
student debt, they may want to consider programs within institutions rather than simply
the overall performance of the institution.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Propensity Score Methods
In order to calculate the propensity of an individual to start post-secondary education at
a for-profit institution, we first used the algorithm proposed by Imbens (2010). As noted
in the paper, we calculate propensity scores separately for the three samples/specifications
described.
1. Estimate the standard logit model with all of the variables in 1 including the under-
24-only variables in the specifications where they are included in the propensity score
specification.
2. Estimate a standard logit model, with the regressors being the same as those in Step
1, but each time include an additional interaction term between the linear terms in
Step 1. Calculate the likelihood ratio test statistic.
3. If the likelihood ratio test statistic is greater than 2.71, then include the interaction.
4. Now estimate a standard logit model, with the regressors being the linear terms in
Step 1, and the interaction terms chosen in step 3, but each time include an additional
interaction term which was not chosen. Calculate the likelihood ratio test statistic.
5. If the likelihood ratio test statistic is greater than 2.71, then include the interaction.
6. The propensity score specification has been determined to be all of the linear terms
in Step 1 and all of the interaction terms chosen in Steps 3 and 5.
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For the younger sample, the algorithm finds that we should include the 23 linear terms,
and 48 interaction terms for those starting in certificate programs and 102 interaction terms
for those starting in Associate’s degree programs. For the older sample, the algorithm
finds that we should include the 20 linear terms and 34 interaction terms for those starting
in certificate programs and 67 interaction terms for those starting in Associate’s degree
programs.
We employ the algorithm suggested by Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2009) to
trim the sample in order to address lack of overlap. In most cases, this results in discarding
observations with propensity scores below approximately .1 and above approximately .9.
Once we have calculated the probability that an individual started in a certificate
(Associate’s degree) program at a for-profit college, those probabilities are used to generate
weights. With i denoting the individual, and j denoting the type of institution at which
the individual started (for-profit, not-for-profit), we weight the observations by
1

∈ 1
for j = for-profit, and
1
1−
∈ 11−
for j = not-for-profit.  denotes the number of
observations starting in a certificate (Associate’s degree) program at institution type j, and
 denotes the propensity to start at a for-profit institution for individual i in institution
type j. The weights for each subgroup (start in a certificate (Associate’s degree) program
at a for-profit, not-for-profit institution) are such that the sum of the weights within the
subgroup is the number of observations in that subgroup.
These weights are then used in the regression of earnings outcomes on whether the
individual started at a for-profit college.
In order to check that the balancing property is satisfied for the propensity score (using
the trimmed sample) we use an algorithm similar to that developed by Becker and Ichino
(2002). We start by dividing the sample into five evenly spaced blocks of the propensity
score. Then, within each interval, we check whether the average propensity score of those
who start at for profit institutions differs from those who start at not-for-profit institutions.
If the averages differ, then we split that block into two, and check if the averages differ in
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the new blocks. Once we have divided the sample into blocks such that within each block
the average propensity score of the for-profit and not-for-profit groups is the same, we
check whether the average value of each term in the propensity score specification differs
between the for-profit and not-for-profit groups.
We use the standard Bonferroni correction for determining the threshold p-value for
significance of each test since we have multiple tests of whether the average propensity
score for each group differs within blocks. When we test whether the average of each
variable differs within blocks, we use the Bonferroni correction adjusted for correlation
across explanatory variables. Since we have many variables, and some of those variables
are presumably correlated, a balancing test for one variable could provide information on
the balancing test for another variable. The information from these correlations should
be accounted for in the Bonferroni correction, raising the threshold p-value (lowering the
critical t) relative to the traditional Bonferroni p-value used to determine significance
for each test. In order to implement this strategy, we find the correlation between each
of the variables used in the propensity score specification, and then take the mean of
those correlations. The mean correlation is then used to adjust the standard Bonferroni
correction. Since the propensity score specifications for the older and younger samples
are different, we test the balance of the propensity score separately for these two samples.
In the younger sample of those starting in certificate programs, this algorithm results in 5
blocks and no variables that are unbalanced, while in the older sample the algorithm results
in 7 blocks and no variables that are unbalanced. In the younger sample of those starting
in Associate’s degree programs, we obtain 7 blocks and no unbalanced variables, while in
the older sample the algorithm results in 5 blocks and no variables that are unbalanced.
2.9 Major Definition
Majors are divided into 13 categories: business; liberal arts and sciences; vocational (man-
ual and technical); human services; undeclared, and eight categories of health majors
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(registered nursing, licensed practical/vocational nursing, health administration, allied
health-assisting, allied health-treatment, somatic bodywork and related therapeutic ser-
vices, health preparatory programs, other health majors). If the major is not available
from transcript data, we use the survey response, which does not distinguish between the
various categories of health majors. We thus add an additional category, “healthsurvey”,
which equals one if the individual does not have transcript data on major and reports his
as health. The CIP codes included in each definition are listed below
Business: CIP Codes
52 (Business, Management, Marketing, and Related Support Services)
Liberal Arts and Sciences: CIP codes
4 (Architecture and Related Services)
5 (Area, Ethnic, Cultural, Gender, and Group Studies)
14 (Engineering)
16 (Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics)
23 (English Language and Literature/Letters)
24 (Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies, and Humanities)
26 (Biological and Biomedical Sciences)
27 (Mathematics and Statistics)
30 (Multi/Interdisciplinary Studies)
38 (Philosophy and Religious Studies)
40 (Physical Sciences)
45 (Social Sciences)
50 (Visual and Performing Arts)
54 (History)
Vocational (Manual and Technical):
1 (Agriculture, Agriculture Operations, and Related Sciences)
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3 (Natural Resources and Conservation)
15 (Engineering Technologies and Engineering-Related Fields)
29 (Military Technologies and Applied Sciences)
41 (Science Technologies/Technicians)
46 (Construction Trades)
47 (Mechanic and Repair Technologies/Technicians)
48 (Precision Production)
49 (Transportation and Materials Moving)
10 (Communications Technologies/Technicians and Support Services)
11 (Computer and Information Sciences and Support Services)
Human Services:
9(Communication, Journalism, and Related Programs)
12 (Personal and Culinary Services)
13 (Education)
19 (Family and Consumer Sciences/Human Sciences)
22 (Legal Professions and Studies)
25 (Library Science)
28 (Military Science, Leadership and Operational Art)
31 (Parks, Recreation, Leisure, and Fitness Studies)
39 (Theology and Religious Vocations)
42 (Psychology)
43 (Homeland Security, Law Enforcement, Firefighting and Related Protective Services)
44 (Public Administration and Social Service Professions)
Registered Nursing: CIP Codes
51.38 (Registered Nursing, Nursing Administration, Nursing Research and Clinical
Nursing)
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Licensed Practical/Vocational Nursing: CIP Codes
51.39 (Practical Nursing, Vocational Nursing and Nursing Assistants)
Excluding 51.3902 (Nursing Assistant/Aide and Patient Care Assistant/Aide)
Health Administration: CIP Codes
51.07 (Health and Medical Administrative Services)
Allied Health-Assisting: CIP Codes
51.08 (Allied Health and Medical Assisting Services)
51.0601 (Dental Assisting/Assistant)
51.0699 (Dental Services and Allied Professions, Other)
51.1802 (Optometric Technician/Assistant)
51.1899 (Ophthalmic and Optometric Support Services and Allied Professions, Other)
51.3902 (Nursing Assistant/Aide and Patient Care Assistant/Aide)
51.1502 (Psychiatric/Mental Health Services Technician)
Allied Health-Treatment: CIP Codes
51.09 (Allied Health Diagnostic, Intervention, and Treatment Professions)
51.0602 (Dental Hygiene/Hygienist)
51.1801 (Opticianry/Ophthalmic Dispensing Optician)
51.1803 (Ophthalmic Technician/Technologist)
51.10 (Clinical/Medical Laboratory Science/Research and Allied Professions)
51.0603 (Dental Laboratory Technology/Technician)
51.2308 (Physical Therapy/Therapist)
51.2309 (Therapeutic Recreation/Recreational Therapy)
51.3103 (Dietetic Technician)
Somatic Bodywork: CIP Codes
51.3501 (Massage Therapy/Therapeutic Massage)
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Health Preparatory Programs: CIP Codes
51.11 (Health/Medical Preparatory Programs)
Other Health Programs:
Programs with CIP Codes 51 (Health Professions and Related Programs) or 60 (Resi-
dency Programs), and not included in the above categories.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit
Highest Degree
Certificate 0.62 0.505*** 0.029 0.025
[.486] [.5] [.169] [.155]
Associates 0.013 0.028 0.399 0.283***
[.115] [.165] [.49] [.451]
Bachelors 0.001 0.009* 0.051 0.139***
[.034] [.097] [.221] [.346]
Months Since Last 
Enrolled 50.636 43.539*** 44.257 33.28***
[15.526] [17.543] [15.571] [19.1]
Total Months Enrolled 13.653 19.848*** 20.643 27.172***
[7.147] [12.588] [11.886] [15.715]
Expected Family 
Contribution,  1.854 5.7*** 3.3 8.715***
2003 ($,000) [5.006] [8.764] [5.884] [13.515]
Years Delayed Starting 
Post‐ 9.146 11.1 5.089 5.45
Secondary Education [21.307] [14.816] [9.038] [12.079]
High School Diploma 0.741 0.789 0.803 0.875**
[.438] [.408] [.398] [.331]
GED 0.177 0.157 0.179 0.08***
[.382] [.364] [.384] [.272]
English is Primary 
Language 0.861 0.892 0.884 0.9
[.346] [.311] [.32] [.3]
Number of Dependent 
Children, 2003  0.732 0.859 0.595 0.414**
[1.024] [1.173] [.987] [.93]
Dependent, 2003 0.431 0.343** 0.447 0.662***
[.496] [.475] [.498] [.473]
Married, 2003 0.145 0.317*** 0.139 0.169
[.352] [.465] [.347] [.375]
Table 2.1:   Summary Statistics by Initial Institution Type
Start Certificate Program Start Associateʹs Program
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit
Age, 2003 24.064 29.155*** 23.758 23.477
[7.869] [11.143] [7.42] [9.301]
Male 0.253 0.436*** 0.444 0.439
[.435] [.496] [.498] [.496]
Hispanic 0.258 0.138*** 0.21 0.139**
[.438] [.345] [.408] [.346]
Black 0.328 0.165*** 0.197 0.145
[.47] [.372] [.399] [.352]
Income in 2002 ($,000) 23243 38497*** 29127 51489.642***
[23998] [30585] [25136] [49022]
Born in the US 0.88 0.886 0.893 0.889
[.325] [.318] [.31] [.314]
Parents Born in the US 0.771 0.821 0.761 0.81
[.42] [.384] [.427] [.393]
Household Size, 2003 3.22 3.364 3.083 3.659***
[1.473] [1.643] [1.489] [1.534]
0.631 0.576 0.522 0.429**
[.483] [.495] [.500] [.495]
Under‐24‐Only 
Regressors
HS GPA > 3.0 0.552 0.643* 0.652 0.622
[.498] [.48] [.477] [.485]
Took the SAT 0.346 0.579*** 0.537 0.748***
[.476] [.494] [.5] [.434]
SAT/ACT score/100 8.300 8.737* 8.678 8.987
[1.763] [1.694] [1.867] [1.682]
N (Age<24) 410 350 250 1440
Parentsʹ Ed < 12
Table 2.1:   Summary Statistics by Initial Institution Type (continued)
Start Certificate Program Start Associateʹs Program
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit For‐Profit Not‐For‐Profit
Outcome Variable
Earnings, 2009 ($,000) 26070 32304*** 29209 32267.337**
[14921] [20186] [18858] [18280]
N (Full Sample) 700 710 380 1820
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample sizes are as shown, except for ParentsʹEd<=12 as some individuals did not know their 
parentsʹ education, and SAT/ACT score because some students did not take the exam.
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses under the means.   Observations are weighted by 
the sample weights from the survey.  All variables are measured in 2009, unless noted 
otherwise.
Stars next to values in Column 2 denote significant differences between Columns 1 and 2.  
Stars next to values in Column 4 denote significant differences between Columns 3 and 4. 
Table 2.1:   Summary Statistics by Initial Institution Type (continued)
Start Certificate Program Start Associateʹs Program
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Ages  Under 24  24 and Over All Ages  Under 24  24 and Over
Start  Program at:
(1) For‐Profit ‐0.038 ‐0.061 0.009 ‐0.060 ‐0.096 ‐0.010
[0.064] [0.084] [0.087] [0.065] [0.080] [0.098]
Highest Degree:
(2) Certificate 0.056 0.138 0.047 0.018 0.080 0.027
[0.060] [0.086] [0.077] [0.058] [0.085] [0.074]
Certificate from:
(3) For‐Profit ‐0.112 ‐0.159 ‐0.127 ‐0.066 ‐0.088 ‐0.103
[0.089] [0.123] [0.112] [0.087] [0.117] [0.120]
(4) Combination (2) + (3) ‐0.056 ‐0.021 ‐0.08 ‐0.048 ‐0.007 ‐0.075
[.067] [.085] [.086] [.066] [.081] [.097]
N 1,400 760 640 1,290 690 610
Start  Program at:
(1) For‐Profit ‐0.136* ‐0.035 ‐0.285* ‐0.146** ‐0.030 ‐0.301**
[0.073] [0.060] [0.154] [0.072] [0.064] [0.149]
Highest Degree:
(2) Certificate 0.286** 0.283* 0.511*** 0.306*** 0.329*** 0.338*
[0.111] [0.157] [0.152] [0.096] [0.080] [0.187]
(3) Associateʹs 0.093** 0.079 0.127** 0.116** 0.097 0.161**
[0.043] [0.055] [0.064] [0.051] [0.063] [0.075]
(4) Bachelorʹs 0.241*** 0.205*** 0.565** 0.201*** 0.188*** 0.389**
[0.057] [0.055] [0.256] [0.066] [0.072] [0.156]
Associateʹs from:
(5) For‐Profit 0.083 0.011 0.193 0.031 ‐0.086 0.154
[0.087] [0.088] [0.175] [0.094] [0.099] [0.172]
Bachelorʹs from:
(6) For‐Profit ‐0.053 ‐0.112 0.069 ‐0.008 ‐0.068 0.194
[0.097] [0.102] [0.409] [0.105] [0.111] [0.399]
(7) Combination (3) + (5) 0.176** 0.09 0.32** 0.147* 0.011 0.314**
[.079] [.075] [.163] [.085] [.085] [.156]
N 2,200 1,690 520 1,660 1,240 410
Table 2.3:  Impact of For Profit Colleges on Log Earnings, 2009:  Without Controls for Major
Panel A: Start in Certificate Program
Panel B: Start in Associateʹs Degree Program
OLS Propensity Score Weighting
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Degree institution types pertain to the highest degree obtained. 
Note: The basic specification weights the observations by the sampling weights of the survey, 
while the Propensity Score specification weights the observations by propensity scores and 
sampling weights. Explanatory variables include:  age, household size (parental for dependent 
students, respondent for independent students), income in 2002 (parental  for dependent 
students, respondent for independent students), income in 2002*dependent, # dependent 
children in 2003, expected family contribution to college finances in 2003, years delayed 
enrollment in college after high school, indicators for HS diploma, GED, dependent in 2003, 
parents born in the United States, Black, Hispanic, male, English is primary language, married 
in 2003, born in the United States, and parents having at most 12 years of education. For those 
under 24 in 2003, we have indicators for high school GPA above 3.0, took the SAT or ACT, and 
SAT/ACT score (included in 1st column  just for those under 24, and the 3rd column).  Each 
column includes controls for highest degree certificate, Associateʹs, Bachelorʹs, and interactions 
of each with for‐profit.
Table 2.3:  Impact of For Profit Colleges on Log Earnings, 2009:  Without Controls for Major 
(continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Start  Program at:
(1) For‐Profit ‐0.038 0.0002 ‐0.010 ‐0.060 ‐0.024 ‐0.020
[0.064] [0.064] [0.061] [0.065] [0.065] [0.063]
Highest Degree:
(2) Certificate 0.056 0.032 0.018 ‐0.001
[0.060] [0.056] [0.058] [0.055]
Certificate from:
(3) For‐Profit ‐0.112 ‐0.108 ‐0.073 ‐0.066 ‐0.061 ‐0.058
[0.089] [0.087] [0.083] [0.087] [0.086] [0.087]
(4) Combination (2) + (3) ‐0.056 ‐0.076 ‐0.048 ‐0.062
[.067] [.068] [.066] [.067]
Certificate with major:
(5) Business ‐0.154 ‐0.203
[0.114] [0.124]
(6) Vocational 0.205** 0.130
[0.104] [0.101]
(7) Human Services ‐0.040 ‐0.038
[0.122] [0.121]
(8) LPN 0.175 0.192
[0.133] [0.124]
(9) Health Administration 0.007 ‐0.039
[0.094] [0.097]
## Allied Health‐Assisting ‐0.024 ‐0.014
[0.093] [0.089]
## Health (Survey) 0.003 0.051
[.125] [.134]
Control for Major N Y Y N Y Y
N 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,290 1,290 1,290
Table 2.4:  Impact of For Profit Colleges on Log Earnings, 2009 with Controls for 
Major:  Start in Certificate Program, All Ages
OLS Propensity Score Weighting
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Note: The basic specification weights the observations by the sampling weights of the 
survey, while the Propensity Score specification weights the observations by propensity 
scores and sampling weights.  Explanatory variables are the same as those listed in Table 2.3. 
Degree institution types pertain to the highest degree obtained.  Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) 
include controls for highest degree certificate, Associateʹs, Bachelorʹs, and interactions of 
each with for‐profit. Columns (2) and (4) include linear controls for each major.  Columns (3) 
and (6) include linear controls for each major, and interact each major with certificate, 
Associateʹs, and Bachelorʹs. The latter three variables are additionally interacted with for‐
profit. The returns to certificates by major are shown in the table only for majors where at 
least 30 students obtained a certificate in the OLS sample.
Table 2.4 (continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Start  Program at:
(1) For‐Profit ‐0.136* ‐0.113* ‐0.113 ‐0.146** ‐0.119* ‐0.124*
[0.073] [0.065] [0.071] [0.072] [0.071] [0.074]
Highest Degree:
(2) Certificate 0.286** 0.265** 0.306*** 0.268***
[0.111] [0.128] [0.096] [0.079]
(3) Associateʹs 0.093** 0.057 0.116** 0.085
[0.043] [0.045] [0.051] [0.052]
(4) Bachelorʹs 0.241*** 0.235*** 0.201*** 0.190***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.066] [0.063]
Associateʹs from:
(5) For‐Profit 0.083 0.089 0.100 0.031 0.032 0.031
[0.087] [0.089] [0.099] [0.094] [0.100] [0.107]
Bachelorʹs from:
(7) For‐Profit ‐0.053 ‐0.084 ‐0.158 ‐0.008 ‐0.044 ‐0.125
[0.097] [0.093] [0.108] [0.105] [0.105] [0.117]
(8) Combination (3) + (5) 0.176** 0.146 0.147* 0.118
[.079] [.082] [.085] [.091]
Associateʹs with major:
(9) Business 0.112 0.139
[0.089] [0.086]
(10) Vocational fields ‐0.027 0.101
[0.129] [0.133]
(11) Liberal Arts and Sciences 0.017 0.052
[0.070] [0.088]
(12) Human Services 0.018 0.088
[0.091] [0.100]
(13) RN 0.480*** 0.507***
[0.140] [0.143]
(14) Allied Health‐Assisting 0.257 0.060
[0.164] [0.191]
(15) Allied Health‐Treatment 0.531*** 0.549***
[0.146] [0.155]
Controls for Major N Y Y N Y Y
N 2,200 2,200 2,200 1,660 1,660 1,660
OLS
Propensity Score 
Weighting
Table 2.5:  Impact of For Profit Colleges on Log Earnings, 2009 with Controls for Major:  Start 
in Associateʹs Degree Program, All Ages
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Table 2.5 (continued)
Note: The basic specification weights the observations by the sampling weights of the survey, 
while the Propensity Score specification weights the observations by propensity scores and 
sampling weights.  Explanatory variables are the same as those listed in Table 2.3. Degree 
institution types pertain to the highest degree obtained.  Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) include 
controls for highest degree certificate, Associateʹs, Bachelorʹs, and interactions of each with for‐
profit. Columns (2) and (4) include linear controls for each major.  Columns (3) and (6) include 
linear controls for each major, and interact each major with certificate, Associateʹs, and 
Bachelorʹs. The latter three variables are additionally interacted with for‐profit. The returns to 
Associateʹs degrees by major are shown in the table only for majors where at least 30 students 
obtained an Associateʹs degree in the OLS sample.
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Appendix Table 2.1: Differences Between Survey and Transcript, Starting Program
BA Associateʹs Certificate
Non‐
Certification/
Other
Missing Data/
Inconclusive N
BA 36% 1% 0% 8% 5% 7530
Associateʹs 1% 15% 2% 10% 7% 5350
Certificate 0% 0% 8% 1% 1% 1630
Non‐Certification/
Other 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 910
N 5730 2630 1770 3210 2080 15420
Note:  Each cell denotes the percentage of all students who have both interview responses 
and transcript files. The percentages in the table as a whole add to 100, though not after 
rounding. The Missing Data/Inconclusive column represents that while all students in the 
table have transcript data, some may be missing certain parts or variables from the transcript 
files.  The transcript data is inconclusive if a student has had multiple certification programs 
at the starting institution.
Su
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ey
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Appendix Table 2.2:  Differences between Survey and Transcript Starting Sector
Panel A: Transcript Denotes Start in Certificate Program
Not‐for‐Profit For‐Profit N
Not‐for‐Profit 51% 1% 920
For‐Profit 0% 48% 850
N 900 870 1770
Panel B: Transcript Denotes Start in Associateʹs Degree Program
Not‐for‐Profit For‐Profit N
Not‐For‐Profit 80% 4% 2210
For‐Profit 0% 16% 420
N 2120 510 2630
Transcript
Note:  Each cell gives the percentage of all the observations who have both 
interview and transcript files, and whose transcript denotes the individual 
started in a certificate program (in panel A) or an Associateʹs degree 
program (in panel B). The starting institution sector from the transcript is 
compared to the starting institution sector in the survey, regardless of the 
starting program denoted in the survey response.
Transcript
Survey
Survey
Chapter 3
The Consequences of Teenage Childbearing Before
Roe v. Wade (with Kevin Lang)
There is a growing consensus among economists that while women who give birth as teens
have worse adult outcomes than those who do not, the causal effect of teen motherhood on
the mothers is small and possibly zero.1 But the supporting evidence comes almost entirely
from a period when teen conceptions and childbearing were non-marital, abortion was legal,
and effective contraception readily available. Teens who anticipate that motherhood would
have significant adverse consequences can avoid pregnancy even if they engage in sex, and,
if they become pregnant, can terminate the pregnancy. It would not be surprising if the
teens who give birth are those who anticipate that motherhood will not adversely affect
their lives.
We study the consequences of teen motherhood for the mother from the 1940’s through
the late 1960’s, a subject that has received much less attention.2 This is a particularly
interesting period over which to study teen motherhood. Firstly, many teen conceptions
during this period were marital, though this proportion was decreasing over time. Secondly,
it enables us to study how women made important investment decisions amidst a changing
economic and social landscape. Further, we are able to analyze the long-term consequences
of those investment decisions when the economic role of women had changed in a dramatic
1For example, deriving consistent estimates of the effect of teen motherhood when abortion is available,
Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang (2013) find modest, generally statistically insignificant effects on adult
outcomes.
2Bailey (2013) examines changes in individuals’ legal and financial access to contraception (though not
abortion), and finds suggestive evidence of long-run consequences for the individuals’ children.
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way, which few teens in the 1940s through early 1960s could have expected. Finally, limited
access to abortion and contraception may have changed who gave birth as a teenager, and
the costs associated with teen motherhood.
We draw on five cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth (1973, 1976, 1982,
1988 and 1995) to study adult outcomes among women who conceived as teenagers (less
than 18) from 1940 through 1968. The last three of these surveys are the earliest data
of which we are aware on pregnancy outcomes for a representative sample of teens. We
will argue below that, while not fully representative, the two early surveys depart only
modestly from this standard.
We follow a standard approach in the recent literature, limiting our sample to women
who first conceived as teens and comparing those whose first conception ended in a live birth
with those for whom it ended in a miscarriage.3 Ashcraft and Lang (2006) show pregnant
teenagers who have abortions tend to be drawn from more favoured backgrounds than
those who do not. Consequently, they show that in a period when abortion is available, this
approach will overestimate the true costs of teen motherhood since miscarriages preempt
some abortions. We provide evidence that abortion was rare for our sample and show that
the bias from abortions is therefore small. Consequently, comparing women who gave birth
to those who miscarried as teens provides us with (nearly) unbiased estimates of the effects
of teen motherhood on adult outcomes.
Our results show that in the 1940s through 1960s, teen motherhood would not have
been viewed as problematic for the future outcomes of the mother if conception had oc-
curred after marriage. Even for pre-marital conceptions, motherhood would not have been
seen as problematic for future outcomes as long as the teen married before the birth. Teen
mothers who conceived pre-maritally obtained less education (especially socioeconomically
advantaged teens) and married earlier (especially after 1960) as a result of the birth. How-
ever, in an age of low female labor force participation (particularly among married mothers)
3We use nontechnical language. We refer to spontaneous abortions as miscarriages and induced abortions
as abortions.
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and few divorces, these effects would not be expected to dramatically alter the teen’s life
course. The exception is that starting around 1960, we see that teens who had conceived
before marriage faced a higher risk of never marrying. Socioeconomically advantaged teens
were better able to avoid this negative outcome.
By the time these women were surveyed in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, divorce had
become much more common, female labor force attachment had intensified, and the returns
to female education had increased. Teens in the 1950s who had dropped out of school and
married as a result of teen motherhood were out of school and the labor force for twenty
years by the time these dramatic changes took hold. This put them at a disadvantage in
the labor and marriage market starting in the 1970s. We see that they were less likely
to be working, and less likely to be remarried if they got divorced. These disadvantages
translated into higher costs of divorce, evidenced by their greater likelihood of still being
in their first marriage. The most socioeconomically advantaged teens seemed not to face
these higher divorce costs.
Teens who became mothers in the late 1960s were not affected in the same way—they
were no less likely to be working, to be remarried conditional on the first marriage ending,
and no more likely to still be in their first marriage. While these women had obtained less
education as a result of a teen birth, the effects were smaller than they had been in earlier
years. They also had spent less time out of school and the labor force by the time female
labor force attachment and divorce began to rise.
Finally, there is evidence that women who were married before conception and had
become teen mothers in the 1960s were more likely to be working and have higher family
income. Compared to those who miscarried, these teens did not reduce their educational
attainment but they did have their children at an earlier age. When female labor force
attachment increased in the 1970’s, these women were less likely to still have very young
children at home and as a result faced lower costs of joining the labor force.
In sum, teen motherhood was only expected to be costly for those who were not able to
marry before the birth. However, teens who had given birth in the 1940s and 1950s were
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likely surprised by the increased prevalence of divorce and female labor force attachment
in the late 1960s and 1970s. They had dropped out of school in response to motherhood,
and then spent twenty years out of the labor force, putting them at a severe disadvantage
in the labor market starting in the 1970s. As a result, they were more likely to stay in
their first marriage. While women who had become teen mothers in later years were also
likely surprised by these societal changes, their youth likely made them more able to adapt.
They also likely experienced beneficial effects of earlier timed births.
3.1 Teenage Motherhood and a Changing Landscape for Women
3.1.1 Marriages, with and without Shotguns
While today teen motherhood is nearly synonymous with non-marital childbearing, this
is much less true during our sample period. Teen marriages were much more prevalent in
the 1940’s through the early 1960’s. Median age at first marriage for women was 21.5 in
1940 but throughout the first two decades after the war fell between 20.3 and 20.5 before
beginning to rise in the mid-1960s. Still, even in 1968, median age at first marriage for
women stood at 20.8. Thereafter it rose steadily, reaching 22.1 in 1980 and 26.6 in 2013
(US Census Bureau 2013). In 1960, one-fourth of 18-year-old women were married, but
this figure had fallen to one-sixth by 1968-70 (US Bureau of the Census 1971). Today the
figures are not even reported separately for 18-year-olds. Only 2.5% of 18 and 19-year-old
women are married.
The minimum legal age at which women could marry without parental consent actually
fell during the 20th century. Until the middle of the century, 21 was the standard age of
majority and thus the age at which children could marry without parental consent (Cultice,
1992 cited in Hamilton). As of 1972, most states had lowered the age to 18 at least for
women (Minnesota Law Review 1972-1973). Dahl (2010) suggests that the age at which a
girl could marry with permission of her parents or a court was a more important factor. He
reports (Dahl 2005) these minimum age laws for forty states. As of 1940, the unweighted
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mean was 14.95. Half the states had a minimum age of 16 but four had a mininum age of 12
and one of 13. By 1969, the mean had risen to 15.66, with two states establishing minimum
ages above 16 and none permitting marriage even with parental consent at age 12. Perhaps
the greatest indication of changes in social attitudes is that in 1970 the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws proposed a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which, among other
things, proposed that individuals be permitted to marry without parental permission at
age 18 and with either parental or court permission at age 16. Those seeking to marry at
a younger age would require both parental and court permission (Minnesota Law Review
1972-1973).
In 1940, 13.5% of teens age 15-19 giving birth were unmarried.4 This proportion was
essentially unchanged in 1950 at 13.4% and had risen only slightly to 14.2% by 1955. We
will focus on younger teens, those conceiving before age 18. Not surprisingly, non-marital
childbearing rates declined with age among teens, standing at 43%, 26% 18% and 12%
for 15, 16, 17 and 18 year old mothers in 1955, the first year for which we have data by
one-year age group. By 1968, the last year in our study, these figures had climbed to 62%,
45%, 35% and 26%. To put these numbers in perspective, by 1980, the corresponding
figures were 79%, 66%, 55% and 45%, and in 2012 approximately 90% for 15-19 year olds
as a group (Martin et al. 2013).
Of course, births can be post-marital either because the child was conceived post-
maritally or because the mother marries between conceiving and giving birth. Before 1950,
52% of the conceptions in our sample occurred after marriage, and this percentage stayed at
50% from 1950 through 1954. Over the period from 1955 through 1959 this percentage fell
to 41%, to 38% from 1960 through 1964, and to 23.5% from 1965 through 1968. Regressing
an indicator for marriage before conception on the year of conception and our usual set of
controls (with the exception that we have to omit age, as it is collinear with survey year,
age at conception, and date of conception), we see that pre-marital conceptions increase
by 1.5 percentage points per year.
4Where not otherwise noted, the figures in this paragraph are from Ventura and Bachrach (2000).
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The percentage of post-marital conceptions in our sample is fairly consistent with esti-
mates from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) (Bachu 1999). Using the CPS, roughly
70% of births to 15-19 year old women in the 1940s were estimated to be post-maritally
conceived. This fell to 43% for 1965-1969. These estimates are larger than those in our
sample, likely because our sample only includes teens who conceived before they turned
18.
While the percentage of conceptions taking place after marriage fell during our sam-
ple period, the percentage of outcomes (birth or miscarriage) taking place after marriage
remained much more stable in our data. Before 1950, this percentage was approximately
73% and rose to 77% during the period from 1950 through 1954. The percentage remained
approximately the same from 1955 through 1959 and also from 1960 through 1964. This
was driven by a greater proportion of pre-marital conceptions resulting in a pre-outcome
marriage. Before 1950, approximately 44% of pre-marital conceptions led to a pre-outcome
marriage. This increased to 55% over the period from 1950 through 1954, and to over 60%
in the periods from 1955 through 1959 and 1960 through 1964. These trends are consistent
with estimates from the CPS, which show that the proportion of premarital conceptions
that resulted in post-marital births increased until the mid-1960’s. In 1960-64, these esti-
mates suggest that almost six-tenths of premarital conceptions were followed by a marriage
prior to birth (Bachu 1999).
The percentage of teens in our sample who were married before the pregnancy outcome
fell to 62% over the period from 1965 through 1968. Over this period, the proportion of
pre-marital conceptions that led to pre-outcome marriages dropped to 50%. This drop is
also seen in the CPS data.
Regressing an indicator for marriage before the pregnancy outcome on our usual set of
controls, we see that pre-marital births and miscarriages increase by .6 percentage points
per year. However, shot-gun marriages increase by .9 percentage points per year. Condi-
tional on a pre-marital conception, shot-gun marriages decrease by .3 percentage points per
year (p=.103). However, only looking at pre-marital conceptions through 1960, shot-gun
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marriages increase by .8 percentage points per year (significant at the .05 level). Even in
the late 1960’s when most conceptions took place before marriage, the teen was married
before the pregnancy outcome in most pregnancies.
3.1.2 Abortion and Contraception
Access to abortion was very limited until shortly before 1973 when Roe v. Wade legalized
abortion throughout the United States. Before 1969, legal abortion was only available in
two states and then only under fairly restrictive conditions. It started to become more
widely available in 1969, and by 1970 was plausibly sufficiently available as to be a signifi-
cant factor in understanding teen births. According to data compiled by Johnston (2013),
reported abortions grew from 1,028 in 1966 to 2,061 in 1967, to 6,211 in 1968 to 27,512 in
1969 and 193,491 in 1970.5
While legal abortion was not widely available pre-1969, women did have abortions
through both legal and illegal means. By its nature, the incidence of illegal abortion is
difficult to estimate. However, estimates of the abortion rate (including illegal abortions)
in the pre-Roe v. Wade period appear consistent to those in our data, and also appear
sufficiently small so that concerns about bias are mitigated. Wiehl (1938) reviewed the
available evidence and concluded that 4-5% of pregnancies ending in illegal abortion was
a reasonable estimate for the rate among married white women in the general population.
Much less is known about the rate among the nonwhite population. The Indianapolis study
of married couples (Whelpton and Kiser 1948) found an overall abortion rate of 3.1% of
which roughly 70% were illegal. However only .4% of first pregnancies among this group
ended in illegal abortions. A further 1.0% ended in therapeutic abortions. 6
5Before Roe v. Wade, “therapeutic abortions” were generally performed if psychiatrists believed that the
mother would commit suicide if the abortion was not performed. Interpretation of this law was inconsistently
applied, with the legal therapeutic abortion rate higher on private services than on ward services (Calderone
1960). Calderone quotes a participant at a conference of the American Public Health Association as saying
that the difference between an illegal abortion and a legal therapeutic abortion was “$300 and knowing the
right person” (Calderone 1960).
6 It is not obvious whether abortions should be more or less common among the teens experiencing their
first pregnancy than among married couples. On the one hand, teens may have had less access to abortion.
On the other hand, by definition, they were less likely to be married. Still, 38% of the teens in our sample
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In our data about 1.1% of first teen pregnancies were terminated by an induced abortion.
If we limit ourselves to the last three cycles, which were conducted long after those abortions
would have been legalized and for which we have data on childless never married women,
the estimate is about 1.7%. Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang (2013) estimate that roughly
75% of legal abortions are reported in cycle V for a closely related sample. So a plausible
estimate of the frequency of abortion among teens during our period is in the range of 1.5%
to 3%. Similar to estimates from the literature, the estimate from our data is sufficiently
small to mitigate concerns about bias.
The FDA first approved the pill in 1957 and approved it for contraceptive use in 1960.
Prior to this period, contraception would have been less convenient and effective for all
couples. Even in the 1960s, unmarried teens had limited access to effective contraception.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decision Eisenstadt v. Baird guaranteed unmarried adults
legal access to contraception. Its 1977 Carey v. Population Services International decision
struck down a New York State law prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives
to individuals less than sixteen years old and permitting the sale of contraceptives only
by pharmacists. A detailed review of parental notification laws is beyond the scope of
this paper,7 but it is safe to say that teenagers have had legal access to effective contra-
ception either over the counter or by prescription since the 1970s. While other forms of
contraception, notably condoms, were widely available, before 1969 only 10 states allowed
unmarried, childless women under the age of 21 to obtain the pill legally without parental
consent. Such laws were followed closely because the pill required a prescription from a
licensed physician and sale by a licensed pharmacist, and violation of the laws was subject
to significant penalties (Bailey 2006).
were married at the time of conception and approximately 73% were married at the time of the outcome.
7See Maradiegue (2003) for more detail.
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3.1.3 Women, Education and the Labor Market
From the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, the adverse consequences of teen motherhood
may have appeared minimal for most teens, provided they were married before or soon
after the birth which, as we have shown, most were. The most likely effect of pregnancy
would be to lead the teen to drop out of high school (voluntarily or involuntarily) since
prior to the passage of Title IX of the 1972 Educational Amendments, pregnant teens could
be expelled from school or required to enter a special program.
Even towards the beginning of the period we study, school enrollment among fourteen-
and fifteen-year old girls was becoming nearly universal (93% in 1947) and increased further
throughout the period. Attendance among 16- and 17-year olds was much less universal.
In 1947 only two-thirds of girls in this age group were enrolled in school although by 1968 it
had reached 89% (US Census Bureau, Accessed 2014). These figures are not substantially
different from those for men. Consistent with the enrollment data, high school graduation
was much lower, especially at the beginning of our period. High school graduates as
a proportion of 17-year-olds in the population stood at 51% in 1940, and 77% in 1968
(National Center for Education Statistics 1993). Female college enrollment began catching
up to that of males in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but the most dramatic catch-up would not
begin until the 1970’s (Goldin et al. 2006).
Perhaps more importantly, most women who did graduate from high school did not
invest in training for careers but instead took jobs that involved less attachment to the
labor force (Goldin et al. 2006). In 1950, the labor force participation rate of married
women 35-44 was only 25%, while by 1970, shortly after the end of our period, it was
46% (Goldin 2006). This contrasts with participation rates of over 60% in the 1980s when
many of the teens in more recent data would have experienced pregnancy. Most strikingly,
in 1948, only 17% of married mothers were in the labor force (Cohany and Sok 2007).
Since most women, especially those anticipating marriage and children, could expect to be
employed in jobs (not careers) that required lower levels of human capital investment, the
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foregone education was likely to be perceived as less costly in this period.
The impact of a teen birth on labor market investments may not have seemed costly
to teens during the period we study, but those same teens may have found it had become
very costly in the 1970’s, when many more married women were working and there was
a growing need for females to be financially independent. Female financial independence
became more important with the doubling of the divorce rate from the mid-1960’s to mid-
1970’s (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), and increased age at marriage partly due to increased
access to the pill (Goldin 2006). Teens in the late 1960’s may have already begun to realize
the costs associated with a failure to invest in education. This may have changed who got
pregnant as a teen, or changed the investment responses for those who did give birth.
3.2 Data
We use cycles I (1973), II (1976), III (1982), IV (1988) and V (1995) of the National
Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), a survey of non-institutionalized women aged 15-44,
administered by the National Center for Health Statistics, an agency of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. Personal interviews were conducted with the
respondents to collect data on pregnancy history, family planning, as well as many social,
economic, and demographic characteristics. The 1973 survey contains a sample of 9,797
women, the 1976 survey 8,611 women, the 1982 survey 7,969 women, the 1988 survey 8,450,
and the 1995 survey 10,847 women. Following Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang (2013),
we define teen pregnancies as first conceptions that occur before age 18. The 1973 and
1976 cycles were limited to married women, previously married women, or women who
were never married but living with their own children. Relative to our samples in the
later cycles, the earlier cycles do not include never married women whose pregnancies all
ended in miscarriage, or those who were not living with their own children. In the three
later cycles there are only 21 women who became pregnant as a teenager, never married
and were not living with one of their own children. We also show in Appendix Table 3.1
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that limiting the later samples in this way does not change the results. Because a greater
proportion of pregnant teens were already married in the earlier period, and because there
was pressure to marry following pregnancy, we are confident that there is very little bias
from the sample restriction.
As we include pregnancies in later years, we risk both more bias due to a growing
number of abortions and including years where the growing availability of abortion and
the pill changed who gave birth as a teen. Our analysis of state abortion laws and abortion
rates in the previous section showed a dramatic increase in the availability of abortion in
1969. Accordingly, we restrict the sample to women who first conceived before 1969.
As the survey year increases, there are fewer women who could have become pregnant
as a teen before 1969. Therefore, more than 75% of our sample comes from cycles I and
II. We define all pregnancies reported to have resulted in a miscarriage or a stillbirth
within the first 22 weeks or five months of pregnancy as “miscarriages.” Thus we exclude
outcomes reported as miscarriages if the pregnancy lasted more than five months and
include the one pregnancy reported to end in a stillbirth at 5 months.8 Twenty weeks is
a more standard cutoff for distinguishing between miscarriages and other forms of fetal
death, but the duration of pregnancy is often reported in months in our data. Moreover,
as the Supreme Court noted in Roe v. Wade, at that time viability before 28 weeks was
rare and the Court felt it was safe to declare that a fetus was not viable before 24 weeks.
Extending the definition of miscarriages to the 22 stillbirths reported at six months might
be problematic since a live birth is also reported at six months.9
8Following Lang and Nuevo (2012), we exclude ectopic pregnancies since respondents were only explicitly
asked about this outcome in 1995. Including ectopic pregnancies may introduce bias from the changing
treatment of this outcome over the cycles. Starting in the 1982 cycle, women who do not remember the
number of weeks at which the miscarriage or stillbirth occurred are asked for the month or trimester in
which this outcome occurred. We treat miscarriages or stillbirths reported to have occurred in the first and
second trimesters as “miscarriages.” Of the women who reported that their first teen pregnancy ended in
a miscarriage (with conceptions before 1969), all but a few reported the miscarriage in the first 22 weeks.
Thus, assuming that reported second trimester miscarriages occur in the first 22 weeks is reasonable.
Respondents in the 1973 cycle were not asked to distinguish between miscarriages and stillbirth. However,
they are asked for the length of the pregnancy, enabling us to code miscarriage in the same way as in the
other cycles.
9There are 4 stillbirths reported at 6 months in both the 1976 and 1982 cycles. There are 14 fetal losses
reported at 6 months in the 1973 cycle—there is no distinction in the 1973 cycle between miscarriage and
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Our principal sample of those conceiving as teens before 1969 consists of 4520 first
pregnancies that result in birth, 293 in miscarriage, and 31 that end in an abortion.10
There is some concern that miscarriages are underreported. Many miscarriages occur
very early in pregnancy and are often asymptomatic (Pandya et al. 1996). Moreover, since
this paper uses recall data, it is possible that women forget miscarriages that happened
long ago. Lang and Nuevo (2012) find no evidence that the reported miscarriage rate in
a given year is higher in more recent cycles of the NSFG, for either all miscarriages or
just for early miscarriages. We confirm below that the miscarriage rate for a given year is
independent of the survey year.
Nonreporting of miscarriages, because the woman was never aware of being pregnant,
has forgotten the miscarriage or simply chooses not to report it, will be problematic only if
the tendency to recognize and report a miscarriage is related to future outcomes. Below we
will confirm that reported miscarriage is unrelated to measured background characteristics
in our data.
We focus on 9 outcome variables. The first two are measures of education: years
of educational attainment, and an indicator for whether the individual obtained at least
twelve years of education. The next variables are related to marital history: age at first
marriage, still in first marriage, conditional on marrying, currently married conditional on
first marriage ending, and whether the respondent was never married. We also consider
whether the respondent was working and her family income. However, the income data are
somewhat problematic because they are reported in intervals in each year, and we impute
income using these intervals.11 Finally, we look at the number of live births. Observations
stillbirth. In contrast with “miscarriage,” late fetal death is predicted in our data by socioeconomic factors
which makes it important to restrict the sample in this way.
10Respondents in 1973 are not asked whether pregnancies ended in abortion. We note that there are
eight observations who report a live birth after less than 4 weeks of pregnancy, when asked for pregnancy
duration in weeks. However, when asked for the duration in months they report either 8 or 9 months. We
thus continue to include these observations. There is one observation who reports a live birth, but does not
report the duration. Since we are interested in the effect of motherhood, the duration of the pregnancy for
a live birth is not important, and so we include this observation.
11 In 1973 and 1976, some respondents provide non-grouped income. For those who do not, they denote the
interval which we impute as follows: less than $1000 per year ($500), $1,000-$1,999 ($1,500), $2,000-$2,999
($2,500), $3,000-$3,999 ($3,500), $4,000-$4,999 ($4,500), $5,000-$5,999 ($5,500), $6,000-$6,999 ($6,500),
147
are weighted by the sampling weights of the survey, normalized so that the weighted sample
size for each survey equals the actual sample size for that survey.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
If reported miscarriages are random, there are no abortions, and miscarriage does not
directly affect adult outcomes, then simply comparing mean outcomes for women who
gave birth with those who miscarried provides an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of
teen motherhood on adult outcomes, for women like those who become pregnant as teens.
We argue below that the frequency of abortion during the period we study is sufficiently
low to be inconsequential. We will provide additional evidence that miscarriage is random.
And if contrary to our implicit assumption, miscarriage affects adult outcomes directly, at
least we measure the effect of a pregnancy ending in a birth relative to a pregnancy ending
in miscarriage.
However, by controlling for other factors that affect adult outcomes, we can increase
the precision of our estimates. Moreover, if reported miscarriages are not random, these
additional controls can reduce bias. Our principal specification allows the effect of a teen
birth to differ by whether the teen was married before conception. We use a straightforward
ordinary least squares regression:
$7,000-$7,999 ($7,500), $8,000-$8,999 ($8,500), $9,000-$9,999 ($9,500), $10,000-$11,999 ($11,000), $12,000-
$14,999 ($13,500), (1973) $15,000-$24,999 ($20,000), (1976) $15,000-$19,999 ($17,500), (1976) $20,000-
$24,999 ($22,500), $25,000 or more (in 1973 $30,000, in 1976 $27,500). We impute this last amount as-
suming the length of the interval is the same as the length of the previous interval. In 1976, respondents
were offered both weekly and yearly intervals. The weekly intervals were the weekly equivalent of the
yearly intervals, and so respondents who provided the weekly interval were coded as if they had provided
the corresponding yearly interval. In 1982 and 1988, there are 17 intervals which we impute as follows:
less than $2,500 ($1,250), $2,500-$4,999 ($3,750), $5,000-$5,999 ($5,500), $6,000-$6,999 ($6,500), $7,000-
$7,999 ($7,500), $8,000-$8,999 ($8,500), $9,000-$9,999 ($9,500), $10,000-$10,999 ($10,500), $11,000-$11,999
($11,500), $12,000-$12,999 ($12,500), $13,000-$14,999 ($13,999), $15,000-$16,999 ($15,999), $17,000-
$19,999 ($17,999), $20,000-$24,999 ($22,499), $25,000-$34,999 ($29,999), $35,000-$49,999 ($42,499), $50,000
and more ($74,499).
In 1995, there are 18 intervals which we impute as follows: less than $7,000 ($3,500), $7,000-$8,499
($7,750), $8,500-$9,999 ($9,250), $10,000-$11,999 ($10,999), $12,000-$13,999 ($12,999), $14,000-$15,999
($14,999), $16,000-$17,999 ($16,999), $18,000-$19,999 ($18,999), $20,000-$24,999 ($22,499), $25,000-
$29,999 ($27,499), $30,000-$39,999 ($34,499), $40,000-$49,999 ($44,499), $50,000-$59,999 ($54,499),
$60,000-$69,999 ($64,499), $70,000-$79,999 ($74,499), $80,000-$89,999 ($84,499), $90,000-$99,999
($94,499), $100,000 and up ($124,499).
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 = + + 1+ 2 ∗+ 3+ 
(3.1)
to measure the effect of teen motherhood for 9 separate dependent variables, 
The variables in X include the respondent’s current age, age at first conception and a
dummy if this age was less than 15, respondent’s mother’s education, four indicators for
the cycle of the survey, Hispanic, black, white, Protestant, Catholic, whether during most
of the respondent’s childhood her mother worked (either full- or part-time), and whether
the respondent lived with both parents at age 14.12  is an indicator equal to one if
the first pregnancy resulted in a birth, and equal to zero if it resulted in a miscarriage.
We limit the sample to women whose first teen pregnancy ended in either a birth or a
miscarriage.
To check whether the costs of teen motherhood were greater for more advantaged teens,
we need to interact Birth with measures of socioeconomic advantage. Because our sample
of miscarriages is relatively small, it is not feasible to interact Birth with each of the
background measures. Instead, we use the individuals in the five cycles of the NSFG who
were born before 1951 and who first conceived at age 18 or older. For these individuals, we
regress education on the explanatory variables in above, excluding age at first conception
and the indicator for age at conception less than 15. We use the coefficients from this
regression to create a predicted education index for each individual in our teen pregnancy
sample of pre-1969 conceptions.13 Predicted education for our sample ranges from about
12The indicator for whether the respondent lived with both parents at the age of 14 is not available in
the 1995 survey. We set the variable equal to zero in 1995, and include indicators for the year of the survey
in the regressions. Since the education of the respondent’s mother, and whether the respondent’s mother
is working, are missing for some of the respondents, we include indicators for whether these variables are
missing and set the variables to zero for those for whom it is missing.
13We note that if teens who expect to get less education are more likely to become pregnant, this is not
a consistent estimate of each teen’s expected education in the absence of a teen birth. Indeed, we find that
teens who miscarry get almost two years less education than “predicted.” However, their actual education
is strongly increasing in their predicted education. We estimate the slope to be a precise .88, which we
cannot reject is different than one.
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eight to seventeen years. The 90/10 range is roughly 11 to 13. For ease of interpretation, we
have rescaled predicted education to (predicted education -12). In the regressions below,
the coefficient on  should be interpreted as the effect of teen motherhood for someone
with 12 years of predicted education.
Using these predicted education levels, we then estimate:
 = + + 1+ 2 ∗ (3.2)
+ 3+ 4 ∗ c+ 5 ∗ c ∗
+ 6c ∗+ 
where c is the predicted education level of the respondent minus 12. We are not able to
control for c in the regressions above, since we include all of the variables that are used
to predict c We present bootstrapped standard errors for this specification since c is
a generated regressor.
3.3.1 Potential Bias from Abortions
In our data, the miscarriage rate is about 6 percent. This is lower than currently estimated,
but as Lang and Nuevo (2012) show, miscarriage rates have been rising, probably because
home pregnancy tests have increased awareness of pregnancy.
Suppose 6% of teens miscarry, 3% have abortions and about 50% of teens who would
have an abortion and would also have a miscarriage (and recognize it) actually have the
abortion (they abort their pregnancy before the miscarriage occurs).14 Then a little al-
gebra shows that about 1.5% of the teens who miscarry are girls who would have had an
abortion. Any bias is very small and is mitigated by our ability to control for differences
in observables.
14This is a rough estimate from Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang (2013).
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Are reported miscarriages random?
Ashcraft, Fernandez-Val and Lang (2013) review the medical literature on miscarriage and
conclude that the medical evidence for large behavioral effects on miscarriage is relatively
weak. Ashcraft and Lang (2006), however, point out that since the decision to have an
abortion is nonrandom, miscarriages are as well. And Lang and Nuevo (2012) show that
reported miscarriages are drawn from a more advantaged population, presumably because
of greater awareness of pregnancy.
The top half of Table 3.1 presents weighted means and standard deviations for the
explanatory variables in the empirical specification, by birth outcome and marital status
at the time of conception. If miscarriages are random during this period we should see few
statistically significant differences in these variables. Teens who give birth are more likely to
be black and less likely to be white. Those giving birth are less likely to be Protestant and
more likely to be Catholic. It is not surprising that a few of the 16 explanatory variables
would be significantly different at the .05 level. We use the Bonferroni adjustment for 16
tests, and adjust for the average correlation between the 16 variables. The only differences
in the explanatory variables that remain significant are that teen mothers who were married
before conception are more likely to have conceived before the age of 15 relative to those
who miscarried, they are less likely to be white, less likely to be Protestant, and more
likely to be Catholic. These differences could reflect that Catholics and teens conceiving
at an age younger than 15 are less aware of miscarriage, or alternatively, these groups are
less willing to report the miscarriage. To mitigate concerns that reported miscarriages are
not truly random we control for these two variables, as well as the others presented in
this table. The similarity in most of these explanatory variables across pregnancy outcome
provides evidence that miscarriages in this period are biologically and socially random.
In table 3.2 we report the result of a linear probability model in which we regress the
pregnancy outcome on our controls. Only one of these coefficients is statistically significant
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at the .1 level, and the R-squared is .01. However, the explanatory variables are jointly
significant. We do see that those married before conception are less likely to report a
birth. This may reflect that those not married before conception are less willing to report
a miscarriage for social reasons, or alternatively are less aware of a miscarriage. We also
see that there is no evidence of recall bias as the coefficients on survey year are not jointly
significant, nor are they individually significant.15 Because the probability of miscarriage
is only about 6% in this sample, there is a risk that different distributional assumptions
would give different results. The second and third columns of table 3.2 show probit and
logit estimates. The individual estimated coefficients mostly remain far from statistically
significant. However, the coefficients are jointly significant. These specifications further
show no evidence of recall bias as the coefficients on the indicators for survey year are not
jointly significant.
We note that if either nonreporting of miscarriages were nonrandom or the abortion
rate were much higher than we report, miscarriages would be predictable. Our inability
to predict miscarriage supports the view that unreported, previously illegal, abortions are
not a major factor.
3.4.2 Comparison of Means
As discussed above, if miscarriages are random then a simple comparison of mean outcomes
provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of teen motherhood, for women like those
who become pregnant as teens. The second half of table 3.1 presents weighted means
and standard deviations for the outcome variables in the empirical specification, by birth
outcome and marital status at the time of conception. Among those not married before
conception, teens reduce their educational attainment in response to a birth. Teens who
give birth obtain approximately .4 fewer years of school and are 15 percentage points less
15These coefficients are not shown because collinearity with indicators for mother’s education and working
mother non-missing make them difficult to interpret in this regression. For ease of interpretation, we
omit mother’s education, working mother, and the indicators for these variables non-missing to determine
whether there is evidence of recall bias. The coefficients on the indicators for survey year are all small in
this regression and not jointly significant.
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likely to obtain at least twelve years of education. There is also evidence that it is costly
for teen mothers to be single at the time of birth or later on. Teens who give birth marry
.6 years earlier, they are more likely to never marry, and they are 12 percentage points
more likely to still be in their first marriage (conditional on marrying). There are no
statistically significant effects of teen motherhood on educational attainment of those who
were married before conception. However, teen mothers in this group are less likely to
be currently married if their first marriage ended. Among those who were married before
conception, those who gave birth were 12 percentage points more likely to be working,
and their family income was higher (though this last effect is not statistically significant).
Those giving birth, both those who conceived before marriage and those who conceived after
marriage, have approximately .8 more live births; these effects are statistically significant
at the .01 level. If miscarriage is truly random, it should have no effect on age at first
marriage among those already married at the time of conception. We reassuringly see that
age at first marriage does not differ by birth outcome for this group.
3.4.3 Adult outcomes
Table 3.3 presents the results from specification (3.1). Each column represents a separate
regression, with the dependent variables listed across the first row. We first discuss the
results for teens who were not married at the time of conception.
Teens who give birth attain approximately .4 fewer years of education relative to those
who miscarry. Similarly, those who give birth are 16 percentage points less likely to com-
plete 12th grade than those who miscarry. There are at least two reasons why teen mothers
attained less education, and were less likely to complete the 12th grade. First, the return to
12th grade completion during this period was not very high for women due to lower college
enrollment rates for females, and low levels of labor force attachment and participation.
With low returns to 12th grade completion, but higher costs due to having a child, teen
mothers may have decided not to complete high school. Alternatively, teen mothers may
have wanted to complete 12th grade, but they may have been forced out of school because
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they were pregnant. By the 1970’s, the return to high school graduation would seem much
higher and Title IX prevented schools from expelling pregnant teens.
Non-marital childbearing had severe consequences for the reputation of both the mother
and father. Plausibly to avoid this social stigma, the results show that teens who gave birth
married about .75 years earlier than those who miscarried. Confirming that non-marital
childbearing had very high social costs, we see that teen mothers are four percentage points
more likely never to have married. This effect exists despite the fact that nearly 60% of
teen mothers not married before conception were married before the birth. Similarly,
conditional on no longer being in their first marriage, teen mothers are slightly less likely
to be married, though this effect is not statistically significant. Interestingly, conditional
on ever marrying, teen mothers are 12 percentage points more likely to still be in their
first marriage. This suggests that women who had conceived pre-maritally and given birth
did not want to find themselves single either at the time of birth or due to a divorce.
In response to the birth, she had attained less education which would likely put her at
a disadvantage in the labor market starting in the 1970s. This effect on the stability of
the first marriage does not disappear if we control for the number of children (results not
shown).
It need not be causal that those giving births as teens have more children. Women with
a history of miscarriage are more likely to miscarry during subsequent pregnancies. On the
other hand, the effect of a live birth on total parity at the time the women are surveyed is
less than 1, suggesting that at least part of the effect of a birth is on timing.
Family income is higher for those giving birth than for those who miscarry, though this
effect is not statistically significant. This positive coefficient is in part due to their greater
likelihood of being married; controlling for marital status results in the coefficient falling in
magnitude (results not shown). Family income is the one variable with substantial missing
data and has been converted from a categorical variable. There is no statistically significant
effect of teen motherhood on whether the respondent is working at the time of the survey.
In sum, we see that teen mothers who conceived pre-maritally were more likely to drop
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out of school and marry earlier. They also were more likely to never marry. Reduced
labor market investments likely made the costs of divorce higher by the time of the survey,
translating into greater stability of the first marriage. While the point estimates suggest
that teen mothers were less likely to be working and had higher income, these effects are
not significant.
The adverse effects of teen motherhood on educational attainment and 12th grade
completion are less pronounced for those married before conception. The effect on both
measures of education is statistically insignificant for this group. While the difference
between those conceiving pre- and post-marriage is not statistically significant when edu-
cational attainment is used as the outcome, the difference is statistically significant at the
.1 level when 12th grade competion is used as the outcome variable. The summary statis-
tics in table 3.1 suggest that this is because women who married before conception received
less education, regardless of whether they gave birth or miscarried, probably because these
women left school at the time of their marriage. As a result, a birth did not affect their
educational attainment.
The positive effect of teen motherhood on whether the respondent is still in the first
marriage is smaller among those married before conception (although again neither the
difference nor the effect is statistically significant). Because such women tended to leave
school at an earlier age regardless of whether they gave birth or miscarried, divorce in the
late 1960’s or later would be costly for both groups. Conditional on no longer being in
their first marriage, teen mothers are 8 percentage points less likely to be currently married
(not statistically significant).
The effect of teen motherhood on working is more positive for those married before
conception (significant at the .05 level). Among this group, those who gave birth are 11
percentage points more likely to be working than those who miscarried. We saw that there
was no difference in educational attainment for those who gave birth relative to those who
miscarried, among those who were married before conception. However, their births were
timed earlier, perhaps allowing them to return to the workforce with lower cost.
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The positive effect of teen motherhood on family income is larger than for those not mar-
ried before conception (again, neither the difference nor the effect is statistically significant).
However, this positive point estimate is driven by the more positive effect of teen mother-
hood on working among those married before conception. When an indicator for working is
included in the income regression, the positive coefficient on  ∗
goes to -.007 but is far from statistically significant.
If miscarriage is truly random, then it cannot affect the age at first marriage among
those who are already married. While giving birth lowers the age at first marriage by
about three quarters of a year among those conceiving premaritally, it is reassuring that
the estimated effect on those who were already married is statistically significantly smaller,
a precise effect of less than .2 years.
We do not discuss the remaining explanatory variables except to note that they gener-
ally enter in the expected way. In sum, table 3.3 shows that teen mothers who conceived
after marriage did not alter their educational investments as a result of a birth. The ef-
fects of teen motherhood on future outcomes appear to have been positive for this group.
Arguably because earlier timed births made entering the labor market less costly, teen
mothers were more likely to be working and to have higher family incomes (not statisti-
cally significant) than those who miscarried. These effects will be further explored in the
following tables.
3.4.3.1 Heterogeneity by Predicted Education
Table 3.3 imposes that a teen birth had similar effects regardless of the teen’s family
background and future prospects. Studies based on more recent data find little effect of
teen motherhood, largely because teen mothers are drawn from groups whose education
and job prospects are already poor. We might therefore expect that in the earlier period
we study, adverse effects would be more prominent among the more advantaged teens who
give birth. On the other hand, very advantaged teens may be more able to overcome any
adverse effects.
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Therefore, in table 3.4 we present the results from specification (3.2). Each column
represents a separate regression. The explanatory variables for each of these regressions
are the same as in table 3.3, but in the top panel we include predicted education, rescaled to
predicted education minus 12, interacted with birth. Predicted education is not included
by itself because all of the variables that enter the predicted education calculation are
included independently in the specification. This specification allows the effect of a teen
birth to increase or decrease with this summary measure of background.
The coefficient on  can be interpreted as the effect of teen motherhood for someone
with 12 years of predicted education, who was not married prior to conception. The top
rows present the coefficients on the birth variables. Below these coefficients, we show the
p-value for the hypothesis that the birth coefficients are jointly 0, both for those who were
married prior to conception and for those who were not. The last rows show the estimated
effects of a birth for individuals with predicted education of 10 and 14 years (rescaled to
-2 and +2), again both for those who were married prior to conception and for those who
were not.
We start by presenting the results for those not married before conception. The increase
in total parity is independent of predicted education. However, the remaining outcomes
show some interesting patterns.
Teen birth has no statistically significant effect on the average education of those with
low predicted education. However, among those with high predicted education teens giving
birth obtain approximately .7 fewer years of education. In table 3.3, we found a large and
significant adverse effect of teen motherhood on the probability of completing 12th grade.
When we include the linear interaction term, the effect on those whose predicted education
was 12 years remains about the same (15 percentage points) and significant at the .01 level.
The estimated effect on those with low predicted education is smaller in magnitude and
not statistically significant. However, the effect on those with high predicted education is
larger (22 percentage points) and statistically significant at the .05 level. This suggests
that for lower levels of predicted education teens who miscarried were unlikely to graduate
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high school anyway, and so a birth had little effect on high school completion. For groups
where the probability of graduation was sufficiently high, a teen birth had a large effect on
high school completion.
When we allow a linear interaction term, the effect on age at first marriage among
those predicted to have 12 years of education remains approximately the same as the
effect in table 3.3. This effect is slightly larger for those with high predicted education,
and slightly smaller for those with low predicted education. However, these differences
are not statistically significant. It appears that regardless of predicted education levels,
teens who gave birth married earlier to avoid the costs of single motherhood. However, the
greater likelihood of never marrying is much stronger for those with lower levels of predicted
education (the difference in the effect between a teen with high and low predicted education
is 16 percentage points, statistically significant at the .05 level).
Conditional on ever marrying, teen mothers with 12 years of predicted education are 14
percentage points more likely to still be in their first marriage. This effect is stronger for
teens with low predicted education and the effect disappears for teens with high predicted
education, though the differences are not statistically significant. Above we said that
teen mothers may be more likely to be in their first marriage because divorce would be
more costly for them. While teen mothers with high predicted education changed their
educational attainment the most in response to a birth, perhaps because their background
characteristics were so favorable their probability of remarriage and financial independence
was higher. Teens with lower predicted education (for example 12 years) still reduced
their educational attainment in response to a birth, but it is plausible that because their
background characteristics were less favorable remarriage and financial independence would
be more challenging. There is no statistically significant effect of teen motherhood, at any
level of predicted education, on being currently married, conditional on no longer being in
their first marriage.
Among those with low predicted education, teen mothers are 9 percentage points less
likely to be working than those who miscarried. This effect goes to zero for those with
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high predicted education. However, neither the effects nor their differences are statistically
significant.
Finally, and with a reminder about the caveat regarding the family income data, we
continue to see a small, positive, though not statistically significant, effect of teen births on
family income that is larger in magnitude for higher levels of predicted education. This is
consistent with the negative effect of motherhood on working disappearing for this group.
We continue to find no statistically significant effects of teen motherhood on average
education or 12th grade completion among those married before conception, regardless
of their predicted education levels. This suggests that even those with high predicted
education levels were likely to leave school at the time of marriage.
For those married before conception, teen motherhood had no statistically significant
effect, at any level of predicted education, on the probability of still being in the first
marriage or the probability of remarriage conditional on the first marriage having ended.
While the effect of teen motherhood on parity is large and statistically significant for those
with low predicted education, and those with 12 years of predicted education, the effect is
much smaller (actually negative) and not statistically significant for those with 14 years of
predicted education.
The effect of teen motherhood on the probability of working is stronger for those with
high predicted education. While the magnitude of these effects are quite large (those with
14 years of predicted education are 17 percentage points more likely to be working), they
are not statistically significant.
Finally, we find a positive, though not statistically significant, effect of teen births on
family income for those with high predicted education while negative for those with low
predicted education. These results are consistent with the greater effect of teen motherhood
on working for those with high predicted education. When we condition the regressions on
working, the magnitudes fall.16
16Finally, as a further check that the results are not biased by immigrants who had access to abortion
in their teens, we perform the estimation but excluding Hispanics. Interpretation of the results is generally
unchanged (not shown). Among those who were not married before conception, we see a stronger impact
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In sum, table 3.4 shows that among teens conceiving pre-maritally, teen motherhood
had a strong effect on the educational attainment of those predicted to be on, or above,
the margin of high school completion. However, those with the highest level of predicted
education did not experience any negative effect on future outcomes. Those with lower
levels of predicted education faced a higher risk of never marrying, and also greater mari-
tal stability. Labor market success may have been more difficult for this group, and thus
divorce more costly. Among teens who were married before conception, motherhood had
no effect on educational investments at any level of predicted education. There is sug-
gestive evidence that the positive effect of motherhood on working and family income is
concentrated among those with higher predicted education.
3.4.4 The Consequences of Teen Motherhood Over Time
Conceptions in our sample range from 1940 to 1968, a period of dramatic social change
in the United States. In order to determine how the effect of motherhood changes over
time, we interact a time trend ( − 1960) with , and continue to
allow for the effects of motherhood to vary by whether the teen conceived pre-maritally.
Specifically, we estimate:
 = + + 1+ 2 ∗ (3.3)
+ 3+ 4 ∗ (− 1960)
+ 5 ∗ (− 1960) ∗
+ 6(− 1960) ∗
+ 7(− 1960) + 
of teen motherhood for those predicted to be on the margin of high school completion and those with low
predicted education (and a less strong effect for those with high predicted education) when Hispanics are
excluded.
160
The results are in Table 3.5. The coefficient on  ∗ ( − 1960)
indicates how the effect of a birth changes over time for those not married before con-
ception. This coefficient is only statistically significant when the outcomes are whether
the respondent never married and whether the respondent is still in her first marriage.
However, the coefficients on  and  ∗ (− 1960) are generally
jointly significant in the regressions where the outcomes are education or marital.
The coefficient on ∗ (−1960)∗ indicates
how the differential effect of a birth for those married before conception differs over time.
This coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. However, the coef-
ficients on  and all of the  interactions are jointly significant, except when the
outcomes are educational attainment, remarriage, and Ln(Family Income) (p=.11).
Among those not married before conception, the effect of a teen birth on both measures
of education is less strong over time. However, in 1968 teens who gave birth were still 14
percentage points less likely to complete high school. However, among those who were
married before conception, the effects of a teen birth on both education measures are
stronger over time. While the effect on 12th grade completion is non-existent in 1952, by
1968 teens who give birth are 11 percentage points less likely to complete 12th grade than
those who miscarry (this effect is not statistically significant). Over time, teens who were
married early may have stayed in school due to an increasing return to education. In this
case, a birth would have been more likely to affect their educational investments.
Among those not married before conception, the effects of a teen birth on age at first
marriage are much stronger over time. In 1952, teens who gave birth married .33 years
earlier (not statistically significant). However, by 1968, teens who gave birth married over
a year earlier (statistically significant at the .05 level). As was mentioned in section 3.1,
median age at first marriage began to rise in the mid-1960’s. This is likely responsible for
creating a larger gap in age at first marriage between those who miscarried and those who
entered into shot-gun marriages before giving birth. Those who gave birth also faced a
greater risk of never marrying over time. While the effect was minimal in 1952, by 1968
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those who gave birth were 6 percentage points more likely to never marry than those who
miscarried (p=.019). This is consistent with the evidence presented earlier showing that in
the mid to late 1960’s, the proportion of pre-marital conceptions ending in a pre-outcome
marriage dropped to its lowest point since the five year period starting in 1950.
Among those not married before conception, the effect of a teen birth on whether
the respondent was still in their first marriage was less strong over time. In 1952, those
who gave birth were 25 percentage points more likely to still be in their first marriage
(significant at the .05 level), but by 1968 that effect had disappeared. However, among
those married before conception, the effects of a birth on whether the respondent is still in
her first marriage are invariant to time. The divorce rate did not start to rise dramatically
until the mid-1960’s. If a teen who got pregnant in 1952 divorced in 1970, she would be
much older at the time of her divorce than a teen who got pregnant in 1968 and divorced
in 1970. The prospect of making educational and labor market investments, which had
been forfeited due to a teen birth, may have seemed more daunting at an older age, thus
increasing the probability of staying in the marriage.
The negative effects on remarriage disappear over time for both those married before
conception and those not married before conception. The positive effects of teen moth-
erhood on the probability of working also increase over time. Among those not married
before conception, those conceiving in 1952 and giving birth were 14 percentage points less
likely to be working. However, by 1968 that effect was positive, though not statistically
significant. Among those married before conception, there was no statistically significant
effect of motherhood on the probability of working for those who conceived in 1952. In
1960 those who gave birth were 11 percentage points more likely to be working at the time
of the survey (p=. 04), and those who gave birth in 1968 were 16 percentage points more
likely (p=.06).
Consider the comparison of a married teen who conceived in 1952 and gave birth, to
one who conceived in 1952 and miscarried. When women began joining the labor force in
greater numbers both had spent considerable time out of school and work, likely making a
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return to these activities more costly for those who gave birth and for those who miscarried.
Now consider the comparison of teens who conceived in 1968, but one miscarried while the
other gave birth. By the 1973 or 1976 survey the teen who had given birth would be less
likely to have a child who was younger than school age, since their births were timed earlier.
Since they had not been away from school or work for as long as the teens conceiving in
1952, re-entering the labor force may have been less costly.
The positive effects of teen motherhood on Ln(Family Income) become stronger over
time for both groups, becoming statistically significant in 1968 for those not married before
conception (p=.09) and at the .05 level for those married before conception. This is in part
due to the greater likelihood of working. When an indicator for working is included in
these income regressions, the positive effects of teen motherhood in 1968 fall in magnitude
and are no longer statistically significant at the .05 level (not shown). The point estimates
still remain large, however.
The effects of teen motherhood were most negative for the earlier cohorts of teen moth-
ers. Because of a birth, these women dropped out of school, and by the 1970s had spent
considerable time away from school and the labor force. They were not well-positioned to
join the growing ranks of women entering the labor market starting in the 1970s. While
in later years teen motherhood also caused a reduction in educational attainment, these
women were not affected in a similar way presumably because they had spent less time
away from school and work. Women who had been teen mothers in this later cohort seemed
to experience beneficial labor market outcomes as a result of earlier-timed births. However,
they were also more likely to never marry.
3.4.5 Shotgun Weddings
Were shotgun marriages good or bad for the pregnant teens? We cannot answer this
question quasi-experimentally since we have no arguably exogenous source of variation in
whether the mother marries between conception and birth. Instead we limit the sample
to women who report that their first conception was premarital and ended in a birth and
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compare outcomes for those who report that they married prior to the outcome and those
who do not.17 The results are presented in table 3.6.
The results suggest that those having shotgun marriages obtained slightly more edu-
cation, although the 4 percentage point effect on high school completion falls well short
of statistical significance at conventional levels. If they married, teens who did not have
a shot-gun marriage married over 3 years later than those who had a shotgun marriage.
Those who had shot-gun marriages were not any more likely to still be in their first mar-
riage, or to marry after their first marriage had ended. Teens who had shot-gun marriages
were five percentage points more likely to be working. The family income of those who had
shot-gun marriages is statistically significantly higher than for those who did not. This
effect goes away once we control for whether the respondent is married and working.
In short, it appears to have been better for unwed pregnant teens to marry prior to the
pregnancy outcome. There is no statistically significant change in the positive relationship
between shot-gun marriage and educational attainment over time. In later years, the
relationship between shot-gun marriages and age at first marriage becomes less negative.
The relationship between shot-gun marriages and marriage after the first marriage ends
becomes more negative over time (results not shown).
3.5 Conclusion
We study the consequences of teen motherhood in the 1940’s through the late 1960’s, an
environment dramatically different than that today. During this period, access to abortion
and contraception were limited, many conceptions took place after marriage, and shot-gun
marriages were prevalent. We are also able to provide insight on investment decisions
amidst a changing landscape for women, and the long-term consequences of those decisions
when the environment had become more unrecognizable to these teen mothers.
17We confirm that women are not less likely to report pre-marital conceptions in earlier surveys. Regress-
ing an indicator for whether the woman is married before conception only on the date of conception and
the survey indicators, the coefficients on the survey indicators are not jointly significant. They are also not
significant when we include the usual set of controls. We thus do not worry that pre-marital conceptions
are underestimated.
164
For many teens, the long-run consequences of teen motherhood likely appeared min-
imal. While those who were not married before conception dropped out of school and
married earlier, these effects were likely not considered costly in a period when labor force
participation rates of married mothers were very low. They did face a serious risk of never
marrying, especially in later years.
However, by the 1970s, women were attaching themselves to the labor market with
greater intensity. We see that earlier cohorts of teen mothers were at a disadvantage
because they had dropped out of school and had been away from the labor force for at
least two decades. As a result, they were less likely to be working and more likely to still
be in their first marriage, arguably because the costs of divorce were higher. Later cohorts
of teen mothers were not affected in the same way, presumably because they had spent less
time away from the labor force. There is actually a positive effect of motherhood on labor
force outcomes for later cohorts, perhaps driven by earlier-timed births.
Especially in the later years of our sample, there appear to be minimal adverse conse-
quences of motherhood among the types of teens who got pregnant (excepting those who
never married). This suggests that consistent with more recent data, and as economists
would predict, the teens for whom teen motherhood would be costly avoid pregnancy or
institutions adapt to mitigate any negative long-run effects.
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Birth Miscarriage Birth Miscarriage
Explanatory 
Variables:
Current Age 35.37 34.06* 33.43 33.99
[5.96] [6.33] [6.6] [7.23]
Age at First 
Conception 16.69 16.89** 16.35 16.25
[1.03] [.82] [1.21] [1.36]
Age at First 
Conception<15 0.07 0.01*** 0.14 0.17
[.25] [.12] [.34] [.38]
Hispanic 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.05
[.32] [.25] [.25] [.22]
Black 0.09 0.05** 0.37 0.3*
[.29] [.22] [.48] [.46]
White 0.9 0.95*** 0.61 0.68
[.31] [.22] [.49] [.47]
Protestant 0.75 0.88*** 0.74 0.77
[.44] [.32] [.44] [.42]
Catholic 0.21 0.09*** 0.18 0.14
[.4] [.29] [.39] [.35]
Working Mother 0.45 0.30 0.57 0.65
[.5] [.47] [.49] [.48]
Motherʹs Education 8.93 10.09 9.80 9.10
[3.55] [2.6] [3.49] [3.8]
Lived with both 
parents at 14 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.60
[.47] [.49] [.48] [.49]
Predicted Education 12.13 12.26 12.35 12.38
[.99] [.75] [.99] [1.05]
Survey1973 0.48 0.46 0.41 0.35
[.5] [.5] [.49] [.48]
Survey1976 0.3 0.36 0.3 0.3
[.46] [.48] [.46] [.46]
Survey1982 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.13
[.34] [.31] [.35] [.34]
Survey1988 0.07 0.05 0.1 0.16
[.26] [.22] [.31] [.37]
Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics by Birth Outcome
Not Married Before ConceptionMarried Before Conception
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Birth Miscarriage Birth Miscarriage
Outcome Variables:
Education 9.81 10.04 10.55 10.93*
[2.43] [2.53] [2.22] [2.3]
Education>=12 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.55***
[.46] [.48] [.49] [.5]
Age at First Marriage 16.1 16.27 18.03 18.63*
[1.07] [.98] [3.09] [3.51]
Still in First Marriage 
| Ever Married 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.35**
[.5] [.5] [.5] [.48]
Married | First 
Marriage Over 0.54 0.66 0.41 0.48
[.5] [.48] [.49] [.5]
Never Married 0.08 0.03***
[.27] [.18]
Number of Live Births 3.64 2.85*** 3.47 2.67***
[1.87] [1.69] [1.92] [1.99]
Working 0.49 0.37** 0.5 0.54
[.5] [.48] [.5] [.5]
Family Income 15905.54 14344.27 15865.85 16077.57
[13711.24] [11017.67] [15100.02] [14201.08]
Number of 
Observations 1193 110 3268 179
Note:  Observations are weighted using the sampling weights of the survey.  Standard Deviations are in 
parentheses. The means for ʺLived with both parents at 14ʺ are just calculated over the 1982 and 1988 
surveys, as the variable is not available in the 1973, 1976, and 1995 surveys.  The means for working mother, 
motherʹs education, education, education>=12, age at first marriage, and family income are calculated over 
the non‐missing values. Stars in the second column denote statistically significant differences between 
columns 1 and 2.  Stars in the fourth column denote statistically significant differences between columns 3 
and 4.  The regression samples additionally include individuals for whom it was not possible to determine if 
they were married pre‐conception, and a variable denoting whether there is data on marriage pre‐
conception. 
Table 3.1 continued
Married Before Conception Not Married Before Conception
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Table 3.2:  Predictors of Miscarriage
Dependent Variable: Birth OLS Probit Logit
Age at First Conception ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Age at First Conception<15 ‐0.007 ‐0.007 ‐0.006
(0.023) (0.026) (0.027)
Hispanic 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Black 0.013 0.013 0.016
(0.042) (0.044) (0.046)
White ‐0.018 ‐0.018 ‐0.016
(0.040) (0.042) (0.045)
Protestant ‐0.020 ‐0.018 ‐0.019
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Catholic 0.020 0.022 0.022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Working Mother ‐0.003 ‐0.005 ‐0.003
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Motherʹs Education 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Lived with Both parents at 14 0.014 0.014 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Married Before Conception ‐0.031** ‐0.029** ‐0.029**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Year of Conception ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 4,813 4,813 4,813
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Probit and Logit marginal effects are 
reported.   Dependent variable is an indicator for first pregnancy resulted in a birth, and 
is zero if first pregnancy resulted in a miscarriage. Working Mother refers to whether the 
respondentʹs mother worked either full‐ or part‐time while the respondent was growing 
up.  Motherʹs education refers to the education of the respondentʹs mother.  Indicators for 
whether each of these two variables, as well as married before conception, is not missing 
are also included in the regressions.  The coefficients on the indicators for survey year are 
omitted because they are difficult to interpret given collinearity with the indicators for 
motherʹs education and working mother non‐missing.
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Outcome
Education 0.28**
[0.12]
Education >12 0.04
[0.03]
Age at First Marriage ‐3.34***
[0.17]
In First Marriage 0.02
[0.03]
Married|First Marriage Over ‐0.02
[0.04]
# Live Births 0.09
[0.09]
Working 0.05*
[0.03]
Ln(Family Income) 0.12**
[0.05]
Controls for Survey Year, Date of 
Conception Yes
Standard Controls Yes
Table 3.6:  Effects of Teenage Motherhood: Shot‐Gun Marriages  
Relative to Out‐of‐Wedlock Births
Notes:  Each row presents the coefficient, from separate 
regressions, on an indicator for shot‐gun marriage, on the 
sample of teens giving birth who conceived before marriage.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. The number of observations 
for each outcome variable is listed in parentheses: Education 
(3264), Education≥12 (3264), Age at First Marriage (2837), In 
First Marriage (2837), Married|First Marriage Over (1598), 
Never Married (3268), # Live Births (3268), Working (3267), 
Ln(Family Income) (2997).
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Non‐Restricted Restricted
Birth Birth Birth
Birth*Pred. 
Education Birth
Birth*Pred. 
Education
Educ ‐0.20 ‐0.16 ‐0.40 0.24 ‐0.33 0.22
[0.30] [0.31] [0.43] [0.25] [0.41] [0.25]
Educ ≥12 ‐0.14** ‐0.13* ‐0.20** 0.07 ‐0.19** 0.07
[0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.06] [0.09] [0.06]
Age at First Marriage ‐0.58 ‐0.58 ‐0.87* 0.38 ‐0.78* 0.27
[0.39] [0.39] [0.47] [0.26] [0.44] [0.26]
In First Marriage 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19** ‐0.02 0.19** ‐0.03
[0.06] [0.06] [0.09] [0.06] [0.08] [0.06]
Remarriage ‐0.07 ‐0.07 0.07 ‐0.17** 0.06 ‐0.16**
[0.09] [0.09] [0.11] [0.07] [0.11] [0.07]
Never Married 0.003 0.01 0.04* ‐0.04* 0.03 ‐0.04*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
# Live Births 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.0005 0.54** 0.01
[0.16] [0.16] [0.22] [0.14] [0.25] [0.18]
Ln(Family
Income) 0.28** 0.28** 0.43** ‐0.17 0.43** ‐0.16
[0.14] [0.14] [0.18] [0.11] [0.17] [0.13]
Working ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.04 0.04 ‐0.03 0.04
[0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] [0.06]
Observations 1137 1116
Appendix Table 3.1 Bias from Excluding Never Married Women Not Living With Their Own 
Children
Non‐Restricted Restricted
Heterogeneity by Predicted EducationNo Heterogeneity
Notes: The first column of results show the coefficient on Birth when each outcome variable is 
regressed on the controls listed in the paper, and the sample is limited to the 1982, 1988, and 
1995 surveys. The second column shows the same coefficient, but excludes never married 
women who were not living with their own children (this mimics the restriction in the 1973 and 
1976 surveys). The third and fourth columns show the coefficients on Birth and Birth*Predicted 
Education when each outcome variable is regressed on these variables and the controls listed in 
the text, and limited to those surveyed in 1982, 1988, and 1995. The fifth and sixth columns show 
the same coefficients when the sample also excludes never married women not living with their 
own children. Predicted education is calculated using the relevant sample in each case. The 
differences on the right side of the table are somewhat larger because excluding these women 
has a larger effect on the sample used to estimate predicted education. Sample sizes are as 
shown, except when the dependent variables are age at first marriage (excludes never married), 
in first marriage (excludes never married), remarriage (excludes never married and those still in 
first marriage), and Ln(Family Income), for which some values are missing. 
1137 1116
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